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1.  Statement of the Problem.  Just war theory’s account of jus in bello is deficient.  
Michael Walzer, the prime representative of the prevailing view in the United 
States, restricts jus in bello to combat, war-fighting, then constructs a theory of 
responsibility and presents a set of principles that guide action when fighting: the 
principles of combatant/noncombatant distinction, proportionality, double effect 
and double intent, as well as the principle of due care/due risk—all of which arise 
amid the tension between winning and fighting well.   
2. Procedures and methods.  This study establishes and describes the gap in the 
prevailing view’s treatment of jus in bello, then investigates alternative ways to 
fill that gap. Throughout, the study combines elements of moral philosophy, 
political philosophy, and strategic studies with historical and contemporary case 
illustrations of war. 
3. Results.  This study finds that the prevailing view is necessary but insufficient; it 
omits jus in bello’s strategic, war-waging dimension which involves a tri-partite 
tension:  (a) setting war aims and making strategy, policy, and campaign decisions 
that increase the probability of being right, or at least less wrong than those one is 
fighting; (b) translating those decisions into action to achieve war aims at the least 
cost, in lives and resources, and least risk to one’s political community and 
adapting aims, strategies, policies, and campaigns to the changing realities of war 
as they unfold; and (c)  doing all of the foregoing while observing the war 
convention, sustaining the war’s legitimacy in the eyes of the political 
community, and  maintaining proper subordination of the military to civilian 
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leadership. In the end, waging war is about using and risking lives: lives of the 
citizens-who-become-soldiers, lives of the innocent, and the life of the political 
community.  The study finds that war-waging dimension of jus in bello is 
governed by five principles which arise from the above tension:  the principles of 
continuous dialogue, final decision authority, managerial competency, war 
legitimacy, and resignation. 
4. Conclusions. This study concludes that a complete account of justice in the 
conduct of war, jus in bello, must include both its war-fighting and war-waging 
dimensions.   
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    Some of the ideas in this dissertation came from my 37 years of experience in the U.S. 
Army where I rose to the rank of lieutenant general.  I was an infantryman, a paratrooper, 
and a ranger. I had the privilege of commanding soldiers in a variety of units, some in 
active operational environments—Haiti, as a colonel; Bosnia, as a brigadier general; and 
Iraq, as a lieutenant general.   Each assignment caused me to delve deeper into the moral 
dimension of using force.  I was also fortunate to have received a Masters of Arts degree 
in Philosophy from Johns Hopkins before teaching ethics and just war theory at West 
Point and the theory and application of military force at the Army’s School of Advanced 
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dimension in more detail.  Throughout my career, I have had great senior commanders, 
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the ideas in this dissertation. 
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officers, and former governmental officials, whose comments also helped me better form 
my arguments and ideas.  Any faults in this dissertation, however, are mine alone.   
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and their families.  If this dissertation can help increase the probability that their 
sacrifices will be made on behalf of better thought out aims, strategies, policies, and 
campaign, then I will have done my duty to them.  The second is found in my wife, 
Sharon Basso, whose encouragement and support gave me the time and space necessary 
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    In 2011, America began its second decade at war, finding out once again that war is 
one of the most complex and, in many ways, most inscrutable of human activities.  In 
conducting the wars in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and against Al Qaeda and their affiliates, the 
United States also relearned that war is a multi-dimensional phenomenon involving 
matters of the human heart, the variety of communities that humans form, and the 
multiple ways these communities interact.  Americans have relearned too that the moral 
dimension of war is as much part of war’s essence as are its other dimensions, for war 
involves life and death.  Governments who conduct war necessarily use the lives of their 
citizens and risk the lives of innocents and sometimes even the life of their political 
community.  Those who use and risk lives in war include both the soldiers and combat 
leaders on the battlefield and the senior political and military officials who send them 
there.  Both, therefore, have jus in bello responsibilities; battlefield responsibilities are 
just more direct and apparent than are the others. 
    The American dialogue about its post 9/11 wars reflects war’s complexity.  Some of 
this dialogue is technical, part of America’s continual fascination with machines and 
technology; some has been strategic, wondering about America’s role in the world; and 
some socio-political, questioning the kind of community America is or ought to be. Some 
of the dialogue has resurrected the language and logic of just war theory, that portion of 
philosophy responsible to study war from its moral perspective.  Perennial questions have 
arisen:  “Are these wars justified?”—concerns of jus ad bellum; “Have we conducted 
these wars justly?”—matters of jus in bello; and “Are we ending these wars justly?”—
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issues of jus post bellum.  These are certainly important questions that deserve continued 
attention.  Answers to these questions will emerge over time, and the arguments that 
precede the answers will contribute to a deeper understanding of war from the moral 
perspective. 
    At various times, the public dialogue in the United States concerning conducting its 
wars has focused on the Abu Ghraib prison abuses, rendition and secret prisons, 
interrogation techniques and torture, the difficulties in distinguishing combatants from 
noncombatants, crimes committed by U.S. combatants, rules of engagement applied in 
combat, and collateral damage caused by drones and other area-effects weapons.  A 
discussion of behavior in combat requires an understanding the principles governing jus 
in bello.   This is an important understanding, especially now, for the tools of war are 
changing, as are its methods.  Moral philosophers have an important role in this time of 
change. 1
   This study intends to contribute to the understanding of jus in bello.  In fact, the intent 
is to narrow the focus to only one aspect of one jus in bello issue:  war-waging 
responsibility.  This study will build upon the continuing influential work done by 
Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars and other of his writings on war.
 
2
                                                 
1 Three of the more useful works concerning the changes in the tools and conduct of war are these:  Rupert 
Smith, The Utility of Force:  The Art of War in the Modern World (London:  Penguin Books, 2006); David 
Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains:  The Coming of Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2013); and General Gordon Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik, Envisioning Future 
Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1995) 
  As Brian 
Orend points out in The Morality of War, “Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars of 
1977 remains the breakthrough work of that decade, directly inspired by Vietnam.  It is 
not much of an exaggeration to say that this work has been to current just war theory 
2 Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars (New York:  Basic Books, 1977). 
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what Grotius’ The Law of War and Peace was to prior centuries.”3  Walzer’s initial 
motivation to delve into just war theory was political activism, not moral philosophy.  He 
thought that, even though there was a rich tradition in just war theory, Americans in the 
1960s and 1970s were insufficiently prepared to understand and use it because of “an 
education which taught…[that morality] had no proper descriptive use and no objective 
meaning.”4  So, Walzer set out to show that there is a structure—a language, and a 
logic—to the ways citizens, soldiers, and political leaders talk about war’s moral 
dimension.  This structure, Walzer demonstrates, is evident in the ways those responsible 
for the conduct of war justify and explain their actions and the ways those judging their 
conduct argue.5  The structure of Walzer’s theory provides a way to argue against both 
the “pacifist,” for whom force is never justified, and the “holy warrior” or “ultra realist,” 
for whom force is almost always justified—a way, in other words, to discuss, scrutinize, 
and critique the middle ground in which real life is conducted.6
    This study will use Walzer as a reflection of the prevailing American view of just war 
theory.  The study will not provide a history of just war theory, for Just and Unjust Wars 
  The power and success 
of Walzer’s project has made his work today’s prevailing view on just war theory, at least 
in the United States.  Walzer is a much-in-demand speaker on the topic of justice in war, 
and Just and Unjust Wars has been used in America’s military academies and 
professional military education programs as well as in many colleges, universities, and 
national security programs.   
                                                 
3 Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Ontario, Canada:  Broadview Press, 2006), p. 24. 
4 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. xi. 
5 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. xii-xiii. 
6 Micahel Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven, Connecticut:  Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 3-22. 
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attempts to recapture and update that history.7
    Walzer’s view of jus in bello—the area to which this study is limited—has several 
components.  First, it is grounded upon individual rights (life and liberty) and the 
communal manifestation of these rights (political sovereignty and territorial integrity) 
which give rise to an essential jus in bello tension: the tension between winning and 
fighting well.  Second, it presents a set of principles that guide, or should guide, just 
conduct in war.  Finally, it prescribes the responsibilities of those conducting war—
soldiers, their officers, and political leaders.   
  Rather, this study will describe a gap in 
Walzer’s treatment of jus in bello.  Then it will suggest ways to fill that gap. 
    The gap in Walzer’s view of jus in bello results from overly restricting the conduct of 
war to fighting.  Fighting, what happens in combat and as a result of combat, is the most 
visible aspect of war’s conduct.  Fighting is certainly the subject of most media reporting 
and the subject that comes to anyone’s mind first when asked, “What is war?”  The 
conduct of war, however, involves more than fighting.  Fighting a war concerns the 
tactical dimension of war’s conduct; waging a war concerns the conduct of war’s 
strategic dimension. 
    Fighting takes place within the context of political and military strategy.  In fact, 
individual battles, engagements, and campaigns gain their meaning only relative to the 
military objectives and the political war aims that they help to achieve.  War aims, 
strategies, and the policies necessary to execute strategies, are devised and promulgated 
by senior political and military leaders.  Further, strategies and policies must be translated 
                                                 
7 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. xiv. 
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into action.  This translation occurs both through the military chain of command and 
through the machinery of civil and military bureaucracies.   
    Although these strategic aspects of conducting war—deciding upon war aims, 
strategies, policies, and military campaigns, translating those decisions into action, and 
adapting as the war unfolds—have a direct effect on how a war is fought, how long a war 
lasts, and whether the lives used and risked in that war are used well and risked 
appropriately, they are absent from Walzer’s account of jus in bello.  Chapter 1 of this 
study will summarize Walzer’s view concerning jus in bello and demonstrate that, while 
necessary, it is insufficient as a full description of the entirety of jus in bello because it is 
limited to the tactical dimension of the conduct of war, war fighting. 
    Chapter 2 will describe the details of the strategic, war-waging, dimension of jus in 
bello and demonstrate that this dimension is related to the same rights used in the 
dominant view.  The chapter will also present the initial description of the central tension 
inherent in waging war as tripartite:  (1) set and achieve war aims and make strategy, 
policy, and campaign decisions that increase the probability of being right, or at least less 
wrong than those one is fighting; (2) translate those aims and decisions into action to 
achieve war aims at the least cost, in lives and resources, and least risk to one’s political 
community then adapt decisions and actions as the war unfolds; and, (3) do all of the 
foregoing while observing the war convention and maintaining legitimacy, public support 
of the war effort.  Later chapters will complete this initial description, with the final 
description of the tri-partite tension presented in chapter 5.  Last, chapter 2 will 
demonstrate that the gap in Walzer’s view of jus in bello requires its own set of guiding 
principles and theory of responsibility. 
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    Chapters 3 and 4 will investigate two prominent theories that could be used to fill the 
identified gap and provide the basis for a war-waging theory of responsibility.  Chapter 3 
looks at a principal-agent theory of civil-military relations as expressed primarily in Peter 
Feaver’s Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations.8  This theory 
highlights important aspects of how the civil and military bureaucracies of the U.S. 
defense establishment and their senior leaders interact with one another.  Specifically, 
Feaver hopes to answer this question:  How do civilians control the military?9
    Chapter 4 uses Eliot Cohen’s unequal dialogue from Supreme Command: Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime to continue the analysis of the strategic dimension 
of war’s conduct and search for a way to fill the gap in Walzer’s account of jus in bello.
  
Ultimately, this study will find that Feaver’s approach cannot provide an adequate 
foundation for jus in bello’s war-waging responsibilities of senior political and military 
leaders.   His approach, however, will be found useful for two reasons.  First, it will 
require, at least in the case of the United States, that the third element of the tri-partite 
tension be changed to read:  “do all of the foregoing while observing the war convention; 
maintaining legitimacy, public support of the war effort; and while maintaining civil 
control of the military.”  Second, it illuminates one aspect of what it takes to make the 
civil and military bureaucracy work in the conduct of a war, compliance, a subject taken 
up in Chapter 5. 
10
                                                 
8 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 2003) 
  
Cohen highlights the necessity of a robust dialogue between senior political and military 
leaders, necessary because war cannot be waged properly without such a dialogue.  This 
9 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants, ibid., p. 1. 
10 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command:  Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: 
Anchor Bookis, 2001) 
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study will find that Cohen’s approach is consistent with Walzer’s rights-based theory; 
provides an adequate account of how senior leaders set and achieve war aims by making 
strategy, policy, and military campaign decisions that increase the probability of being 
right, or at least less wrong than those one is fighting; and insists upon observing the war 
convention and maintaining civil control of the military.  Thus, Cohen’s approach 
provides much of what is necessary to fill the identified gap and provide the basis for a 
theory of responsibility, but not all.   
    His approach will be found incomplete for three reasons.  First, his description of the 
“unequal dialogue” does not capture the full extent of the sets of dialogues that must be 
conducted to wage war.  Second, his discussion is incomplete in its treatment of the 
conditions necessary for the dialogue he describes to work.  Last, he does not discuss 
how decisions that result from the dialogue get translated into action—an important war-
waging responsibility. 
    Chapter 5 of this study addresses these shortcomings, analyzing the necessary 
conditions for the kind of dialogues necessary to wage war and discussing how decisions 
and actions are converted into action.  Chapter 5 suggests that the set of near-continuous 
dialogues actually form a performance-oriented decision-and-execution regime rather 
than a single dialogue, and that such a regime is what is necessary to wage war.  A 
dialogue-execution regime is necessary both prior to the initial decisions concerning war 
aims, strategies, policies, and military campaigns as well as through the war so to adapt to 
the dynamic nature of war.  Once begun, war is a continuous political-military activity 
that requires an equally continuous civil-military dialogue-execution regime, not a 
discrete dialogue in which military leaders provide episodic “advice” or “input.”  
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Episodic “advice” or “input” also conveys an overly role differentiated separateness to a 
dialogue-and-execution regime that, in its optimal form, is inherently both civil and 
military. 
    Chapter 6, the final chapter, completes the discussion of waging-war responsibilities, 
the strategic dimension of jus in bello, that Walzer omits.  It will present five principles—
the principles of continuous dialogue, final decision authority, managerial competency, 
legitimacy, and resignation—as those that govern jus in bello’s war-waging activities.  
The chapter will go on to describe jus in bello responsibilities of senior political and 
military leaders as positional responsibilities and present a rationale for the moral 
grounding of these responsibilities. Chapter 6 will also describe the sources and purposes 
of the five war-waging principles that govern the strategic dimension of jus in bello. 
    In the end, this study hopes to continue Walzer’s work and thus contribute to 
describing a more complete just war theory.  Throughout, the study will use historical and 
contemporary illustrations to clarify and explain the ideas it presents:  first about the gap 
in Walzer’s jus in bello theory, then about how to fill that gap with an adequate account 
of war-waging responsibilities.      
    Just war theory is a theory of practical morality applied in the most complex of human 
activities.  War is the realm of ambiguity, whether for soldiers and their military leaders 
who are fighting it or the senior political and military leaders waging it. Decisions and 
action, again whether tactical or strategic, are often taken under conditions of near-
extreme uncertainty.  Those responsible to decide and act—from soldiers and their 
immediate military leaders to senior generals and political officials—often do not have 
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the luxury of time or anything close to “complete” information or understanding.  Under 
fire, soldiers sometimes stare at their sergeants and lieutenants for what seems eternal 
seconds awaiting orders.  The battlefield rarely provides the time to get more 
information, to reflect a bit longer, or to understand more completely.   For a different set 
of reasons, time is often not on the side of senior political leaders and generals either.  
Nor do these senior leaders have the information they would like to have before making 
important and consequential decisions.  Mistakes, misjudgments, misunderstanding are 
rife at both the tactical and strategic levels.  In every war, learning takes place at both the 
tactical and strategic levels.  Any practical morality, and certainly a theory of 
responsibility designed to explain and guide the conduct of war—whether war-fighting or 
war-waging—must take into consideration these actual conditions in which moral agents 
decide and act.  Equally certain, however, is this:  the difficulty of conditions may 
mitigate responsibility, but they do not erase it.   
    Moral philosophers have the luxury of time, and they have the luxury of not being 
responsible for deciding and acting under conditions of extreme ambiguity and with lives 
at stake.  This study intends to take advantage of those luxuries to help those responsible 
for waging war as well as those responsible to evaluate war-waging decisions and 
actions. 
    American citizens expect their leaders to account for their decisions and actions.  
American leaders, political and military, understand this.  Explanation and justification—
whether before the media, in front of a Congressional committee, at a memorial service 
with the family of a veteran killed in combat, or among those with whom one just 
fought—goes with the territory of leadership.  Walzer’s war-fighting principles provide 
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the means to explain, justify, judge, and assign moral praise or blame at jus in bello’s 
tactical level; the principles presented in chapter 6 provide similar services at jus in 
bello’s strategic level.  Together, they form a more complete account of the conduct of 





Walzer and the Prevailing View of Jus In Bello 
 
 
    This chapter summarizes Walzer’s view concerning jus in bello.  The chapter then 
argues that, while necessary, Walzer’s view is insufficient as a full description of the 
entirety of jus in bello because it is limited to the tactical dimension of the conduct of 
war, war fighting.  In limiting the scope of jus in bello to combat, this chapter 
demonstrates, Walzer’s account omits other morally relevant aspects inherent in the 
conduct of war.   
    “The rules of war,” says Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars, “consist of two 
clusters of prohibitions attached to the central principle that soldiers have an equal right 
to kill.  The first cluster specifies when and how they can kill, the second whom they can 
kill.”11  Applying these rules in battle make war distinguishable from mere atrocity, 
murder and massacre.  Soldiers, and other combatants for that matter, remain moral 
agents even in combat.  In fact, Walzer correctly points out that “professional soldiers 
remain sensitive (or some of them do) to those limits and restraints that distinguish their 
life’s work from mere butchery….That is why…officers…will often protest 
commands…that would require them to violate the rules of war and turn them into mere 
instruments for killing.”12
                                                 
11 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. 41.  Once can see a similar approach contained in “Part 
Three:  Issues of Fighting” in Nicholas Fotion and Gerard Elfstrom’s Military Ethics:  Guidelines for Peace 
and War (Boston, Massachusetts:  Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1986), pp.135-211; as well as “Chapter 4: Jus 
in Bello #1, Just Conduct in War” in Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op.cit., pp.105-139. 
 
12 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 45. 
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    For Walzer, the central moral tension in jus in bello is between winning and fighting 
well—where “winning” is defined as achieving the military objective and “fighting well” 
is as applying a set of limitations placed on soldiers and their leaders who otherwise 
might justify doing anything that they believe is necessary to win.  These limitations, 
which Walzer calls the War Convention, are a “set of articulated norms, customs, 
professional codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and reciprocal 
arrangements that shape our judgments” for military conduct in war.13
 
   
The Principles of and Inherent Tension in Jus in Bello. 
    Walzer uses the following five principles to describe just behavior on the battlefield: 
1.  The principle of non-combatant immunity.  This is the War Convention’s first  
principle.  Simply put, “once war has begun, soldiers,” unless they are wounded or 
captured, “are subject to attack at any time.”14
                                                 
13 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 44.  See also, Geoffrey S. Corn, et. al., The Law of 
Armed Conflict:  An Operational Approach (New York:  Wolters Kluwer, Law and Business, 2012), pp. 
107-413. 
  Civilians, non-combatants, on the other 
hand, are not subject to attack.  The Law of Armed Conflict is also clear about this 
fundamental principle, “Combatants and civilians are the most widely recognized terms 
for describing the actors on the battlefield, establishing their legal status, and for 
providing guidance to the soldier as to who may be lawfully targeted in armed conflict, or 
14 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid. p. 138. 
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detained on the battlefield until the threat to the force is ended or the enemy has been 
defeated.”15
    Even this fundamental combatant/noncombatant distinction is muddied immediately.  
Some combatants are legal; other, illegal.  Some civilians lose, under specific 
circumstances, their immunity from attack; others do not.
  Few things in war are absolute or universally clear, however.   
16
2. The principle of double effect and double intent.  “Double effect is a way of  
  The next three principles are 
designed to help guide decision and action in these morally muddy waters. 
reconciling the absolute prohibition against attacking civilians with the legitimate 
conduct of military activity.”17  The principle tells soldiers and their leaders that an act of 
war is permitted even if it is likely to kill non-combatants, provided four conditions hold:  
“(a) The act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means…that it is a legitimate 
act of war. (b) The direct effect is morally acceptable—the destruction of military 
supplies…or killing of enemy soldiers. (c) The intention of the actor is good, that is, he 
aims only at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means 
to his ends, and aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting cost to 
himself. (d) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil 
effect.”18
3. The principle of proportionality.  Proportionality, with respect to jus in bello,  
  The ambiguity inherent in this principle gives rise to the next two. 
                                                 
15 Goeffry S. Corn, et. al., The Law of Armed Conflict, op.cit., p133. 
16 Goeffry S. Corn, et.al.,The Law of Armed Conflict, ibid., pp. 133-138 and 143-145; Michael Walzer, Just 
and Unjust Wars, op.cit., pp. 146, 150-151; Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op.cit., pp. 112-15. 
17  Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 153.  Brian Orend, The Morality of War, ibid., pp. 115-
19. 
18  Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 153, 155. Goeffry S. Corn, et.al., The Law of Armed 
Conflict, op.cit., pp. 152-52 and 161- 86. 
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“mandates that soldiers deploy only proportionate force against legitimate targets.”19 
Walzer acknowledges that proportionality “turns out to be a hard criterion to apply, for 
there is no ready way to establish an independent or stable view of the values against 
which the destruction of war is to be measured.”20
4. The principle of due care and due risk.  Soldiers may lose their right to life with  
  The central idea of prohibiting 
excessive harm, purposeless violence, and wanton destruction, however, demands that a 
principle of proportionality be included in the war convention. 
respect to the enemy, but not with respect to their own leaders.21  Soldiers do not want to 
be led by those who do not value their lives.22  In the end, however, Walzer says, “if 
saving civilian lives means risking soldier’s lives, the risk must be accepted….War 
necessarily places civilians in danger; that is another aspect of its hellishness.  We can 
only ask soldiers to minimize the dangers they impose….Exactly how far they must 
go…is hard to say….In fact, the degree of risk that is permissible is going to vary with 
the nature of the target, the urgency of the moment, the available technology, and so on.  
It is best…to say simply that civilians have a right that due care be taken.”23
5. The principle of supreme emergency.  The limitations inherent in the war  
 
                                                 
19 Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op.cit., p. 118; Goeffry S. Corn, et.al., The Law of Armed Conflict, 
ibid., pp. 187-89. 
20 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. 129; Goeffry S. Corn, et.al., The Law of Armed 
Conflict, ibid., p. 191. 
21 James M. Dubik, “Human Rights, Command Responsibility, and Walzer’s Just War Theory,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, Fall 1982, Volume 11, Number 4., especially pp. 363-64; Brian Orend, The Morality of 
War, op.cit., pp. 133-36. 
22 Michael Walzxer, Arguing About War, op.cit., pp. 23-25. 
23 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. 156; Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op.cit., p. 116. 
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convention, while not absolute, cannot be easily overridden.24  According to Walzer, 
appeals to “supreme emergency” as justification for actions necessity on the battlefield 
are, in reality, often merely appeals to expediency.   “Individuals,” Walzer says, “cannot 
kill other individuals [i.e. the innocent] to save themselves, but to save a nation we can 
violate the rights of a determinate but smaller number of people.”25
    Imminence and nature of a threat, together, determine whether a supreme emergency 
exists. “The two criteria must both be applied.  Neither one by itself is sufficient as an 
account of extremity.”
  Only in rare cases, 
which Walzer calls “supreme emergency,” can the principles of the war convention be set 
aside, and then only temporarily and by the political leaders representing proper 
authorities.   
26  The imminent threat must be to a political community, not an 
individual, and be posed by “evil objectified in the world,” a threat—and Walzer uses 
Nazism as his example—to “everything decent in our lives, an ideology and practice of 
domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the 
consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably 
awful.”27
    The principles of the war convention do not resolve the tension between winning and 
fighting well.  That tension is never resolved.  Rather, the war convention reveals a 
   Supreme emergency, however, is a conditional situation.  Once either of the 
conditions no longer obtains, the supreme emergency is over, and the “routine” principles 
of the war convention once again apply. 
                                                 
24 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 231-32. 
25 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid. p. 254. 
26 Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid. p. 252. 
27 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 253. 
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fundamental characteristic of jus in bello: in combat, soldiers and their leaders are 
between a rock and a hard place.   
    This tension exists, according to Walzer, because soldiers lose their right to life 
“simply by fighting.”28  Civilian non-combatants, the innocent, do not.  This is a matter 
of class legislation.29  It is the enterprise of a soldier’s class that radically distinguishes 
the individual soldier from the civilians he leaves behind.30  A soldier is made into a 
“dangerous man….The actual risks he lives with may be reduced or heightened:  here the 
notions of military necessity, and also of kindness and magnanimity, have free play.  But 
the risks can be raised to their highest pitch without violating his rights.”31  Civilian non-
combatants, on the other hand, are innocent.  They are not trained and prepared for 
fighting; they are not fighting or cannot fight.32  We call them innocent because “they 
have done nothing, and are doing nothing, that entails the loss of their rights.”33
    Walzer is quick to point out that neither the loss nor the retention of the right to life is 
absolute.  Captured or wounded soldiers receive benevolent quarantine from their 
enemies.
 
34  Soldiers regain their right to life once they are removed from the class of 
“dangerous men.”  Similarly, some civilian non-combatants may be attacked—those that 
are partially assimilated into the class of soldiers because they are working directly for 
the war effort making what soldiers need to fight.35
                                                 
28 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 136 
  Direct support of the war effort 
cannot be inferred from merely living in an enemy’s territory, nor can it be derived from 
29 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 42, 138, 140, and 144. 
30 Michel Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 144. 
31 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 145. 
32 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 43. 
33 Michel Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 146. 
34 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 46; see also Goeffry S. Corn, et.al., The Law of Armed 
Conflict, op.cit., pp. 244-46 and 328-354. 
35 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 145-46. 
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work producing what soldiers need to live.   In sum, “when it is militarily necessary, 
workers in a tank factory can be attacked and killed, but not workers in a food processing 
plant.”36  Further, these workers can “only be attacked in their factory (not in their 
homes), when they are actually engaged in activities threatening and harmful to their 
enemies….because they are not armed men, ready to fight.”37
   Though the line between combatants and noncombatants is a fine one, drawn under 
pressure, and observed under conditions of ambiguity and duress, it remains plausible 
because it can be observed and is necessary to restrict the damage of war.  Such is moral 
life between the rock and the hard place. 
 
   The current discussion over using drones exhibits both the enduring use of the war 
convention and the tension inherent in it:  Is the attack being considered aimed at a 
legitimate target, making the attack a legitimate act of war?  Is the direct effect (killing or 
destruction) morally acceptable?  Is the strike aimed only at the acceptable effect?  Does 
the strike use the evil effect (the death of noncombatants) as one of its means?  How is 
the evil effect minimized?  Does the good done outweigh the evil effect?  Is the means 
used proportional to the target and circumstances?  Are the noncombatants who may be 
killed or injured given “due care?”  Have the combatants assumed “due risk?” 
   The war convention does not provide answers to these questions; it merely provides the 
boundaries within which decisions have to be made and action taken.  Some of the 
ambiguity concerning the use of drones results from whether the fight against Al Qaeda is 
a war, a “souped-up” police action against international criminals, or something in 
                                                 
36 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 146. 
37 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 146. 
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between?  How one answers this fundamental question matters as to the body of legal and 
moral precepts applicable to operations against Al Qaeda:  which are legitimate targets, 
what is the level of force that can legitimately be applied against these targets, are Al 
Qaeda operatives combatants or criminals, or which operational rules apply?38
                                                 
38 Tony Pfaff, “Military Ethics in Complex Contingencies, “ in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 
editors, The Future of the Army Profession (New York:  McGraw Hill custom Publishing, 2005), pp. 409-
428. Among the many books and articles discussing the use of drones and the issues—legal, moral, and 
prudential—are are the following: Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture:  The War on Terror and the Soul of 
the Obama Presidency (New York:  Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012); David El Sanger:  Confront and 
Conceal:  Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York:  Crown Publishers, 
2012);  Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work” and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail,” both in 
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, pp. 33-54; Jonathan Masters, “Targeted Killings” Council on Foreign 
Relations, 
  Though 
we have been fighting Al Qaeda for over a decade, few of these fundamental issues have 
been resolved—legally, morally, or diplomatically.  Those fighting Al Qaeda have been 
treading new ground, whether that ground is new because it involved a war against a non-
nation state or because it is a police action that spans the globe.  In neither case is this 
“war” governed by a set of sufficiently settled laws and conventions. 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627;  Jo Becker and Scott Shane, 
“Secret Kill List Proves Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” New York Times, May, 29, 2012;  David 
Kretzmer, “Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists:  Extra-judicial Executions or Legitimate means of 
Defence?” The European Journal of International Law, volume 16, number2, 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/KretzmerTargetedKillings.pdf 
Department of Justice White Paper:  Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen 
Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qaeda or an Associated Force, leaked to NBC News and 
available at:  http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf;  Speech 
by Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, Department of State, March 25, 2010, available at: 





    The war convention holds that soldiers on the battlefield are neither permitted to do 
whatever they deem necessary to win, nor are they absolutely prohibited from harming 
civilian non-combatants. The moral tension within this space is theirs to deal with.  
Walzer sums it up this way in Just and Unjust Wars:  “I have tried to argue…that some 
degree of care be taken not to harm civilians—which means, very simply, that we 
recognize their rights as best we can within the context of war.  But what degree of care 
should be taken?  And at what cost to the individual soldiers who are involved?  The laws 
of war say nothing about such matters; they leave the cruelest decisions to be made by the 
men on the spot with reference only to their ordinary moral notions, or the military 
traditions of the army in which they serve.”39  Brian Orend, in The Morality of War, 
agrees that “the common sense of the abstract need for balance and moderation is clearly 
there, but it remains very difficult to define precisely, especially under battlefield 
conditions.”40
  Soldiers in combat sometimes must choose between “morally abominable courses of 
action.”
 
41  The fact of the matter is that an act in war may be both morally permissible, 
even morally necessary, yet also be morally abhorrent.  This is part of the moral horror of 
war from which those who wage it cannot escape.  J. Glenn Gray calls this the “ache of 
guilt,” resulting from the fact that “men who in private life are scrupulous about 
conventional justice and right are able to destroy the lives and happiness of other in war 
without compunction.”42
                                                 
39 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. 152. 
  We may want the world to be otherwise, and work to make it 
40 Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op.cit., p. 119. 
41 Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre,” in Marshall Cohen, et.al., editors, War and Moral Responsibility 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 23. 




otherwise, Thomas Nagel observes in “War and Massacre,” but “it is naïve to suppose 
that there is a solution to every moral problem.”43  The moral tension inherent in jus in 
bello is merely one manifestation of Aristotle’s insight that “precision cannot be expected 
in the treatment of all subjects alike….Our discussion of ethics and morality will be 
adequate, if it achieves clarity within the limits of the subject matter.”44
 
 
Theory of Responsibility. 
    With the foundation for his approach to jus in bello laid, the inherent tension presented, 
and the principles described as accurately as possible, Walzer then structures an 
associated theory of wartime responsibility.  The “assignment of responsibility,” he 
points out, “is the critical test for the argument for justice.”45  There can be no justice in 
war if there are no responsible men and women.  Walzer is not concerned with legal guilt, 
but with moral blameworthiness of individuals for their decisions and actions.46
    In general, Walzer holds that political leaders have jus ad bellum responsibilities; 
soldiers and their military leaders have jus in bello responsibilities.  The Law of Armed 
Conflict echoes this distinction by saying, “using force against another State or sovereign 
is a significant decision and one that requires the leader of a nation to carefully weigh 
many important factors,” whereas military commanders make “sure his force effectively 
execute military operations…in a manner that fully complies with the Law of Armed 
   
                                                 
43 Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre,” op.cit.,  pp. 23-4. 
44 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Martin Ostwald translator (Indianapolis, Indiana:  The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1962), p. 5. 
45Michael Waler, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit. p. 287. 




    Walzer’s account of soldier responsibility is the most complete and straight-forward.  
Soldiers are not responsible for the war itself, but for their conduct in war, for what they 
do.
  Walzer addresses four categories of jus in bello responsibility:  soldiers, 
officers, generals, and political leaders.   
48
    The first category of jus in bello responsibility concerns soldiers.  Walzer recognizes 
that the moral dimension of a soldier’s life is complicated at the point of battle, but he 
believes that the jus in bello norms he adduces—the combatant/noncombatant distinction; 
principles of proportionality, double effect, double intent, and due care/due risk; and the 
limited nature of supreme emergency—form a suitable moral framework that addresses 
the tension between winning and fighting well at the individual soldier level.
  His treatment of officer responsibility is also relatively complete, but as subsequent 
analysis will show, Walzer’s account falls short with respect to an officer’s responsibility 
to the soldiers under his care.  The detailed analysis that follows will also show that his 
account of a general’s responsibility is deficient, as is his treatment of jus in bello 
responsibilities of political leaders.  Each category is taken up in turn. 
49  These 
rules provide sufficient guidance in that space between utility and necessity, which may 
justify “too much” killing, and the rights of the innocent, which may tend toward 
“absolute prohibitions” against any killing.50
                                                 
47 Goeffry S. Corn, et. al., The Law of Armed Conflict, op.cit., pp. 2 and 527. 
  The rules also demonstrate that soldiers are 
48 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., pp. 38 and 40. 
49 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 34-47 and 127-159. 
50 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 226-7 and 304. 
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not mere instruments, killing machines, or automatons; rather, while they serve in war, 
perhaps the most morally ambiguous of human activities, they remain moral agents.51
    Rights form the moral foundation of the principles governing jus in bello; they also 
play an important role in understanding the soldier’s responsibility in war.  “Individual 
rights (to life and liberty),”  Walzer says, “underlie the most important judgments that we 
make about war….It is enough to say that they are somehow entailed by our sense of 
what it means to be a human being.  If they are not natural, then we have invented them, 
but natural or invented, they are a palpable feature of our moral world.”
  
52  Walzer 
acknowledges, however, that taking another’s life in war is, under specific circumstances, 
justified.  Therefore, his understanding of the right to life is neither absolute, nor merely 
the result of arbitrary conventions or utility, for then justifying taking another’s life in 
war would be too easy.   So Walzer calls these rights “something like absolute” and 
claims that civilian non-combatants retain their right to life; soldiers do not.53  “Simply 
by fighting,” Walzer claims, “whatever their private hopes and intentions, they [soldiers] 
have lost their title to life and liberty….everyone else retains his rights.”54  The war 
convention rests on a certain view of noncombatants, which holds that they are men and 
women with rights and that they cannot be used for some military purpose, even if it is a 
legitimate purpose.”55
                                                 
51 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 306. 
  Walzer understands that war necessarily places civilians in 
danger; that is another aspect of its hellishness.  The principles of the War Convention 
52 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 54. 
53 Elsewhere I have a more complete analysis of Walzer’s use of rights in his just war theory.  See:  James 
M. Dubik, “Human Rights, Command Responsibility, and Walzer’s Just War Theory, op,cit., pp.354-71. 
54 Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. 136. 
55 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 137. 
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restrict the hellishness of war by demanding that soldiers and their officers minimize the 
danger they impose on civilians.56
    The second category of Walzer’s jus in bello theory of responsibility concerns military 
officers.  “Being an officer is not like being a common soldier.”
 
57  Officers, besides being 
bound by the same rules of war as are all soldiers, have additional responsibilities:  they 
must aim at victory and attend to the needs of their soldiers as well as those of non-
combatants.  Officers choose where and how to fight, and they order soldiers into battle.  
Officers create the climate within which soldiers fight, and this climate has an important 
moral dimension:  it either engenders restraint and discipline or it allows laxity with 
respect to both fighting skill and attention to principles of the War Convention.58  Such 
laxity is morally relevant for it may result not just in a unit’s inability to succeed against 
an enemy force but also in war crimes.59  Officers are “automatically responsible” for 
their soldiers.  They are, according to Walzer, “presumptively guilty” with respect to any 
massive violations of the rules of war by those under their command.  The burden of 
proof is on them to demonstrate innocence.60
    Though Walzer does not use the term, what he describes are the positional duties or 
special obligations of officers.  These duties are morally important because they 
    
                                                 
56 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 156. 
57 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 316.  See also a more recent essay entitled, “Two Kinds 
of Military Responsibility” in Michael Walzer, Arguing About War op.cit.,, pp. 23-32; see also Goeffry S. 
Corn, et.al.,The Law of Armed Conflict, op.cit., pp. 526-569. 
58 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 319-322.  See also Goeffry S. Corn, et. al., The Law of 
Armed Conflict, ibid., pp. 526-531 and 550-557. 
59 Three examples from our current wars that demonstrate how laxity resulted in war crimes are described 
in:  Jim Frederick, Black Hearts:  One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death (New 
York, Random House, 2010); Anna Mulrine, Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 2010, “Pentagon had 
red flags about command climate in ‘kill team’ Stryker Brigade;” and Charlie Savage and Elisabeth 
Bumiller’s January 27, 2012 NYT article covering the massacre of 24 Iraqi civilians by U.S. Marines in 
2005, “Iraqi Massacre, a Light Sentence and a Question of Military Justice.” 
60 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., pp. 321-22. 
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“significantly affect the interests of others”—life, death, protection of the innocent, and 
protection of the political community.  As such, Walzer’s account of the responsibilities 
of officers is consistent with other professions associated with institutions that serve a 
vital moral function in society and other obligations which apply “only to those who have 
consented, promised, or come to occupy a relevant role.”61
    As with his treatment of the moral dimension of fighting in war, Walzer’s account of 
the moral dimension of leading
  
62
    The issue of a person’s right to life—which, together with an individual’s right to 
liberty, forms the basis of the War Convention for Walzer—emerges as an important 
element in the discussion of an officer’s responsibility.  An argument can be made as to 
whether a right that one has simply by being human can be “lost” as Walzer claims.   But 
there is no argument that an important aspect of one’s right to life changes—even if not 
lost—when one becomes a soldier: one can be killed, justifiably.  The status of “being 
able to be killed justifiably,” however, is a conditional status.  It applies only when one is 
a soldier, only during a war or other forms of hostility, and only relative to the enemy 
being fought.  A soldier cannot be killed, justifiably, by just anyone.  Murder is still the 
appropriate term for soldiers intentionally killed by one of his or her fellow soldiers, or 
by a non-combatant, or, if intentional, by his or her officers.  Thus a soldier’s right to life 
seems more durable than Walzer initially describes.   
 in war is relatively complete, except in his account of 
the rights of citizens-who-become-soldiers relative to their officers.   
                                                 
61 Alan Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics (Totawa, New Jersey:  Rowan and 
Littlefield, 198), pp. 3-9, 290; James Fiskin, The Limits of Obligation (New Haven, Connecticut:  Yale 
University Press, 1982), pp. 26-27.   
62 Walzer does leave out any discussion of the role of sergeants and the moral dimension of their leadership 
responsibilities.  This omission, however, is not important, for what he says about the moral responsibilities 
of officers can be made to apply to sergeants as well. 
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    Walzer seems to recognize this durability in his claim that “no one would want to be 
commanded in wartime by an officer who did not value the lives of his soldiers.”63   He 
also seems to recognize the durability of this right in his claim that even in war, soldiers 
and their officers remain moral agents; they are never mere instruments.64  Durability is 
also a reflection of the fact that when one becomes a soldier the state continues to 
exercise its responsibility to protect the rights of their citizens-who-become-soldiers 
through the military chain of command.65
    One could take a firmer view of rights arguing that to say a person has a right to 
something is to say that no one can legitimately take it from that person or require that 
the person give it up. In this sense, soldiers have lost their right to life, for they can be 
asked—even ordered—by their commanding officers into situations where losing their 
life is at least a probability.  Even in this firmer sense, soldiers losing their right to life 
does not mean that they lose all value in the eyes of their commanding officers or that 
their commanding officers should not care a great deal about preserving their lives for 
more than merely utilitarian reasons. 
   
    Whether a soldier’s right is merely abridged, lost only vis-à-vis the enemy, or lost all 
together as in the firm sense of rights, something morally significant remains, and this 
remainder affects Walzer’s discussion of “due risk and due care.”   
    Civilians have a right to due care because they are non-combatants who retain their 
right to life fully, and soldiers must take due risk to protect that right.  “Exactly how far 
                                                 
63 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. 155. 
64 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 36, 40, 45, 306, and 311. 
65 I present an extended argument concerning the durability of a soldier’s right to life in:  James M. Dubik, 
“Human Rights, Command Responsibility, and Walzer’s Just War Theory,” op.cit., pp. 354-371. 
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they [soldiers] must go in doing that,” Walzer explains, “is hard to say….if saving 
civilian lives means risking soldier’s lives, the risk must be accepted.  But there is a limit 
to the risk that we require….We can only ask soldiers to minimize the dangers they 
impose….The limits of risk are fixed…roughly at that point where any further risk-taking 
would almost certainly doom the military venture or make it so costly that it could not be 
repeated…[and] soldiers cannot enhance their own security at the expense of innocent 
men and women.”66  Walzer admits that he “cannot specify the precise point at which the 
requirements of ‘due care’ have been met.”67
    The enduring value of the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers is revealed in an 
exchange between a commanding officer and his soldiers in Iraq during the summer of 
2005.   U.S. special operations forces were fighting a series of battles in the Euphrates 
River Valley in an attempt to stem the flow of foreign fighters using the valley as an 
infiltration route, “ratlines” as they were called.  Al Qaeda had rooted itself throughout 
the valley, setting up way stations and safe houses in the rural desert compounds and 
riverside cities connecting Syria to Baghdad.  “If the black Al Qaeda flags that insurgents 
draped over the sides of compound walls or flew from rooftops weren’t evidence enough 
of how deeply entrenched Zarqawi [the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq at the time] 
sympathizers were in the upper corridor [of the Euphrates],” writes General Stanley 
McChrystal who commanded the special operations forces during these battles, “the 
  The durability of a human being’s right to 
life provides at least part of the reason why there is a limit to “due risk” and why a 
precise point of “due risk and due care” is difficult.   
                                                 
66 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., pp. 136-37, 155-57, and 305. 
67 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 321. 
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violence that ensued when we contested these areas proved it.”68  The Al Qaeda fighters 
had hardened their safe houses sometimes rigging walls with explosives, many began 
wearing suicide vests constantly—even sleeping in them, makeshift pillboxes were often 
constructed inside the houses.  The fighting was bitter and close with whole units of 
foreign fighters sometimes barricading themselves in basements firing up through 
floors.69
    Even after adapting their tactical methods to match the enemy’s preparedness, the 
losses among General McChrystal’s forces grew, as did the stress of months of constant 
close quarters combat.  At one point, the General met with leaders and soldiers in a small 
compound in the Valley.  “Listen,” he said, “this really hurts.  But let me tell you what 
would make these [operations] hurt even more:  if it is all in vain.”
 
70  He then went on to 
discuss the importance of their battles within the context of the larger strategy in Iraq and 
explaining how the nighttime raids in the Euphrates Valley were not only linked but also 
vital to the overall strategy in Iraq.71
    Dying in vain wouldn’t matter if nothing remained of the citizen-now-soldier’s right to 
life or if a citizen-now-soldier’s life had no value other than as an instrument.  Their lives 
could be used any way that their leaders see fit—utility being the only limiting factor.  
What General McChrystal’s comments reveal, however, is this:  how a soldier’s life is 
used does matter.  Officers are responsible to ensure that the lives they use are used for a 
purpose, that their sacrifices are made to achieve higher aims, and that they are not 
 
                                                 
68 General Stanely McChrystal, My Share of the Task:  A Memoir (New York:  Portfolio/Penguin, 2013), p. 
183. 
69 General Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task, ibid., p. 184. 
70 General Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task, ibid., p. 185 
71 General Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task, ibid., p. 186. 
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merely wasted.  This responsibility derives from the fact that soldiers, at least American 
soldiers, remain citizens and the democracy for which they fight retains its obligation to 
provide adequate care for its citizens.  Part of an officer’s commission involves the 
responsibility to exercise this obligation.  Walzer admits in 2004, that “soldiers have 
every right to expect…this of him [the officer] and to blame him for every sort of 
omission, evasion, carelessness, and recklessness that endangers their lives.”72
    The third category in Walzer’s theory of responsibility concerns generals.  Generals, 
according Walzer, must be considered as a special category of officers for they “straddle 
the line” between those responsible for the war itself and those responsible for the 
conduct of war.
  Walzer’s 
1977 account of a soldier’s right to life in Just and Unjust Wars, in the end, seems to 
have been too absolutely stated.  Something morally significant remains, and officers are 
responsible for attending to it. 
73
                                                 
72 Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, op.cit.,  p.24. 
  This claim is overstated.  Some generals do straddle the line between 
officers and political leaders, but some do not.  The distinguishing marks are often rank 
and position.  Some generals have as little to do with “the war itself” as do common 
soldiers or other officers.  Others have significant input into consequential decisions as to 
war policy.  In World War II, for example, General Eisenhower certainly did straddle the 
line but Brigadier General Darby, who led a regiment of Rangers and was responsible 
solely for successful tactical operations, did not.  Generals MacArthur and Ridgway 
straddled the line during the Korean War, but the commanding generals of the various 
infantry divisions who fought the war did not.  The same is true of Generals 
Westmoreland and Abrams in Vietnam and their subordinate combat division 
73 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., pp. 38-9. 
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commanding generals.  Generals Casey and Petraeus in Iraq, and Generals McNeill, 
McKiernon and McChrystal in Afghanistan also straddled this line, but the generals 
commanding tactical troops in the various provinces of both countries did not.  The 
distinction has moral consequences.  Those generals who have significant input into 
consequential war-policy decisions have responsibilities different from those generals 
who do not.74
    In some senses, Walzer seems to grasp this distinction among general officers.  In his 
discussion of the Nuremberg Trials and of the Vietnam War, for example, he lays the 
responsibility for war-policy decisions not only on heads of state, but also, inner circles 
of advisors, those who play a major role in making or executing strategy and policy, and 
a nation’s foreign policy elite.
  
75
    In other ways, however, drawing the line “between the war itself, for which soldiers 
are not responsible, and the conduct of the war, for which they are responsible.”
  Some generals may be in this inner circle, but not all 
generals are.   
76—a line 
which Walzer draws, Orend reinforces,77  and The Law of Armed Conflict  follows78
    Walzer uses this line to separate jus ad bellum, matters concerning justice of the war 
itself, which is the realm of political responsibility, from jus in bello, matters concerning 
justice of the conduct of war, which is the realm of military responsibility.  This stark 
separation of responsibilities does not correspond to the realities of war.  In fact, jus in 
–
misses an important point. 
                                                 
74 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 292, 298, and 304. 
75 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 292 and 302. 
76 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 38-9. 
77 Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op.cit., pp. 170-79. 
78 Goeffry S. Corn, et. al., The Law of Armed Conflict, op.cit., pp. 2 and 527. 
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bello responsibilities are twofold.  At the tactical level, fighting war, military leaders are 
responsible as Walzer posits, but at the strategic level, the level at which war is waged, 
senior political and military leaders share responsibility.  This war-waging aspect of a 
war’s conduct is absent from Walzer’s treatment of jus in bello. 
    The reality is that the conduct of war involves both of these important functions:  first, 
waging a war—the set of strategic activities which combine war aims, strategy, policy, 
and major military operations and which describe the context within which some generals 
and political leaders cooperatively inform one another, make decisions, and act; secondly, 
fighting a war—combat, the tactical activities associated with what military forces do on 
the battlefield and which are governed by the war aims, strategies, and policies set at the 
higher level.  Understanding that the conduct of war includes both waging a war and 
fighting a war demonstrates that political leaders have more jus in bello, conduct of war, 
responsibilities than Walzer admits.  It also demonstrates that only some generals share in 
these responsibilities. 
    War springs from political purpose, political goals form war’s aim, and violent force is 
an important means to attain that aim—these propositions are basic to the understanding 
of war.79
                                                 
79 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York:  Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), pp. 1-28;  
Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Peret, editors and translators (Princeton, New 
Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 75-88. 
  The military and non-military means of war cannot be understood in isolation 
from the political purpose.  Waging war is essentially a political and military act, 
therefore; it is neither solely military nor solely political—especially in democratic 
nations.     
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    In drawing his line between war and its conduct as he does, Walzer employs the 
conventional view that strategy, war policy, and military operations are aligned by 
civilian leaders deciding to go to war while generals and other officers conduct that war.  
This view is too simplistic and identifies a gap in Walzer’s theory of responsibility and 
treatment of jus in bello.  Not recognizing that the conduct of war includes more than 
fighting, Walzer leaves out the mutually-related responsibilities among those senior civil 
and military leaders who must wage war—that is, the responsibility to figure out war 
aims and strategy, identify and promulgate war policies, ensure that military operations 
are means toward the declared aims, and make both civil and military bureaucracies work 
well enough that they help achieve the aims set. 
    The stark line that Walzer draws also results in his false belief that officers “plan and 
organize campaigns; they decide on strategy.”80
                                                 
80 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. 316. 
  The reality of war is that campaigns are 
civil-military decisions that require a robust and continual interaction between selected 
senior political leaders and generals.  Often the decision to conduct a campaign is more a 
decision of civil leaders than of military.  The campaigns conducted in North Africa, 
Italy, and Europe in World War II; the campaign to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and 
conduct the Inchon Landing in Korea; the air campaign against North Vietnam; and the 
decisions to “surge” in Iraq in 2007 and Afghanistan in 2009—all are examples of civil-
military decisions where political considerations sometimes outweighed military factors. 
None were planned and organized merely by officers or based solely upon military 
factors.  Campaigns commit significant resources of a nation—troops, funds, supplies and 
equipment, as well as political capital.  Such decisions involve a select set of senior 
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generals and political leaders and an on-going exchange of information and discussion 
between them.   
    The invasion of North Africa during World War II is a clear example of the civil-
military nature of decisions concerning military campaigns.  The decision to invade 
North Africa in 1942 was a decision that emerged from extended correspondence, 
dialogue, debate, and argument among four key figures—President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, General George C. Marshall, and General 
Sir Alan Brooke—as well as the bureaucracies and staffs that served each.  This decision, 
although informed and shaped by military factors, was, in the final analysis, made—and 
correctly so—based as much on political considerations as military. 
   The context of this decision is important.  In 1942, the war was not going well for the 
allies.  Western Europe was under Nazi occupation.  In the Pacific, the Japanese were on 
the offensive.  In January, the Japanese invasion of the Philippines forced the withdrawal 
of American forces toward Bataan.  “The Japanese took the [Bataan] peninsula under 
siege and…cut off all help and supplies.”81
                                                 
81 Michael and Elizabeth M. Norman, Tears in the Darkness:  The Story of the Bataan Death March and its 
Aftermath (New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), p. 4. 
  On January 10th, the Japanese made their first 
surrender demand.  Japanese success in Malaya forced the withdrawal of the British 
toward Singapore.  The British surrendered in February.   By April, American forces in 
the Philippines surrendered to the Japanese, and the Japanese forced the British to 
withdraw from Burma into India.  In June of 1942, the German Army’s Africa Corps 
pushed British forces out of Libya and threatened Egypt. That same month, “nearly 200 
German divisions invaded the Soviet Union.  Within a day, German attacks had 
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demolished one-quarter of the Soviet Air Forces.  Within four months, the Germans had 
occupied 600,000 square miles of Russian soil, captured 3 million Red Army 
troops…and closed within sixty-five miles of Moscow.”82
    When Germany invaded Russia, the U.S. was fighting in the Pacific but not yet in 
Europe. The defeats Russia suffered gave rise to a powerful movement for a ‘Second 
Front’” that would return the Allies to the Continent and draw German troops from the 
Russian front.
  The Soviet Union was on the 
ropes.   
83
    Soon after Pearl Harbor, December 1941, the Americans and British met in 
Washington.  The U.S. military leaders wanted to invade Europe in 1942.  “We’ve got to 
get to Europe and fight,” wrote General Eisenhower in January of 1942,” and we’ve got 
to quit wasting resources all over the world—and worse—wasting time.”
  Great Britain, had won the air battle over its skies, but did not have the 
capacity to create a second front alone, nor were the conditions ripe for a successful 
invasion of the continent.  Whether a second front would be undertaken—when, where, 
by whom, and under whose command—ultimately became decisions facing four key 
figures: President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Chruchill, and Generals Marshall and 
Brooke.   
84
                                                 
82 Rick Atkinson, An Army At Dawn:  The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York:  Henry Holt and 
Company, 2002), p. 8. 
  The U.S. was 
thinking about an invasion of Europe in two phases:  first, a build-up of troops and 
materiel in England; then, an invasion to seize Antwerp followed by a move east toward 
Berlin.  Both the British Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff opposed such a course in 
83 Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders:  How Four Titans Won the War the West, 1941-1945 (New 
York:  HarperCollins, 2009),  p. 122, 
84 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, An Army at Dawn:  The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York:  
Henry Holt and Company, 2002),  p. 11. 
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1942 believing, correctly as it turned out, that a 1942 invasion of Europe would be folly.  
As the historian John Keegan puts it, “Churchill feared the [early] Second Front [in 
Europe] because it would succeed only if it was launched in such overwhelming 
force…that the Atlantic Wall and its defenders would be crushed by the impact; and he 
knew that neither the force nor the support would be available in 1942.”85  After several 
months of active analysis, intense and sometimes acrimonious debate, above board and 
behind-the-scenes maneuvering, contentious re-analysis, and final argument, the four key 
leaders decided to delay a direct invasion of Europe in favor of an invasion and 
subsequent campaign in North Africa.  President Roosevelt ultimately cast the deciding 
vote when he realized an invasion of Europe was not actually possible in 1942, but that 
some action was both militarily and politically necessary that year.  So in mid July, active 
planning and preparation of forces, shipping, equipment, and supplies for an invasion of 
North Africa began.  The invasion took place in November of 1942.86  The “rationale for 
the President’s decision,” Williamson Murray and Allan Millett report in A War To Be 
Won, “stemmed from domestic politics.  The United States had to involve its forces in 
combat with the Germans in 1942 or else the political pressures for a ‘Japan First’ 
strategy might become intolerable.”87
    This individual decision took place within the context of other, even broader, strategic 
discussions and decisions among the four key civil-military leaders.  “In March [of 
1941],…after fourteen sessions in Washington over two months, American and British 
Planners agreed [to] the strategy that would be adopted in the event of the United States 
 
                                                 
85 John Keegan, The Second World War (New York:  Viking Press, 1989), p. 313. 
86 Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders,op.cit., pp. 223, 254-57, 260-88, 269-70, 291-99, 362-64, 
561, and 587. 
87 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won:  Fighting the Second World War 
(Camridge, Massachusetts:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 273. 
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entering the war.  Germany would be defeated first, Allied interests in the Mediterranean 
would be maintained and the Pacific theatre would stay on the defensive until victory was 
secured in the West.”88
   How to react, what overall strategy to follow, where and how to begin a 
counteroffensive, and what priorities to establish—all were decisions that President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had to make.  All were decisions that had both 
domestic and international consequences.   None, therefore, were solely military 
decisions.  The fate of nations was at stake.  Each political leader needed the advice of his 
senior military leader, Marshall and Brooke, but in the end, the responsibility for these 
decisions was theirs.  In Masters and Commanders, Andrew Roberts sums it this way:  
“Each of the four men was strong willed, tough minded and certain he knew the best way 
to win the war.  Yet, in order to get his strategy adopted, each needed at least two of the 
other three.  Occasionally the politicians would side together against the soldiers, and 
vice versa.”
  Over the following years, there would be subsequent debates 
over exact priorities, operational and logistics, but the general outline of this strategy held 
throughout the war.   
89
                                                 
88 Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders, op.cit., p. 115. 
  The decisions to demand unconditional surrender, to use the United States 
as the “industrial base,” to place the defeat of Germany ahead of Japan, and to begin with 
a campaign in North Africa, like so many others of World War II, exemplify final 
decisions that rightfully lay with political leadership. These decisions are also examples 
of the shared responsibilities associated with those senior civil and military leaders who 
contribute to decisions concerning war aims, strategies, policies, military campaigns, and 
non-military activities that are all means toward achieving the declared aims.    
89 Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders, ibid., p. 48. 
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    While final decision authority rests upon a very small group, sometimes an individual, 
decisions of this magnitude are preceded by detailed analysis of alternatives, feasibility 
studies, and reams of paper reflecting the arguments that had been conducted by 
numerous committees and study groups as well as subordinate organizations and staff 
agencies.  The quality of the final decisions often reflects the quality of the preparatory 
work.  Finally, decisions must be executed and adapted as the war unfolds.  Execution 
and adaptation require that civil and military bureaucracies work together well enough to 
carry out the decisions made then alter those initial decisions, if necessary, as 
opportunities and obstacles arise.  In a very real way, therefore, it is a set of senior 
political and military leaders who share responsibility for war waging decisions and 
actions.  The reality of war is not as Walzer presents, a line “between the war itself, for 
which soldiers are not responsible, and the conduct of the war, for which they are 
responsible.”90
    Further, Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall, and Brooke, had to create new organizations 
and processes to prepare them for their personal dialogue and the decisions which flowed 
from it and facilitate execution of those decisions. Two of these organizations were the 
Joint Staff Mission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.  The Joint Staff Mission was 
located in Washington, D.C. and consisted of members of the British and US Chiefs of 
staff and represented the British chiefs in regular meetings with their American 
counterparts.  In October of 1941, the Mission was staffed with about two hundred 
military personnel.  By the end of the war, the Mission grew to no fewer than three 
thousand personnel.  The Combined Chiefs—U.S. and British—was an instrument 
   
                                                 
90 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., pp. 38-9. 
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designed to create close cooperation and direct Anglo-American strategy until the war’s 
end. 91
    General Marshall also streamlined the bureaucracy of the U.S. War. He knew that the 
U.S. would have to raise an army and expand the Army Air Corps. “In the early part of 
[1940],” for example, “the year of the German Blitzkrieg, the American army was 
antique enough.  There were only two regular divisions in the continental United States 
that…could be said to be reasonable ready for combat.  One was traditional [horse] 
cavalry…the other…infantry.  Both were under VIII Corps headquarters in…Texas, to 
guard against trouble spilling across the Rio Grande.”
 Other combined organizations and command structures were created as 
requirements emerged. 
92
    Marshall’s assessment was that the War Department’s planning and coordinating 
organization had “lost track of its purpose of existence.  It had become a huge, 
bureaucratic, red-tape-ridden operating agency.  It slowed down everything.”
   He also knew that the policies 
of conscription, troop and industrial mobilization as well as pace and prioritization of 
industrial production and distribution would require changes to the non-military 
governmental departments and agencies and close coordination with the War 
Department.   
93
                                                 
91 Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders, op.cit., p. 115 and 152-53.  See also Forrest C. Pogue, 
George C. Marshall:  Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1941 (New York: Viking, 19665),  p. 283. 
  His 
changes were sudden, massive, and radical.  He downgraded general staff positions, 
eliminated chiefs of arms, subordinated formerly independent organizations to the chiefs 
of staff, and abolished a number of headquarters all together.  In less than a week, 
92 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants:  The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945 
(Bloomington, Indiana:  Indiana University Press, 1981), p.1. 
93 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall:  Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1941 op.cit.,  p. 289. 
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Marshall had his recommendations, but such changes had political implications and the 
decisions were not just his to make, so he explained them to the Secretary of War who 
gave his approval.  A few days later the President put the changes into effect by 
Executive Order.  “Only under the pressure of war and the shock of Pearl Harbor would it 
have been possible to stifle the heated protests of the officers whose authority was being 
eliminated or sharply curtailed.  Only because he believed ruthless changes were vital to 
the effective waging of war did General Marshal demand the immediate adoption of a 
program that might otherwise have been debated for months.”94
   Like the “Europe-first” strategy of World War II, the “don’t involve China” strategy of 
the Korean War, the “stop Communism in Southeast Asia” strategy in Vietnam, the 
“handover to Iraqi control” strategy of 2003-2007, and the debate over a counter-terrorist 
or counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan that started in 2008 are all examples of 
civil-military decisions where the military advice of a select number of senior generals 
played an important role, but where political considerations often outweighed or modified 
purely military factors.  Military factors play an essential part in making these kinds of 
decisions, as do non-military factors.  The final decisions rightfully fall to political 
leaders, since decisions concerning strategies and campaigns are a far cry from solely 
military activities.  Walzer’s claim that “officers plan and execute campaigns and decide 
on strategy” simply does not reflect the reality of war. 
 
    In World War II, war aims and strategy, industrial capacity and priority, logistical 
preparedness, industrial and personnel mobilization plans, and organizational 
                                                 
94 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall:  Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1941 ibid.,  p. 295.  See pp. 289-301 for 
a complete account of the speed, severity, and completeness of Marshall’s changes. 
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effectiveness in execution—all fell within the realm of civil-military shared war-waging 
responsibility, and all had a direct effect on how the war was fought.  The history of 
World War II shows that decisions made in these areas have consequences.  They either 
increase or decrease the probability of success in war, increase or decrease war’s 
duration, increase or decrease the probability that lives will be well used or wasted.  None 
of the foregoing World War II decisions were easy, nor were they perfectly conceived 
and executed.  All, however, were the result of continual, often heated, civil-military 
debate.  All included reasonable alternatives.  Many needed modifications to adapt to the 
dynamics of war.  Further, all needed both military and governmental mechanisms—
organizations and processes—to increase the quality of final decisions and to translate 
plans into action.  Furthermore, all demonstrate that political leaders have more jus in 
bello, conduct of war, responsibilities than Walzer admits.   
    In sum, Walzer’s theory of responsibility concerning generals is inadequate in several 
ways.  First, it is factually inaccurate since conducting a war includes more than fighting 
and responsibilities for waging war are both civil and military—even where the final 
decisions are made by political leaders.  Some generals are involved in decisions of 
strategy, campaigns, and policy; others are not.  Second, it is inadequate because the 
resultant theory of responsibility does not recognize the on-going, mutual dialogue 
necessary to align war aims, strategy, policy, and military operations.   Nor does Walzer’s 
theory address the positional responsibilities of those who are, or should be, in this 
dialogue, responsibilities that “significantly affect the interests of others”—life, death, 
protection of the innocent, and protection of the political community—and result from 
assumption of relevant roles.  Finally, Walzer’s account of generals does not discuss their 
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part of the responsibility to translate aims, strategies, and policies into action.  These 
inadequacies emerge again in his account of the wartime responsibilities of political 
leaders. 
    The last category in Walzer’s theory of responsibility addresses political leaders.  
Walzer holds political leaders responsible for three major wartime decisions.    First, 
governments decide to go to war.  Whether the war is aggressive or defensive, whether a 
justified intervention or not, whether preventative or preemptive war—the decision to go 
to war is, according to Walzer, one of the burdens of political office.   It reflects the basic 
foundation of Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm.95   Second, governments can held responsible 
if they establish policies that result in war crimes.96  Third, political leaders decide 
whether their states face a supreme emergency, a rare condition which would temporarily 
justify overriding the rules of war.97
                                                 
95 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit, pp. 58-63.  The Legalist Paradigm consists of six basic 
propositions:  (1) There exists an international society of independent states.  (2)  This international society 
has a law that establishes the rights of its members—above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty.  (3)  Any use of force of imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty 
or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.         (4)  Aggression justifies 
two kinds of violent response:  a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the 
victim and any other international society.  (5)  Nothing but aggression can justify war.            (6)  Once the 
aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished.  Walzer then goes on to describe cases 
of exception:  varieties of justified intervention, preemptive strikes, and supreme emergency.  Thus, the 
Legalist Paradigm is not absolute, but absent these exceptions, it holds. 
  The first responsibility that Walzer presents 
concerns jus ad bellum—justifications for going to war.  The second and third 
responsibilities concern jus in bello—justifications for action in war.  As the World War 
II example above demonstrated, however, some political leaders have a wider role in the 
conduct of war—that is, they have war-waging responsibilities not captured in Walzer’s 
theory because it limits jus in bello to the tactical level.        
96 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 19, 31, 36, 38, 59, 61-63, 74, 85-86, 91, 95, 127, 136, 
231, 245, 287, 289, 290, 291, and 292.   
97 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 251-268. 
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    Generals who help shape war-waging decisions and actions associated with aligning 
war aims, strategy, policy, and military operations have responsibilities different from 
those generals who do not.  Similarly, political leaders who make war-waging decisions 
and take action based upon these decisions have jus in bello responsibilities.  These 
political leaders do not, as the conventional view Walzer employs suggests, just decide to 
go to war, then hand off the responsibility to conduct that war to generals.  At least some 
subset of political leaders set war aims—the goals, or objectives which give war its 
purpose.  They also establish strategies and policies governing the conduct of the war—
strategies and policies necessary to mobilize political, economic, diplomatic, industrial, 
psychological, fiscal, and logistical resources necessary to achieve the war aims, conduct 
military operations, and execute essential, war-related non-military activities.  This subset 
of political leaders also have responsibilities for policies that govern actions following 
termination of major hostilities, which sometimes include fighting—policies of 
occupation, temporary guardianship of a conquered nation, or other political 
arrangements that may result from active combat. Further, this subset of political leaders 
is also co-responsible for the quality of the dialogue among senior civil and military 
leaders that affects war’s aim as well as the strategies and policies that govern that war.   
    Finally, executing policies—whether those associated with jus ad bellum, jus in bello, 
or just post bellum—requires a government that is sufficiently capable of generating and 
orchestrating the military and non-military means available in ways that increase the 
probability of success.  Winning—as defined by achieving the strategic aims of a war or 
other employment of military force a war—requires that political leaders make their 
governments work well enough to succeed.  This responsibility is embedded in Walzer’s 
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claim that a state has a right to win wars it is forced to fight.  When fighting against 
aggression, he says, “War is no longer a condition to be endured.  It is a crime they can 
resist…and once one is fighting for purposes of this sort, it becomes terribly important to 
win.”98  Of course a state cannot do anything to win, moral limits are spelled out in the 
war convention and rules of war, but inherent in the right to win are two key 
assumptions:  first, that one has the military and non-military means to win, and second 
that a government has the capacity to use those means efficiently and effectively enough 
to win.  “Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara failed as war leaders,” explains Eliot 




Conclusions:  Conducting a war involves more than fighting. 
    A complete understanding of the conduct of war reveals that jus in bello concerns more 
than “right conduct in the midst of battle, after the war has started.”100
                                                 
98 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., pp. 21, 110, and 129.   
  Jus in bello also 
has a larger, war-waging scope.  A complete theory of wartime jus in bello moral 
responsibilities must include, therefore, responsibilities that senior political and military 
leaders have to set in place processes for cross-governmental department coordination as 
well as coordination among allies, ways to adjudicate conflicts in priorities, and methods 
to ensure departmental support for important war policies to achieve sufficient unity of 
effort and coherency in action throughout the war.  These are responsibilities for 
99 Eliot Cohen, “The Unequal Dialogue,” in Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, editors, Soldiers and 
Civilians:  The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  MIT 
Press, 2001), p. 453. 
100 Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op.cit., p. 105. 
43 
 
execution, for “where strategy usually fails is not in the formulation but in the 
execution.”101
    Conducting a war has dimensions that lie far beyond battlefield commanders.   Success 
in war is an outcome, partially related to what military units do in battle, but it is equally 
related to civil-military relationships and organizational activities.
  The standard is certainly not perfection, for every war is replete with 
examples of mistakes and missteps.  Morality should demand, however, that there be 
some way to address the number and frequency of mistakes those who wage war make, to 
the speed or slowness at which those who wage war learn and improve—for the cost of 
learning is lives of the innocent as well as those of citizens-who-become-soldiers, lives 
for which the government remains responsible.  The military leader’s responsibility not to 
waste soldiers’ lives or use their sacrifices in vain on the battlefield is clear.  The 
immediacy of the battlefield provides this clarity.  Less clear because of the distance from 
the battlefield, but no less important, is the senior political and military leader’s 
responsibility to get decisions concerning war aims, strategies, policies, and campaigns as 
“right as possible,” then execute those decisions sufficiently well and adapt as the war 
unfolds. 
102
                                                 
101 Bruce Riedell is quoted from the forward he wrote to Ambassador Newmann’s book:  Ronald E. 
Newmann,  The Other War:  Winning and Losing In Afghanistan  (Washington, D.C.:  Potomac Books, 
Inc., 2009), p. x. 
  This chapter 
identified the gap in Walzer’s account of jus in bello and introduced the strategic, war-
waging dimension of jus in bello as the component necessary to fill that gap.  A complete 
understanding of jus in bello must include much more than “right conduct in the midst of 
102 Mackubin Tomas Owens, US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11:  Renegotiating the Civil-Military 
Bargain (London: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), especially Chapter 3, “The Role 
of the Military and Military Effectiveness.” 
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battle, after the war has started.”103
                                                 
103 Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op.cit., p. 105 
   The next chapter will describe the war-waging 
dimension of jus in bello in more detail. 
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    Chapter Two: 
Waging War:  The Missing Piece in Just War Theory 
 
 
    This chapter will use the American Civil War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as 
examples of the activities and responsibilities that are essential to conducting war but that 
lie far beyond battlefield commanders and “right conduct in the midst of battle.”  The 
activities and responsibilities that this chapter will illuminate are not traditional jus in 
bello responsibilities, for traditionally jus in bello had limited the scope of the conduct of 
war to fighting alone.  Rather, the examples of the Civil War, the on-going war in 
Afghanistan, and the recent war in Iraq will reveal details concerning the responsibilities 
associated with the waging of war; the aspect of just in bello absent from Walzer’s 
account.   
    This chapter will also use both the Civil War and more current wars to identify the 
central tension inherent in the strategic, war-waging dimension of war’s conduct as 
tripartite:  (1) setting and achieving war aims and making strategy, policy, and campaign 
decisions that increase the probability of being right, or at least less wrong than those one 
is fighting; (2) translating those aims and decisions into action to achieve war aims at the 
least cost, in lives and resources, and least risk to one’s political community then adapt 
decisions and actions as the war unfolds; and, (3) doing all of the foregoing while 
observing the war convention and maintaining legitimacy, public support of the war 
effort.  The chapter closes with a discussion of the moral foundation of the war-waging 
responsibilities it identifies.  That is, war-waging jus in bello responsibilities, emanate 
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from what democratic governments owe not only to the innocent and to the political 
community but also what they owe to the citizens whose lives they use.    
  
The American Civil War and  war-waging responsibilities. 
    “The Civil War was the first of the modern total wars, and the American democracy 
was almost totally unready to fight it,” writes historian T. Harry Williams.104  The same 
could be said of the U.S. military at the time, for “there was not an officer in the first year 
of the war who was capable of efficiently administering and fighting a large army.”105  
The outbreak of the American Civil War found President Lincoln equally unprepared for 
his duties as a war president.  Yet, “not only Lincoln’s success or failure as president,” 
the Civil War historian James McPherson reminds us, “but also the very survival of the 
United States depended on how he performed his duties as command in chief.”106
    While Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution identifies the President as the 
Commander-in-Chief, the Constitution does not define the powers, responsibilities, and 
limitations of this role.  Additionally, his role as Commander-in-Chief, as Lincoln would 
  
Lincoln worked hard to master his new role.  What he learned in his role of war 
president, and the actions he and his senior political and military leaders took as a result, 
laid the foundation for the shared civil and military war-waging responsibilities that 
continue today—but that the prevailing view of jus in bello omits.   
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learn, was shared with Congress.  Article I, Section 8 gave Congress the power to declare 
war; raise, fund, and regulate the army and navy; and provide for the capture of enemy 
property.107  Ultimately, Lincoln “performed or oversaw five wartime functions” in his 
capacity as Commander in Chief.  McPherson describes those functions as follows:108
1.  Policy refers to war aims—the political goals of the nation in a  
 
time of war. 
2. National Strategy refers to mobilizing the political, economic,  
diplomatic, and psychological as well as military resources of the nation  
to achieve these war aims. 
3. Military Strategy concerns plans for the employment of armed forces to  
win the war and fulfill the goals of policy. 
4. Operations concerns the management and movement of armies in  
particular campaigns to carry out the purposes of military strategy. 
5. Tactics refers to the formations and handling of an army in actual battle. 
(Italics in the original.) 
   Whether these five functions are exactly right is immaterial.  They illustrate that 
Walzer’s theory of responsibility, derived from a belief that the conduct of war is a 
military matter, is inaccurate.  Lincoln came to realize that the conduct of war included 
fighting—tactics—but it also included more—policy, national strategy, military strategy, 
and operations.  Lincoln’s five functions make clear that conducting war cannot be solely 
the concern of military leaders.  Correspondingly, these functions illustrate that Walzer’s 
account of jus in bello and the theory of responsibility derived from his account is 
necessary but insufficient.     
    To conduct the Civil War, the Lincoln administration had to identify its war aims.  
Then, together with Congress, government departments and agencies, and the military 
leadership, the administration had to devise a strategy to attain those aims and raise an 
                                                 
107 Jethro K. Lieberman, The Enduring Constitution:  A Bicentennial Perspective (New York:  West  
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army and navy capable of victory.  A special session of Congress, held in July of 1861, 
eventually authorized all the emergency actions that President Lincoln had taken, 
including calling up troops and instituting a naval blockade of the South.  In this session, 
Congress appropriated funds to put 500,000 soldiers in the field.  The Militia Act of 1862 
bolstered Union forces by allowing the President to employ persons of African descent in 
military and naval service.  Last, the Conscription act of 1863 created the first draft in 
American history.   
    With respect to war aims, “Lincoln first established national preservation as the goal 
for which the North would fight, putting aside the question of slavery.  In doing so, he 
chose the approach that plainly commanded the broadest public support….Although 
Lincoln made the prudent choice at the start,” Andrew Polsky says in Elusive Victories:  
The American Presidency at War, “he faced a more difficult task in reevaluating war 
aims as the conflict progressed.”109  By 1862, sediments had changed and the war had 
evolved into a nation-rending struggle that few had anticipated.  An August, 1862 letter 
that Senator John Sherman wrote to his brother General William T. Sherman said as 
much: “ A year ago men might have faltered at the thought of proceeding to this 
extremity [but now] they are in great measure prepared for it.”110  Emancipation became 
a “military necessity…to the preservation of the Union.”111
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    War costs money.  As gold and silver coin became increasingly scarce; the 
government’s ability to finance the war was at risk.  In addition to loans,112 and again 
working with Congress, the Lincoln administration used the Legal Tender Act to create 
paper money.  The act also established the Internal Revenue Bureau in the Department of 
Treasury and levied a federal income tax for the first time in American history.113
    War involves diplomacy.  One of the main diplomatic efforts during the Civil war was 
designed to keep European powers from recognizing the South.  The Confederate States 
tried to withhold cotton as an economic weapon.  As one Southern newspaper wrote, 
“keep every bale of cotton on the plantation.  Don’t send a thread to New Orleans or 
Memphis till England and France have recognized the Confederacy.”
   
114  To counter this 
threat, one that would certainly have prolonged the war, the Union executed both a naval 
strategy of blockade and a diplomatic engagement strategy in London and Paris.  British 
and French officials “exchanged worried views about the probable impact of a cotton 
famine.  Textile magnates in Lancashire and Lyons talked of shutdowns….British and 
French diplomats discussed the possibility of joint action to lift the blockade.”115  
Ultimately, “history would later give Secretary of State [William H.] Seward high marks 
for his role in preventing Britain and France from intervening in the war.”116
   War requires managerial capacity.  The sheer scale of the Civil War was beyond any 
previous U.S. military or political experience.  Initial management efforts simply failed.  
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Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton came to realize that to wage a war as massive as the 
one he faced, “everything had to be done systematically and in order.”117  As if a 
harbinger of what President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson, and General Marshall 
faced in World War II, some of the most important innovations of the Civil War 
concerned “more efficient techniques, procedures, and methods” to manage personnel 
and logistics and execute strategy.118
    Secretary Stanton and his quartermaster general, Montgomery Meigs, put in place a 
number of new organizations and management procedures, for example the War Board 
created to help manage the broad undertaking demanded of the Civil War.  Though an 
informal body, not functioning as a source of command, the War Board ultimately 
created sufficient unity of effort that facilitated logistics; coordinated rail, water, and road 
transport as well as telegraph and industrial actions; and recommended priorities and 
strategy.  In establishing this board and running it as he did, Secretary Stanton 
strengthened the administration of the Union war effort.   
   
    After he established the Board, Secretary Stanton “gathered together the heads of 
several bureaus of the army ‘to effect an informal organization for his own instruction, 
and in order…to bring to bear the whole power of the Government” upon the operations 
involved in the Civil War.  This gathering included the adjutant general, the 
quartermaster general, the chief engineer, the commissary general.  The War Board and 
its informal committee of bureau heads facilitated control and coordination in operations, 
often prescribing the strategy of particular campaigns.  Following suit, President 
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Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy created several boards—The Navy Board, The Board of 
Strategy, and the Ironclad Board—to orchestrate the actions of the navy, government, and 
private industry.119
    None of these managerial innovations worked immediately, and none worked 
perfectly.  They did, however, contribute significantly to translating aims, strategies, and 
policy into action, and they helped the civil and military bureaucracies adapt to both 
opportunities and obstacles that emerged over time.  Thus, they helped make Lincoln’s 
government work “well enough” toward his common goal—that is, at least better than the 
Confederate government.  In sum, as historian James McPerson wrote, “The Union 
developed the superior managerial talent to mobilize and organize the North’s greater 
resources for victory in the modern industrialized conflict that the Civil War became.”
   
120  
In How the North Won, Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones agree.  Effective civil and 
military leadership, efficient civil and military staffs, and innovative management of both 
the military and civil dimensions of the overall war effort as well were all keys to 
Lincoln’s success.121
    War, at least when waged by a democracy, requires legitimacy.  Lincoln understood 
that to attain his war aims, his decisions concerning strategy and military operations had 
to be made with “a keen awareness of their political implications.”
 
122  Lincoln had to 
come to grips with maintain the war’s legitimacy among a variety of political factions, 
competing views, geographic regions, and ethnic constituencies.123
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“Lincoln appointed ‘political generals’ whose chief recommendation was their 
prominence as politicians or as leaders of…ethnic communities.  The rationale…was…to 
mobilize maximum support and recruitment for the war.”124
    Sustaining public support was a “daunting challenge in the face of heavy losses and 
battlefield setbacks.  Morale slumped in the wake of defeats.”
  Of course some of the 
political generals’ inability to command caused problems, but recognizing the strategic 
value of their service to generate and sustain popular support for the war, the President 
found ways to work around these problems.   
125  Following the 1861 
Union defeat in the Battle of First Manassas came the failure of General McClellan’s 
Peninsula campaign that started in May of 1862 and ended with a Confederate victory in 
the Battle of Seven Days.  Then came Jackson’s success in his Shenandoah Valley 
Campaign and the defeats in the Battle of Second Manassas in August of 1862 and 
Fredericksburg in December of 1862.  All were shocks to the North’s resolve.  The 
North’s success at Antietam in September of 1862 helped dissuade the French and British 
from recognizing the Confederacy, and thus provided some hope to the Lincoln 
administration.126
    The battle of Antietam and Grant’s initial progress along the Tennessee, Cumberland, 
and Mississippi Rivers were also bright spots in an otherwise dim year of fighting.  In 
general, 1862 brought high casualties and little progress toward success.  High casualties 
and the lack of progress put the legitimacy of the war at risk.  In fact, part of the rationale 
for the 1862 Emancipation Proclamation was to bolster support for the war.  The twin 
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Confederate defeats in the Summer of 1863 at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, and the 
beginning of the final set of campaigns that began in the Spring of 1864, increased 
Northern support for the war.  Even then, however, President Lincoln had to attend to the 
relationship between support for the war, casualties, and progress.  Union troops, fresh 
from the Gettysburg battlefield for example, had to rush to New York City to help quell 
draft riots in July of 1863. 
    Lincoln’s reelection was in doubt following the 1864 Spring and Summer battles of the 
Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor where Union casualties were very high.  
During three months in the summer of 1864, for example, over 65,000 Union soldiers 
were killed, wounded, or missing-in-action—there had been 108,000 Union casualties in 
the first three years of the war.127  The issue of support of war in the face of such losses 
became an open question.  “A Union general home on sick leave found ‘great 
discouragement over the North, great reluctance to recruiting, [and] strong disposition for 
peace….Financial markets were pessimistic…[and] Democrats began to denounce Grant 
as a ‘butcher.’”128
    At the start of the war, President Lincoln deferred to General Winfield Scott, hero of 
both the War of 1812 and the Mexican War.   Quickly, he found Scott wanting and 
replaced him with General George B. McClellan.  Lincoln also deferred initially to 
  Later in 1864 when Richmond was under siege, Lee’s army was 
nearly surrounded, and Sherman’s march to the sea was in progress, progress toward 
ultimate victory was in sight.  The President was reelected and support for the war was 
never again a major issue. 
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McClellan, with disappointing results.  Deference was perhaps the natural result of the 
President acknowledging his own inadequate understanding of what it took to wage war 
and in light of the experiences his generals had, or appeared to have had.  In short order, 
the President learned—especially in the dark days of 1862—that he could not merely 
“hand over” the war to his generals.  In fact it was early that year, in January of 1862, that 
President Lincoln came to believe that the best approach to Union military success was 
by simultaneous advances throughout all the theaters of the war.129  The results of 1862 
only confirmed Lincoln’s belief:  battles and campaigns had to be means toward 
achieving his administration’s political ends.  Further, battles and campaigns had political 
costs.  Thus he learned that, neither policy nor national strategy could be separated from 
military strategy, operations, and tactics.130
    In finding a general who was capable of executing his simultaneous-advances strategy, 
Lincoln was sequentially let down by Generals Henry W. Halleck, Don Carlos Buell, 
John Pope, Ambrose E. Burnside, Joseph Hooker, and William Rosencrans, but he never 
deferred again.
   
131  Even after the President “discovered” General Ulysses S. Grant, a 
commander who was capable of executing his “simultaneous advance strategy” and in 
whom the President could place significant trust and responsibility never to be 
disappointed, Lincoln kept his hand on the pulse of military strategy and operations.132
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He visited the front often, as he did military hospitals; he received reports from his own 
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telegraph.  Monitoring execution became part of President Lincoln’s repertoire of 
leadership behavior. 
   President Lincoln’s personal leadership behavior, the managerial and organizational 
innovations of his secretaries; his work with Congress; his discussion with senior military 
commanders and staff officers; and the mechanisms he put in place to ensure he 
benefitted from a robust dialogue that included asking “hard questions about the 
assumptions behind strategy, whether war goals were appropriate and can be achieved, 
how much progress has been made, and more”133
    Conducting war, Lincoln, his cabinet, and his generals found, is both a complex and 
serious endeavor.   Complexity remerges from several areas.  Wartime success requires 
constant balancing and rebalancing war ends, strategies, and policies with the use of 
military forces on the battlefield.  It is also complex because in war few things are static, 
opportunities come and go, the enemy actively attempts to foil plans, obstacles arise, and 
—all demonstrate two essential 
elements in the war-waging dimensions of conducting war:  creating a cooperative civil-
military effort in order to devise appropriate war aims, adequate policy, and proper 
strategies and an equally cooperative and important effort to execute that policy and 
strategy is executed and adapt as the war unfolds.  Without both, his aim to preserve the 
Union would not have been achieved and the lives and resources used in waging that war 
would have been wasted.  The President did not come to office fully understanding what 
it meant to conduct war, but the reality of being a war president taught him quickly that 
conducting a war involves more than fighting; it also involves waging war, and this 
second dimension of conducting war is an inherently civil-military responsibility. 
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domestic and international situations that affect the various strategies required in war ebb 
and flow.  Lincoln also found that the need to sustain legitimacy of the war in the eyes of 
the public required having the right war aims and making progress toward those aims, 
another dimension of war’s complexity.  Last, war’s complexity is seen in nature of 
making decisions and taking action.  While President Lincoln may have been the final 
decider, he could neither figure out the “Rubik’s Cube” of war nor supervise the 
execution of war alone.  Elusive Victories reminds the reader that “no president leads 
alone in wartime, and Lincoln’s effectiveness depended a great deal on others.”134  
Decision and action in war demand for a constant civil-military dialogue and constant 
coordination between civil and military bureaucracies.   Constructing a set of sufficiently 
coherent strategies is one thing, executing those strategies and adapting them as 
conditions change is quite another.  In both, President Lincoln required civil and military 
organizations and processes to help decide and execute.  Lincoln knew how to control the 
processes that surrounded him, and he knew how to lead.  He emerged, as Doris Kerns 
Goodwin says, not only the commander-in-chief, but also “the captain of [a] most 
unusual cabinet.”135
   President Lincoln also learned, as succeeding Presidents would, that war is a serious 
affair because life and death are inherently involved—not just of enemy combatants; but 
also of the American citizens-who-become-soldiers; of the innocent, friendly and enemy; 
and sometimes of political communities.  As the President said at Gettysburg, “It is rather 
for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored 
dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of 
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devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that 
this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the 
people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.”136
   Poor war aims, strategies, and policies; badly thought-through campaigns and major 
operations; and inefficient and ineffective civil-military dialogue and execution can join 
to prolong a war unnecessarily, decreasing the probability of success and, thereby, 
increasing the probability of risking the lives of the innocent and the life of the political 
community unnecessarily as well as wasting the lives soldiers and national treasure on a 
scale much larger than that of fighting itself.  When a soldier errs, the cost in lives may be 
counted in the dozens.  When a commanding general errs, that count may extend to the 
thousands—even tens of thousands as in the case of several Civil War battles.  When 
senior political and military leaders get war aims, strategies, and policies wrong or decide 
upon those that cannot be executed by the associated military and civil bureaucracies 
with sufficient effectiveness, the fiscal price and human costs—individual and 
communal—can be staggering.     
 
    For Walzer, the conduct of war is governed by principles that emerge from the tension 
between winning and fighting well, the two competing responsibilities of soldiers and 
their military leaders.   These principles, and the tension from which they flow, govern 
moral behavior while fighting and describe the tactical aspect of jus in bello.  They are a 
necessary part of just war theory, but alone they are not sufficient.  Right conduct in war 
also has a strategic dimension, the war-waging responsibilities described in the Civil War 
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case.  In this dimension, Walzer’s theory of responsibility is deficient.  He holds that 
political leaders are responsible for the war itself—matters of jus ad bellum; military 
leaders, on the other hand, are responsible for the conduct of war—matters of jus in bello.  
President Lincoln would find this distinction not just unhelpful but also factually 
incorrect.  The moral issues associated with the strategic dimension of jus in bello, 
Lincoln, his cabinet, and his generals would find, result from a tension among three 
competing responsibilities associated with senior political and military leadership.  First, 
set and achieve war aims by making strategy, policy, and military campaign decisions 
that increase the probability of being right, or at least less wrong than those one is 
fighting.  Second, translate those decisions into action to achieve war aims at the least 
cost, in lives and resources, and least risk to one’s political community then adapt 
decisions and actions as the war unfolds.  Third, do all of the foregoing while observing 
the war convention and maintaining legitimacy, public support of the war effort.   
    In sum, Lincoln came to understand conducting war in a broad and complete sense.  
From the moral dimension, his understanding reveals that a complete account of justice in 
war must include both the war-fighting and war-waging dimensions of war’s conduct.  
He also came to realize that, because of the dynamic interrelationship among his five 
functions, conducting war required iterative decisions, a sustained civil-military dialogue, 
and continual coordination and cooperation among the civil and military bureaucracies.  
Walzer’s view of jus in bello captures little, if any, of the war-waging responsibilities 
Lincoln came to understand. 
    Lincoln’s war lessons remain valid today.  Many of the lessons Lincoln learned as he, 
his cabinet, and his generals waged the Civil War were initially ignored in America’s 
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post 9/11 wars.  Some came to be re-learned; other, not.  Learned or not, the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq confirm that the war-waging functions which emerged during the 
Civil War and tri-partite tension inherent in waging war remain operant.   
 
Beyond the Civil War:  Waging war in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
    On October 7, 2001, twenty-six days following the September 11, 2001attack of New 
York and Washington, D.C., the United States invaded Afghanistan where the 9/11 
attacks were planned and launched.  When the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan refused to 
extradite Osama bin Laden and the rest of the Al Qaeda planners, the United States was 
forced to go to war.  President George W. Bush, in his words, “felt the gravity of this 
decision. I knew the war would bring death and sorrow.  Every life lost would devastate a 
family forever….My anxiety about the sacrifice was mitigated by the urgency of the 
cause.  Removing al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan was essential to protecting the 
American people….We were acting out of necessity and self-defense, not revenge.”137
   At the start of the war, President Bush deferred to his generals.  Again in his words, “I 
did not try to manage the logistics or the tactical decisions.  My instinct was to trust the 
judgment of the military leadership.”
  In 
sum, the President concluded that going to war was justified and worth the cost in lives 
and treasure.  The country—in fact, the world—was in support. 
138
                                                 
137 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 184. 
  In relatively quick order, the Taliban was routed.  
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assume full responsibility until October 2006.  In the interim, three strategic decisions 
began to erode initial success, prolong the war, and set the conditions for the return of the 
Taliban. 
   The first decision was to allow execution to precede planning and preparation.  The 
President, in his speech delivered to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, 
said this would be a war to punish and bring to justice those who attacked the United 
States, a war “against a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports 
them…a war on terror…that will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped and defeated.”139   The President corroborated the expansive nature 
of the war aims in his memoir, Decision Points, “removing Al Qaeda’s safe haven in 
Afghanistan….destroy the Al Qaeda network….help the Afghan people liberate 
themselves….bring these people [Al Qaeda] to justice….change the impression that, in 
the words of Bin laden, Americans were paper tigers.”140
    Yet the speed at which the United States invaded Afghanistan meant not only that 
resources and means were not fully aligned with aims, but also that the aims themselves 
may not have been fully vetted and debated.  Further, the execution plan, to say the least, 
was far from fully developed.  Without doubt, the scale of Al Qaeda’s attack on the U.S. 
    Thinking through the 
political, diplomatic, fiscal, organizational, and material resources necessary to achieve 
these war aims is not a trivial task. 
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and the resultant death and destruction not only caught America and the world by 
surprise, but also justified an immediate response.   The Bush administration was under 
tremendous pressure to respond, and was justified in doing so.  The President could not 
allow those who attacked the United States an opportunity to do so again.  Haste, 
however, resulted in insufficient intellectual, strategic, organizational, and logistic 
preparation, and this haste affected the conduct of the war in Afghanistan from the very 
start.  The items on Lincoln’s list—policy, national strategy, military strategy, operations, 
and tactics—were far from sufficiently aligned as the first U.S. forces landed in 
Afghanistan. 
    For example, even as the battle raged, Bob Woodward observed in Bush at War that 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed that the Central Intelligence Agency was 
in charge of the offensive to remove the Taliban, while the CIA believed it was a military 
operation.141  In his memoir, Known and Unknown, Secretary Rumsfeld presented a 
different picture, one of a prearranged shift in overall command and control.  “The CIA,” 
he wrote, “would have the lead initially, since its personnel would be in Afghanistan first.  
Command would shift to Franks [General Tommy Franks, Commander of U.S. Central 
Command]…as the campaign took on more of a military character.”142
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    This mix of forces, however, was hugely insufficient to remove al Qaeda’s safe haven 
in Afghanistan, destroy the Al Qaeda network, bring them to justice—war aims the 
President identified—or to deal with a post-Taliban Afghanistan.  Shortly after the 
Taliban was routed, the inadequacies of planning and policy became clearer.  The 
deficiencies in numbers and types of troops, confused command and control 
organizations, overly compartmentalized intelligence and planning arrangements, and 
piecemeal method of unit deployments—all contributed to the Taliban’s and al Qaeda’s 
escape into Pakistan, thus prolonging the war.143
   The second decision was to take a “lead nation approach” to the rebuilding of 
Afghanistan.  This approach resulted in Germany being responsible for training the 
Afghan national police; the United States, for training the Afghan Army; Great Britain, 
for the counter-narcotics mission; Italy, for the reform of the justice system; and Japan, 
for the disarmament and demobilization of the Afghan warlords and militias.  In addition, 
the United States continued combat operations against the remnants of Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban—independent from the NATO effort.  Unity of purpose and cohesion of action 
was lost almost immediately, and stayed diffused for years.  Further, many of the allied 
nations agreed to their tasks under the assumption that they would operate in a post-
hostility environment, akin to the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Kosovo.  They 
quickly found that this was not the case, so their efforts were, to say it kindly, seriously 
impaired. 
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    Haste was at least partially responsible for not using the Roosevelt-Churchill-Marshall-
Brooke model of carefully building of organizations and processes that were necessary to 
wage a global war.  Over the years of World War II, these organizations and processes 
improved, but they began to emerge very early in 1941—months prior to the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in December of that year.  Lincoln, his cabinet, and his generals 
also required a period of learning.  But, by 1864, when Lincoln promoted Grant to 
lieutenant general, the administration’s decision making and execution methodologies 
were sufficiently mature, effective, and efficient. 
    It was 2006, however, five years after the initial invasion of Afghanistan, before the 
President realized that the approach in Afghanistan had to change.  “The multilateral 
approach to rebuilding…was failing,” wrote President Bush, “there was little 
coordination between countries, and no one devoted enough resources to the effort….The 
multilateral mission proved a disappointment as well….The result was a disorganized and 
ineffective force with troops fighting by different rules and many not fighting at all.”144  
Not only were too few troops allocated to the task, but also, as the President concluded, 
“Our government was not prepared for nation building.”145
    Writing about this period, Ronald E. Neumann, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan 
from 2005-2007, says “The public has little understanding of any aspect of the [Afghan] 
conflict other than the military engagement, most at the tactical level, which makes for 
  Meanwhile, the Taliban 
began to return, casualties among both combatants and non-combatants mounted, the war 
dragged on, and public support became an issue. 
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compelling stories but offers a limited view of a larger picture.”  He continues, “As I 
worked through the fourth war that I have experienced up close, I was struck by how 
little either the public or senior policy makers understood the complex business of 
implementing policy….Divorcing high-level policymaking from implementation leads us 
to ignore information from the ground level necessary to make policies work and 
prevents us from learning how to adjust policies when they do not….Incomprehension of 
the complexity of implementation makes finding the proper balance between policy and 
operations difficult.”146
    Dov Zakheim—one of the original members of a group of eight who advised George 
W. Bush on foreign and national security policy issues who became, in 2002, the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) civilian coordinator for defense activities in Afghanistan, a 
position that he held simultaneously with comptroller and chief financial officer at the 
Pentagon—reinforces Ambassador Newmann’s perspective.  “In the case of 
Afghanistan…through sins of both commission and omission, the Bush administration 
was often incapable of effectively implementing manifestly good policies, sound ideas, 
and wisely chosen goals.”
 
147
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absence of standard government procedures and institutions to implement [wartime] 
policy, no one understood the importance of devising such procedures beforehand.”148  
Securing funding necessary to conduct the war, mobilizing the U.S. military’s reserves, 
and securing allied troop and monetary contributions “turned out to be more complicated 
and frustrating that it might, or should, have been.”149  Even determining the size of the 
ground forces the nation would need to fight in Afghanistan, in Iraq, as well as in the 
global war against Al Qaeda, was a matter more of contention than consensus.150  With 
regard to funding, for example, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of 
State, and the Department of Defense were more competitors and obstacles to each other 
than cooperative agencies in pursuit of a common wartime goal.151
    Zakheim goes on to explain that the U.S. government’s “neglect of Afghanistan,” a 
neglect which Ambassador Newmann’s The Other War documents as well, “allowed the 
Taliban to gradually seize control of key areas of the country, particularly in the 
country’s southern and eastern provinces.”
   
152
    The third decision that began to erode initial success thus setting the conditions for the 
return of the Taliban and prolonging the war in Afghanistan, was to invade Iraq.  The 
invasion caused U.S. attention to wander from Afghanistan according to Bruce Reidel, 
former CIA analyst, White House counter terrorist specialist, and Brookings Institute 
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fellow.  The result:  the effort to rebuild Afghanistan stalled and the Taliban regrouped in 
Pakistan and staged a comeback.153
    The invasion of Iraq is relevant to understanding the broader scope of jus in bello 
independent of how the invasion affected the war in Afghanistan.  Setting aside the 
decision to invade Iraq—for historians, strategists, lawyers, and moral philosophers will 
be arguing the wisdom or necessity of that decision for decades—the invasion and its 
subsequent operations shows  how strategy and policy affected the fighting of the Iraq 
War and how conducting a war involves both war-fighting and war-waging activities.   
   
    On March 19, 2003, President Bush ordered Operation Iraqi Freedom to begin.  On 
April 9, Baghdad was close to falling into coalition hands, and on May 1, the President 
gave his speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln under the “Mission Accomplished” 
banner.  The initial invasion and immediate aftermath in Iraq looked eerily similar to 
what was done in Afghanistan.   
    The Iraqi regime fell as quickly as did the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Then a new reality 
emerged.  The security vacuum in Iraq—fueled by years of oppression under the Saddam 
regime as well as insufficient numbers of coalition forces, the destruction of the Iraqi 
army, and the collapse of the police—resulted in looters carrying artifacts out of Iraq’s 
national museum as well as pillaging many of Iraq’s ministries, kidnappings, and 
murders.   
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    The U.S. Central Command, responsible for U.S. military actions throughout most of 
the Middle East used three three-star headquarters—one U.S. Army corps, one Marine 
Expeditionary Force, and a common headquarters—to plan, coordinate, and execute the 
campaign to remove the Saddam regime.  All three of these headquarters were withdrawn 
about 90 days after the initial invasion.  The three were replaced by a single, different, 
three-star U.S. Army corps headquarters that would be responsible for executing the 
“post combat” phase of the Iraqi invasion, though neither its commander, Lieutenant 
General Ricardo Sanchez, nor its staff participated in any of the planning or preparation.   
In fact, General Sanchez was only interviewed by the Secretary of Defense in April—one 
month after the invasion and less than two before he would assume his responsibilities in 
Iraq.154
    One three star headquarters is much less capable than three such headquarters.  One—
especially one led by a newly minted lieutenant general with an undermanned staff—
would not be able to attend properly to the combination of active combat leadership 
requirements, the tasks associated with rebuilding the Iraqi forces, the logistical tasks 
inherent in supporting an effort like that in Iraq at the time, and the administration of 
large detention operations. Nor would one be able to attend adequately to all of the tasks 
listed above as well as to the demands of coordination with the political, diplomatic, and 
non-governmental agencies that were responsible for reconstruction and humanitarian 
assistance.   
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    In retrospect, the Secretary of Defense, not recalling his interview with Sanchez or his 
role in the general’s assignment, wrote that the commanding general had been put “in a 
terrible position….The establishment of a government, the long-term care of detainees, 
the training and equipping of [Iraqi] security forces, the engagement of an increasingly 
deadly terrorist threat called for a senior military official with far more experience.”155  
The Secretary continues by saying that this decision was a “serious misassessment,” 
acknowledging that the tasks assigned to Sanchez required “a large, fully staffed 
supporting headquarters [but what the commanding general got was]…well less than 
half—37 percent—of the staff he required.”156  This “misassessment” was not corrected 
until June 2004, one year after the initial invasion.  Reflecting on his experience, General 
Sanchez agreed, “Without the four-star command in Iraq, [the corps headquarters that I 
led] had assumed the entire burden for the strategic political–military interface and for 
the tactical warfighting aspects of the mission.  It was simply too much of a burden for an 
Army corps headquarters to bear.” (italics in original)157
    An Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) had been created 
hastily in January of 2003, just prior to the invasion. This organization was charged with 
devising the plans for the rebuilding of Iraq and turning plans into action. The civilian 
who would initially become responsible for Iraqi reconstruction—Jay Garner, a retired 
U.S. Army three-star—was first contacted by the Department of the Defense just a few 
  The commanding general, 
however, was not the only one in a terrible position. 
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months before the invasion of Iraq, in January of 2003.158  About 30 days prior to 
launching the invasion, Garner orchestrated a meeting that assembled “most of the 
players in the government’s postwar game, including the Pentagon, State Department, 
CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], the vice president’s office, and McKiernan’s 
command at Camp Doha [the Kuwaiti base of the three-star headquarters overall 
responsible for planning, preparing, coordinating, and executing ground operations in 
Iraq].”159  The meeting was to provide an “opportunity for each agency to pitch its ideas 
about how to proceed, but there was, as yet, no master strategy.”160  In fact, one general 
who participated in the session concluded that “The U.S. agencies were not ready, had no 
real understanding of what Iraq was like, and did not yet have a coherent plan….There 
was no clear demarcation between what would be run by the civilians and what the 
generals would control.  The funding for the multibillion-dollar undertaking in Iraq was 
still up in the air, and it was ludicrous to expect that it would all come from the U.N.”161
    In April of 2003—a month after the invasion of Iraq and only two after Garner held his 
initial meeting at Camp Doha—Ambassador Bremer had been contacted about the 
possibility of assuming the responsibilities originally given to Garner.  After an interview 
with President Bush, the Ambassador agreed.  In his words, the President gave him “full 
  
By May of 2003, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) that 
Garner led was disbanded.  He and his staff returned to the United States.  In their stead, 
came Ambassador L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA). 
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authority to bring all the resources of the American government to bear on Iraq’s 
reconstruction….I was neither Rumsfeld’s nor Powell’s man.  I was the President’s 
man….Over the next two weeks, I had a frenzied series of meeting at the Pentagon, 
struggling to get ‘read in’ on the situation in Iraq before my departure.  Between sessions, 
I scrambled to assemble a staff.”162  Many on that staff were young professionals who 
had never worked outside the United States and would never leave Baghdad’s secure 
“Green Zone.”  Many rotated in and out of their jobs in well less than a year, some 
rotations were as short as 90 days; and many were more politically correct than 
professionally competent.163
    For a variety of reasons progress that year was, at best, fitful.  Saddam Hussein was 
captured and Iraqi sovereignty was transferred to an interim government that set the 
conditions for drafting an Iraqi constitution and elections.  But, the insurgency grew as 
did Al Qaeda’s involvement in it, fed in part by the increase of foreign fighters but also 
by the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and the de-Ba’athification program—two Bremer-
related policies that were at the time, and remain, controversial.  Violence from an 
expanding Shia militia also contributed to Iraqi insecurity and instability, as did and the 
misdeeds committed by Iraqi Security Forces and crimes committed by U.S. soldiers in 
the Abu Ghraib prison.  Neither the still-forming Iraqi Army nor its police were 
  The Ambassador would hold his job for about a year, until 
June 2004—the same tenure as Lieutenant General Sanchez. 
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proficient enough or large enough to help stem the rising violence. Simply put: the 
situation in Iraq had deteriorated.164
    In 2004, one well-known defense analyst put it this way: “it quickly became apparent 
that the…administration had paid far more attention to the planning and conduct of the 
war than to the planning and conduct of the ‘peace.’”  Moreover, he continues, one of the 
main obstacles was “continuing division…over U.S. policy toward Iraq and the 
respective roles of the State and Defense Departments in formulating and implementing 
that policy.”
       
165  Major General, retired, Spider Marks, who was a senior intelligence 
officer in Iraq at this time said, “My position is that we lost momentum and that the 
insurgency was not inevitable….We had momentum going in…but we did not have 
enough troops to conduct combat patrols.”166  General (now retired) Jack Keane, who 
was the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army at the time, said more bluntly, that the 
United States mission in Iraq was made all the more difficult by the administration’s 
aversion to nation-building and its determination not to study the lessons of its 
predecessors.  Keane added that military leaders, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Vice Chiefs, and General Franks share responsibility [with the political leaders at the 
time] for the problems in Iraq.167
        Confusion, insufficient attention, and lack of civil-military cohesion followed the 
initial success in Iraq, just as in Afghanistan, and the price of this confusion, 
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insufficiency, and lack of cohesion was paid in blood, for years.  As Afghanistan slid 
toward the Taliban, Iraq was coming apart.168
    In the early summer of 2004, Ambassador Bremer and Lieutenant General Sanchez 
were replaced by Ambassador John Negroponte and General George W. Casey.  
Ambassador Negroponte’s U.S. Embassy and its staff would replace the ad hoc Coalition 
Provisional Authority.  To replace the lone, three-star army corps, General Casey would 
create a large staff commensurate with his four-star rank (Multi-national Force, Iraq).  
Additionally, Casey, understanding the complexity and scope of his task, brought in 
three, three-star deputies: one to run combat operations (Multi-national Corps, Iraq), a 
second to help create the Iraqi military and police forces (Multi-national Security and 
Transition Command, Iraq), and a third to run the special operations in Iraq.  The 
strategy, policies, and organizations that were put in place in 2004 would govern the war 
in Iraq for the next two and a half years.  But the violence went from bad to worse. 
 
     The summer of 2006, President Bush writes in Decision Points, “was the worst period 
of my presidency.  I thought about the war constantly.  While I was heartened by the 
determination of the Maliki Government and the death of Zarqawi [then leader of Al 
Qaeda in Iraq], I was deeply concerned that the violence was overtaking all else….For 
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the first time, I was worried we might not succeed.”169  In sum, the strategy in Iraq—
pursuing extremists and reducing (the already too small) military footprint as the 
Coalition trained Iraqi military and police forces— as well as the policies and military 
operations supporting that strategy were failing.  By the summer of 2006, President Bush 
noted, “an average of 120 Iraqis a day were dying.  The war had stretched to more than 
three years and we had lost more than 2,500 Americans.”170  In March of 2003 when the 
invasion of Iraq began, 75% of those polled believed that the U.S. had not made a 
mistake sending troops to Iraq, and only 23% thought sending troops was a mistake.  By 
December 2006, the numbers were 45% and 53% respectively.  Support for the war was 
clearly slipping.171
    “For two and a half years,” President Bush writes, “I had supported the strategy of 
withdrawing our forces as the Iraqis stepped forward—the ‘we’ll stand down as they 
stand up’ policy.  But in the months after the [2006] Samarra [mosque] bombing, I had 
started to question whether our approach matched the reality on the ground.”
   
172
                                                 
169 George W. Bush, Decision Points, op.cit., p. 367. 
  
Although there were successes in Iraq—elections to choose an interim national assembly 
to draft a constitution, a ratified constitution, as well as an election of a Prime Minister 
and of a permanent legislature—violence escalated nearly out of control, the legitimacy 
170 George W. Bush, Decision Points, ibid., p. 367. 
171 Gallup polling data:  http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx.  
172 George W. Bush, Decision Points, op.cit., p. 363.  The Askariya shrine at the Golden Mosque of 
Samarra is one of the holiest sites in shia Islam.  On February 22, 2006, two massive explosions destroyed 
the mosque.  The attack was an enormous provocation designed to incite a war between Iraqi Shia and 
Sunnis.  It succeeded. 
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of the war was being questioned, and the President concluded that he required a new 
strategy with radically new resources and policies.173
    The 2006 situation in Afghanistan was no better.  As President Bush put it, “My CIA 
and military briefings included increasingly dire reports about Taliban influence.  The 
problem was crystallized by a series of color-coded maps I saw in November, 2006.  The 
darker the shading, the more attacks had occurred in that part of Afghanistan.  The 2004 
map was lightly shaded.  The 2005 map had darker areas in the southern and eastern parts 
of the country.  By 2006, the entire southeastern quadrant was black.  In just one year the 
number of remotely detonated bombs had doubled.  The number of armed attacks had 
tripled.  The number of suicide bombings had more than quadrupled.”
   
174  When the U.S. 
invaded Afghanistan in November of 2001, 89% of those polled believed that the U.S. 
had not made a mistake sending troops to Afghanistan, and only 9% thought sending 
troops was a mistake.  By December 2006, the numbers were 25% and 70% respectively.  
Support for the Afghan war was slipping as well.175  The U.S. and NATO strategy—
diplomatic, military, economic, and political—was failing, the Afghans had lost faith in 
their government, and sanctuaries in Pakistan contributed to this worsening situation.176
    In the end, the wars in Afghanistan (still not over) and Iraq (with rising violence and 
resurgent Al Qaeda, Sunni insurgents and Shia militias at the time of this writing)
  
Further, legitimacy in the eyes of the American public had begun to be an issue. 
177
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cost the United States over 6,500 killed and over 51,000 wounded and an estimated $3 
trillion dollars.178
    The point of reviewing Iraq and Afghanistan, and recalling the Civil War, is not to 
recount mistakes.  No war is devoid of mistakes at any level, tactical through strategic, 
made by military and political leaders.  Every war contains a record of the learning and 
adapting necessary to move from pre-war beliefs and doctrines to what waging war and 
fighting actually requires.  Rather, the point is to provide a more detailed account of war-
waging responsibilities than was presented in chapter 1.  Further, to point out how 
difficult it is to exercise these responsibilities “sufficiently right” and how badly poor 
execution of these responsibilities affects the conduct of war.  Lives, of the innocent and 
of soldiers, are lost in every war; every war also involves risk to the political community, 
whether existential or a lesser degree.  Sufficient effectiveness in waging war, however, 
reduces the risks and lessens the likelihood that the lives used in war are wasted.  The 
reverse is also true:  ineffectiveness in waging war increases the loss of innocent life, risk 
to the political community, and the likelihood that the lives used are wasted.  In sum, all 
three examples—World War II, the American Civil War, and the U.S. post 9/11 wars—
demonstrate that the conduct of war includes both war-fighting and war-waging 
dimensions, that both dimension are related to individual and communal life, and that 
effectiveness in waging war matters.   
   
    To be a complete account of justice in the conduct of war, therefore, jus in bello cannot 
be limited only to right conduct in battle.  Such a narrow focus omits a crucial way in 
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which senior political and military leaders can meet or fail to meet their wartime 
responsibilities.  Jus in bello must include right conduct in waging war just as it includes 
right conduct in fighting war.   
    The brief review of the U.S. Civil War, the discussion of World War II in the previous 
chapter, and the initial look at the more recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, reveal that 
waging war involves at least the following senior political and military responsibilities:  
1. Making the best initial decisions possible concerning war aims, strategies 
(domestic, diplomatic, military, and non-military), policies, and campaigns.   
2. Adapting initial decisions as the dynamics of war unfold.    
3. Raising and allocating forces, other resources, and funds necessary to achieve 
those aims,  
4. Engaging in adequate diplomacy.   
5. Attending to the legitimacy of the war—maintaining public support.  
6. Making the military and non-military governmental agencies work well 
enough to execute strategies and policies and attain war aims.   
7. Establishing mechanisms that facilitate proper dialogue, decision making, 
action, and adaptation.     
    Depending upon the effectiveness of these war waging activities, a war can be 
shortened or prolonged.  Prolonging war unnecessarily entails more death—combatant 
and noncombatant—and requires more of a nation’s other resources.   When these actions 
are not adequately attended to, the cost is paid in lives as surely as failures and violations 
of the tactical dimension of war fighting.  A complete just war theory must expand its 
understanding of the conduct of war to accommodate the full set of war-waging activities 
and responsibilities.  
    Again, every war has mistakes, tactical through strategic, and every war contains a 
record of the learning and adapting from pre-war misconceptions to realities of war.  
Some mistakes will, fortunately, not result in unnecessary loss of life.  Others will.  Still 
others are not really mistakes at all.  Rather, they amount to failures of some senior 
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political and military leaders in meeting their war-waging responsibilities.  These kinds 
of failures are neither an “unfortunate consequence of war,” nor are they merely 
examples of human fallibility which are understandable.  Rather, they are the result of a 
kind of failure that just war theory must have the means to identify, criticize, and judge. 
   Soldiers and their leaders who observe the tactical jus in bello principles that Walzer 
presents mitigate part of war’s nastiness.  Applying these principles in combat is part of a 
soldier’s and a leader’s moral responsibility in war.  Sufficient capacity at the strategic, 
war-waging level can also mitigate part of war’s nastiness.  Applying the appropriate 
war-waging principles is part of a senior political and military leader’s moral 
responsibility in war.  Just war theory, therefore, must identify appropriate principles for 
the strategic dimension of jus in bello.  (This study will suggest a set of war-waging 
principles in chapter six.) 
    The standard for deciding upon war aims, strategy, policy, and military campaigns, 
then executing those decisions and adapting as the war unfolds is not perfection; no 
government or set of civil-military leaders could ever meet that standard.  Every 
government will make mistakes initially.  Every government’s policy and strategy as well 
as their execution will be only partially effective and efficient.  If a government’s civil 
and military leaders can learn and adapt quickly enough, it can make fewer mistakes than 
its enemy, improve its efficiency and effectiveness, thus increasing the probability of 
success and decreasing the probability of putting the political community at risk and 
wasting the lives of the innocent and the citizens-who-become-soldiers as well as other 
national resources.  If, however, a government’s civil and military leaders do not learn 
and adapt but continue to conduct a war for unattainable aims, using known inefficient 
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and ineffective strategies and policies, or through known inefficient or ineffective 
organizations and management processes, those leaders should be morally 
blameworthy—even if not legally guilty—for the results of their actions just as soldiers 
and their leaders ignoring the war convention would be on the battlefield.  Life, even if a 
soldier’s, is not a resource to be used without compunction.  Those senior political and 
military leaders whose responsibility it is to wage war have a responsibility to act in ways 
that lives—not only of the innocent but also of the soldiers they employ—are respected, 
not squandered. 
 
A Soldier’s Life Retains Moral Value.   
    Walzer firmly establishes the important role that the lives of the innocent play in jus in 
bello.  Conducting a war necessarily entails putting the lives of the innocent at risk, and 
the war-fighting jus in bello principles that he adduces are designed, rightly so, to limit 
risk to the innocent.  Conducting a war also necessarily entails using the lives of other 
human beings—whether at the war-fighting or war-waging level.  Jus in bello must also 
address how these lives can be used. Walzer’s emphasis on the lives of the innocent and 
on the effect that respecting the value of these live has in the conduct of war is necessary, 
absolutely necessary, but it is insufficient.  A soldier’s life also retains moral value and 
respecting the value of these lives also affects the conduct of war.   
    Confused and ill-thought out war aims, strategic concepts, and operational policies 
have consequences in the conduct of war, as do personnel policies, logistics policies, 
management structures, and decision-making and execution processes.  As Afghanistan 
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and Iraqi policies were being argued, decided, and implemented, innocents as well as 
American citizens-who-became-soldiers were dying each day.  Citizens-who-become-
soldiers understand that their lives change once they become soldiers.  Their inherent 
right to life is altered in substantial ways.  Soldiers become instruments, but not “mere 
instruments.”  They can be killed in war, justifiably; they are expected to risk their lives 
on behalf of the innocent, their fellow soldiers, and their political community.  They 
remain, however, not only moral agents, but also human beings and citizens. 
    The continued value of their lives during the conduct of war is manifested in three, 
morally relevant relationships.  The first is with the innocent—reflected in the limit of 
“due care” set at “due risk.”  Walzer treats this relationship adequately.  The second is 
with their military leaders—reflected in military leader obligations that recognize, as 
Walzer points out and General McChrystal’s remarks quoted in chapter 1 make clear, that 
“his soldiers are in one sense instruments with which he is supposed to win victories, but 
they are also men and women whose lives, because they are his to use, are also in his 
care.”179
    This third relationship is reflected in President Lincoln’s words at Gettysburg, and also 
reflected in President Bush’s remarks on the evening of January 10, 2007, when he 
stepped in front of television cameras and said, “The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to 
the American people—and it is unacceptable to me.  Our troops in Iraq have fought 
bravely.  They have done everything we asked them to do.  Where mistakes have been 
  Walzer recognizes this relationship, but his treatment of it is less complete.   
The third is between citizens-who-become-soldiers and their government.  This 
relationship and its relevance to jus in bello is all but absent from Walzer’s account. 
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made, the responsibility rests with me.  It is clear that we need to change our strategy in 
Iraq.”180  Here the President is clearly referring to what the government owes the 
citizens-who-become-soldiers so that their lives are used well: properly identified war 
aims, strategies, and policies, as well as effective military campaigns and the political and 
military bureaucracies that can translate plans into actions—all so that their sacrifices are 
not in vain.  Separate from his remarks on television, the President clearly describes the 
necessity of dialogue between senior political and military leaders in his discussion not 
only of the decisions he made leading up to the 2007 changes in Iraqi strategy, policy, 
and personnel but also in their execution.181
    Walzer recognizes that political leaders should not plan, prepare, initiate, and wage an 
aggressive war, else the war would be unjustified.  Accordingly, governments must use 
the lives of their citizens-who-become-soldiers only for “purposes worth dying for, 
outcomes for which soldier’s lives are not too high a price.  The idea of a just war 
requires the same assumption.  A just war is one that it is morally urgent to win, and a 
soldier who dies in a just war does not die in vain.  Critical values are at stake [i.e. the 
defense against aggression or other uses of force authorized by the Legalist Paradigm and 
its exceptions]….The deaths that occur in their course…are morally comprehensible—
which is not to say that they are also occasionally the products of military stupidity and 
bureaucratic snafu:  soldiers die senselessly even in wars that are not senseless.”
   
182
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   For 
Walzer, the legitimate ends of war, its goals, set limits for even a just war.  “Once they 
are won, or once they are within political reach, the fighting should stop.  Soldiers killed 
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beyond that point die needlessly, and to force them to fight and possibly to die is a crime 
akin to that of aggression itself.”183
     In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer did not address this relationship or its moral 
relevance with respect to the conduct of war, for he provided only an account of right 
conduct in the fighting of war.  In Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and 
Equality, however, Walzer provides a way to account for this third relationship and 
explain a fourth limit on the legitimate use of state power in the waging of war:  that lives 
are to be used as wisely as possible. 
  Nor can political leaders set in place policies that 
require war crimes.  These are the three limits that Just and Unjust Wars places on the 
legitimate use of state power.  A government’s relationship to its citizens-who-become-
soldiers, however, demands more. 
184
    In democracies, Spheres of Justice argues, state power is necessary but limited and 
flows from citizens to political leaders and institutions.
   
185
    These rights, retained by citizens-who-become-soldiers relative to both their military 
and political leaders, prevent service from becoming enslavement.  The concept of 
  Democratic sovereignty does 
not entail domination over its citizens.  The moral relevance of Walzer’s two most basic 
human rights of life and liberty are manifest in his account of jus in bello at the tactical, 
war-fighting level; they also provide an account of senior political and military leaders’ 
war-waging responsibilities and should be captured by the jus in bello’s strategic 
dimension.   
                                                 
183 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. 110. 
184 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York:  Basic Books, 
1983), pp. 282-84 and 289. 
185 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, ibid., p. 281. 
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slavery entails an absence of any kind of rights.  The slave is not a person.  He or she 
becomes an object, a piece of property that can be used as any other object one owns.  
This is what makes slavery so morally objectionable.   In becoming a soldier serving a 
democracy, whether conscripted or volunteer, a citizen does not become a slave nor does 
the state become a tyrant.  As with all other citizens, the power of the state is limited with 
regard to citizens-who-become-soldiers. 
    Certainly, as has already been presented, soldiers can be used in ways other citizens 
cannot.  Justice places limits, however, on how the lives of soldiers can be used.  That is, 
even in a just war, justice demands that a government use the lives of its citizens-who-
become-soldiers as wisely as possible.  Ineptitude in waging war—errors beyond 
understandable mistakes resulting from human fallibility—forces citizens to fight under 
conditions that increase the likelihood that their sacrifices will be in vain.   
    Justice arises in a system that “ideally rational men and women would choose if they 
were forced to choose impartially, knowing nothing of their own situation, barred from 
making particularist claims, confronting an abstract set of goods.”186  Not knowing his or 
her position in a society, set of natural assets and abilities, or level of intelligence, no 
citizen would choose a system that might require a total loss of rights should he or she 
become a soldier.  Rather, the rational choice from behind this “veil of ignorance” would 
be to ensure the system of justice include limits as to how the government can use the 
lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers—even in war.187
                                                 
186 Quoted from Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, ibid., p. 5, but referring to John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  The Belknap Press, 1971), especially pp. 11-22. 
  These limits may be ambiguous, 
like the line between due risk and due care or the line between bravery and heroism, but 
187 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, ibid., p. 12. 
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limits exist none-the-less.  Clear limits, for example, are set by duration—the increased 
risk demanded of soldiers ends when a soldier is captured, wounded, or leaves service.  A 
second clear limit is condition—risks acceptable during a war are greater than those 
acceptable in peacetime training.   Scope is a third clear limit—a democratic government 
cannot limit a soldier’s right to religious belief, for example, or to own personal property.   
    War-waging jus in bello responsibilities, absent from Walzer’s account, emanate not 
only from responsibilities toward the innocent and toward one’s political community but 
also from what democratic governments owe the citizens whose lives they use, whether 
volunteers or conscripts.  That is, that the senior political and military leaders waging a 
war on behalf of a democratic government may not squander the lives of the citizens-
who-become-soldiers without accruing moral blame.  Rather, they must use these lives 
responsibly.  “Responsible use” is a fourth limit on governmental power.  When senior 
political and military leaders fail to meet their war-waging responsibilities, and the failure 
is not merely a mistake or error, they act beyond the limit of “responsible use” and are, 
therefore, morally blameworthy. 
 
Conclusions:  Looking beyond Walzer. 
    Jus in bello, justice in the conduct of war, must expand to include principles and a 
theory of responsibility for those waging war.  To understand these responsibilities will 
require looking beyond Walzer.  One possible explanation of these responsibilities, which 
will be taken up in the next chapter, lies with the principal-agent theory found in Peter 
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Feaver’s Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations.188
    Armed Servants uses as its starting point Samuel Huntington’s classic work, The 
Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.
  In this 
book, Feaver argues that “the essence of civil-military relations is a strategic interaction 
between civilian principals and military agents.”  This is the exact intersection at which 
war-waging decisions—war aims, strategy, policy, and military operations—and their 
execution meet.  This is also the intersection of both governmental and military 
bureaucracies.  Although Feaver does not intend the principal-agent framework he 
presents in Armed Servants to be used to fill the jus in bello gap in just war theory, his 
concepts are worth investigating as possible gap-fillers. 
189  Feaver 
acknowledges Huntington’s decades-long influence in the United States, but seeks to 
advance an alternative theory, “drawing upon relatively recent advances in the study of 
political oversight of the non-security bureaucracy.”190  An understanding of Feaver, 
therefore, will require a short discussion of Huntington’s central ideas.  Feaver departs 
from Huntington by using the “principal-agent framework to derive a specific theory” to 
explain how senior civilian and military leaders, and their bureaucracies, interact.191
                                                 
188 Feaver, Peter D.  Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 2003). 
  
Political leaders are the principals; military leaders, their agents.  Chapter 3 provides with 
a brief summary of Huntington, so that Feaver’s principal-agent framework can be 
understood within the correct context.  Then the chapter goes on to present, analyze, and 
critique the framework Feaver adduces.  
189 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State:  The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) 
190 Feaver, Peter D.  Armed Servant, op.cit., p.2. 




The Relationship between Senior Political and Military Leaders  
 
 
    This chapter will investigate whether the principal-agent theory of civil-military 
relations as expressed primarily in Peter Feaver’s Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, 
and Civil-Military Relations can provide an adequate foundation for the war-waging 
responsibilities identified in chapter 1 and explored in detail in chapter 2.192  Armed 
Servants investigates how the civil and military bureaucracies of the U.S. defense 
establishment and their senior leaders interact with one another.  Specifically, Feaver 
hopes to answer this question: How do civilians control the military?193  Samuel 
Huntington’s classic work, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations194 is the starting point for Feaver’s discussion in Armed Servants.  
Feaver acknowledges Huntington’s decades-long influence in the United States, but seeks 
to advance an alternative theory, “drawing upon relatively recent advances in the study of 
political oversight of the non-security bureaucracy.”195
    This chapter will find that Feaver’s approach contributes to the understanding of the 
tri-partite tension inherent in waging war, namely the requirements of execution and the 
importance of civil primacy.  Ultimately, however, the principal-agent framework used in 
Armed Servants will be found incapable of providing an adequate foundation for the war-
  An understanding of Feaver, 
therefore, requires a short discussion of Huntington’s central ideas.   
                                                 
192 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servants, ibid. 
193 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants, ibid., p. 1. 
194 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State:  The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) 
195 Feaver, Peter D.  Armed Servant, op.cit., p.2. 
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waging responsibilities of senior political and military leaders. The principal-agent 
framework’s over-focus on military compliance and on the economic-based relationship 
between civilian-principals and military-agents risks excluding other essential aspects of 
senior leader war-waging responsibilities as well as treating the lives of citizens-who-
become-soldiers as if they have less value than they actually do.   
 
The Soldier and The State and Armed Servants. 
    Huntington’s The Soldier and the State uses a paradox to identify the core issue in 
democratic civil-military relations.  On one hand, to provide security, which is a military 
force’s function, a nation’s military must be large enough and have sufficient skills, 
leadership, and materiel to create and sustain the capacities the nation needs to be secure 
relative to the threats that nation faces, or believes it faces.   On the other hand, a nation’s 
military cannot be so strong that it ends up destroying the very state it is designed to 
serve.  “The military institutions of any society,” Huntington claims, “are shaped by two 
forces:  a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a 
social imperative arising from the forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the 
society.”196
     Huntington suggests that the proper balance is achieved through a complex set of 
power and attitudinal relationships among civilian and military groups.  “Nations which 
develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations,” he goes on to say, “have a 
  Achieving a proper balance between the functional and social imperatives is, 
for Huntington, the crux of the civil-military relationship issue. 
                                                 
196 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op.cit., p. 2. 
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great advantage in the search for security.  They increase their likelihood of reaching 
right answers to the operating issues of military policy.  Nations which fail to develop a 
balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated 
risks.”197  For Huntington, increasing the likelihood of reaching right answers to the 
operating issues—that is, the war-waging activities of identifying strategic aims, then 
crafting strategies and policies and conducting military campaigns that will lead to 
achieving those aims—is an important part of the functional imperative.  Having and 
using a military force, should use become necessary, without putting the state itself at risk 
results from properly balancing both the functional and social imperatives.  The Soldier 
and the State posits five ways to balance the functional and social imperatives, thus 
create a proper civil-military relationship.  Huntington ultimately rejects the first four, 
and adopts the fifth. 198
     Military officers and political leaders form the core of the civil-military relationship.  
The military officer corps, Huntington says, is the “active directing element of the 
military structure and is responsible for the military security of the society.”  The political 
leaders of the state are “responsible for the allocation of resources among important 
values including military security.”
 
199
                                                 
197 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., p. 2. 
  The first way to ensure a proper balance between 
the functional and social imperative Huntington calls “subjective civilian control.”  In 
this form, the civilian group that has gained control of the state simply selects a sufficient 
number of officers that agree with the controlling group’s ideology.  Huntington says that 
“subjective control is…the only form of civilian control possible in the absence of a 
198 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., pp. 80-85. 
199 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., p. 3. 
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professional officer corps….and except very recently in western society, civilian control 
has existed only in this subjective sense.”200  The second alternative he considers is called 
“civilian control by governmental institutions.”201  This alternative has the military forces 
under the control of the nation’s Chief Executive—the Crown, the President, or the Prime 
Minister—or the nation’s representative body—a Parliament, Council of Representatives, 
or Congress.  The third method is called “civilian control by social class.”202  Here 
military forces are controlled by an aristocracy or some other sub-group, sect, or tribe of 
the nation at large.  Fourth, Huntington poses “civilian control by constitutional form.”203
    Huntington points out that even in a democracy “the military may undermine civilian 
control and acquire great political power through the legitimate process and institutions 
of democratic government and politics.”
  
That is, civilian control is identified with democracies, while military control is 
associated with absolute or totalitarian governments.  He rejects these four forms of civil-
military relationships as proper for the United States because each increases the military 
participation in politics which, in turn, puts the social imperative at risk.    
204  The fifth alternative, the one that Huntington 
ultimately adopts, is “objective civilian control” which maximizes military 
professionalism.205  The essence of objective civilian control is “the recognition of 
autonomous military professionalism; the essence of [the forms of] subjective civilian 
control is the denial of an independent military sphere.”206
                                                 
200 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., pp. 80-81. 
  Objective control, as 
Huntington posits it, requires a highly professional officer corps that will carry out the 
201 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., p. 81. 
202 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., pp. 81-82. 
203 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., pp. 82-82. 
204 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., p. 82. 
205 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., pp. 83-96. 
206 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., p. 83. 
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wishes of any group of political leaders regardless of its ideology.  Crudely put, a degree 
of military autonomy is exchanged for an apolitical officer corps and military.  Objective 
control strengthens the military’s functional capacity while ensuring it remains a tool of 
the state; the forms of subjective control decrease functional capacity because they 
“civilianize” and “politicize” the military and increase the military’s involvement in 
politics—thus putting both the functional and social imperatives at risk.207
    Huntington then acknowledges that the U.S. Constitutional separation of powers is a 
stumbling block to the ideal version of objective control because the military must report 
to both the Legislative and Executive branches of government and, therefore, will be 
involved in the political struggles between those branches.  In the end, however, 
Huntington concludes that no actual civil-military relationship is ever ideal and “within 
the framework of the separation of power, institutional adjustments can be made which 
will reduce its deleterious effects.  But…a lesser measure of civilian control and lower 
standards of military professionalism are the continuing prices the American people will 
have to pay for the other benefits of their constitutional system.”
   
208
    Since its publication in 1957, The Soldier and The State has had an on-going, 
significant, and one might even say, dominant, influence in the way American military 
and political leaders view each other’s roles. 
   
209
                                                 
207 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., pp. 84-85. 
  Reflecting this continuing influence 
General (retired) Barry McCaffrey, who has had experience with U.S. civil-military 
relations as both a general and a cabinet member, suggested in 2009 the following 
208 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ibid., pp. 191-92. 
209 A good summary of Huntington’s position as well as the contribution and influence The Soldier and The 
State has had on the U.S. military can be found in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, American Civil-
Military Relations:  The Soldier and The State in a New Era (Baltimore, Maryland:  The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2009), especially pp. 1-10 and 290-308. 
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guidelines for senior military officers, “First, senior military leaders must adamantly 
manifest non-partisan behavior and attitudes while on active duty….[and]…must be 
viewed by the public and senior civilian leaders as politically neutral and blind to partisan 
considerations.  Second, senior military leaders speak frankly and objectively, where their 
professional judgments are asked for and not reflect a loyalty to hierarchy that leaves the 
policy process adrift….[and they] must be utterly transparent and honest when dealing 
with their constitutional masters in Congress; with the President and the president’s 
officers….”210
    In Armed Servants Peter Feaver recognizes that “Huntington’s theory, outlined in The 
Soldier and the State, remains the dominant theoretical paradigm in civil-military 
relations, especially the study of American civil-military relations….Huntington’s model 
is widely recognized as the most elegant, ambitious, and important statement on civil-
military relations theory to date.” 
  Walzer, too, reflects Huntington’s influence—even if not intentionally.  
Huntington’s objective control and the autonomy of the political and military spheres it 
requires form the foundation of the hard line that Walzer draws between war itself and 
the conduct of war. 
211  Feaver seeks to update one portion of Huntington’s 





                                                 
210 Quoted in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, American Civil-Military Relations, ibid., p. xv. 
211 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, op.cit., p. 7. 
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91 
 
Feaver’s Principal-Agent framework. 
    The principal-agent framework is “an approach developed by economists to analyze 
problems of agency, where one person has delegated authority to someone else to act on 
his behalf….Civilians invent the military, contracting with it to protect society from 
enemies, but then civilians find it necessary to assure themselves that the military will 
behave as intended.”213  In sum, the framework that Feaver uses supposes that a specific 
type of employer-employee relationship exists between civilians and the military.  He 
explains that relationship this way:  “The employer (principal) would like to hire a 
diligent worker (agent), and, once hired, would like to be certain that the employee is 
doing what he is supposed to do (working) and not doing something else (shirking).  The 
employee, of course, would like to be hired and so has an incentive to appear more 
diligent during the interview than he really is; this fact complicates the employer’s efforts 
to pick the sort of employee who will want to work hard….Once hired, moreover, the 
employee has an incentive to do as little work as he can get away with, all the while 
sending information back to the employer that suggests he is performing at an acceptable 
level; this fact complicates the employer’s efforts to keep tabs on the employee….The 
principal-agent approach, then, analyzes how the principal can shape the relationship so 
as to ensure that his employees are carrying out his wishes….”214
    In the case of the civilian (employer)-military (employee) relationship, “the military 
officer is promising to risk his life, or to order his comrades to risk their lives, to execute 
any policy decisions.  The civilian actor is promising to answer to the electorate for the 
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consequences of any policy decisions.  The military officer is expected to obey even 
stupid orders, or resign in favor of someone who will.  The civilian is claiming the right 
to be wrong.”215  This kind of military officer-civilian leader relationship forms, for 
Feaver, “a subtextual [to the] civil-military discourse for all policy making in the national 
security realm.”216
    Feaver defines the functional goal in terms of “working”—that is, the employee doing 
what the employer wants and doing it the way the employer wants it done.
  The civil-military, employer-to-employee relationship returns Feaver 
to the basic paradox that Huntington describes:  the employers (civilian leaders) want two 
things from their employees (the military), to protect against external enemies—the 
functional imperative, and to remain subordinate to their employees—the social 
imperative which Feaver calls “the Relational Goal.” 
217  Doing 
anything other than what the employer wants as the employer wants it done is “shirking.”  
Working, according to Feaver but quite unlike Huntington, does not necessarily mean 
that the outcomes of military action will please civilians.  In fact, some of the things that 
civilian leadership wants done may in fact result in losing a war, for working and shirking 
are not synonymous with winning and losing on the battlefield.  One side can “work,” in 
the narrowly-defined, principal-agent framework sense of the work, and still lose; 
likewise, one side can “shirk” and still win.218  In the principal-agent framework, military 
officers “should advise against…policies [they consider ill-advised], but the military 
should not prevent those policies from being implemented.”219
                                                 
215 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p.8. 
  What Feaver is insisting 
on is not a civil-military relationship that increases the probability of “choosing wisely” 
216 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., pp. 8 and 9. 
217 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 61. 
218 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 64. 
219 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 65. 
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with respect war to aims, strategies, policies, or military campaigns—which was inherent 
in Huntington’s understanding of the functional imperative.  Rather, because of the very 
specific way the principal-agent framework understands the employer-employee 
relationship, the resultant military officer-political leader relationship is based primarily, 
perhaps even solely, on power and control.   
    Civilians are related to the military as principals and employers are related to agents 
and employees.  Further, according to the principal-agent framework that Feaver uses, 
employees are always likely to shirk, given the chance.  Even if employee goals and 
desires coincide with those of the employers, employers would not necessarily know that.  
As such, civilian-employers must figure out how to best monitor and control their 
military-employees so as to make sure they do what the employers want and how they 
want it done.  That is, civilian-employers must identify cost-effective monitoring 
schemes that increases the likelihood of their military-employees “working” and reduces 
the incidences of “shirking.” All employers must monitor employees, so the question is 
only how intrusive or extensive must the monitoring scheme becomes.   
    In some ways, Feaver’s discussion is unremarkable.  Senior leaders of all large 
organizations—whether government bureaucracies, corporations, or military 
headquarters—are charged to “get things done,” so must monitor their work force and 
subordinate leaders.  Goals without strategies to execute them are dreams, and 
execution—especially in large, complex, and geographically dispersed organizations—
requires monitoring schemes.  In this sense, all senior military leaders monitor their own 
organizations through a combination of personal inspections as well as staff and 
subordinate leader reports and assessments.  Senior political leaders—Executive and 
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Legislative—also monitor not only the civilian and military actions within the 
Department of Defense but also the other departments, agencies, and organizations that 
make up the U.S. government.  Such monitoring is, and will always be, conducted. 
    Similarly unremarkable is Feaver’s “right to be wrong,” if this formulation can be 
taken merely as a strongly worded way to say that in democracies the final decision 
authority concerning war aims, strategies, policies, and campaigns lies with senior 
political leaders, not military leaders.  Civilian principals have the right to direct military 
agents to do something that ultimately proves costly, foolhardy, and even disastrous.  
Military agents have an obligation to point out, honestly and clearly, the potential 
negative consequences of proposed courses of action.  Feaver recognizes that senior 
military leaders should always present their views and assessments, argue over what they 
believe are imprudent strategies or policies, and make every attempt to mitigate risks 
inherent in the final decisions. 220
    In this unremarkable sense, Feaver’s approach is merely descriptive of what is 
necessary to ensure the proper balance between the functional and social imperative, thus 
making sure a nation has both a strong, capable military and one that is subordinate to 
civilian authority.  In other ways, however, Feaver’s approach goes well beyond this 
unremarkable sense causing an imbalance between the functional and social imperatives.  
Further, the imbalance created by the principal-agent framework results from an 
  In the end, however, the choices for senior military 
leaders are few:  execute the decisions of the senior political leaders as if they were their 
own and inform political leaders of any adaptations to initial directives based upon 
unfolding realities on the battlefield, or resign.   
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inaccurate understanding of the functional imperative and the roles that both senior 
political and military leader play in waging war. 
    Feavers’s approach is radically incomplete.  A civil-military relationship based upon 
power and control is not the kind of relationship necessary to wage war.  The object of 
the wartime civil-military relationship—to identify the set of war aims, strategies, 
policies, and military campaigns which when executed, have the highest probability of 
success and to adapt these aims, strategies and policies as the reality of war unfolds—is 
left out of a framework that defines “work” as narrowly as does Armed Servants.  Power 
and control replace the functional imperative as Huntington conceived of it, or at least 
diminishes its importance.  
    Feaver uses the Vietnam War as “a case of military working even in the presence of 
sharp disagreements between civilians and the military.”221  The Vietnam War, then, 
provides a good example of why Feavers’s approach is radically incomplete.  The 
principal-agent framework is not concerned with evaluations of whether the United States 
should have intervened, whether the intervention was executed well, or the outcome of 
the intervention.  Rather it is concerned “first and foremost with whether and why 
military agents acted as directed by civilian principals, whether the military complied 
with its civilian masters.” 222
    “It is generally conceded,” Feaver states, “that the military did not press the war on 
reluctant civilian leaders but rather the reverse.”
 
223
                                                 
221 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 171. 
  Feaver does describe several times 
222 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 172. 
223 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 172. 
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during the Vietnam War at which the military could be rightly accused of shirking,224 and 
he notes that there is some conventional wisdom that says the military did not shirk 
enough during the war, that they were “overprofessional” in their attitude.225  But in the 
end, he calls attention to the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not resign en masse in 
1967, so concludes that the military did not shirk as much as one might have expected 
and that Vietnam was in general an example of military subordination in which the 
military obeyed an order to fight.226  In terms of the agency framework, “civilians 
monitored intrusively and the military apparently worked during the Vietnam War.”227
    As to why, Feaver presents three main reasons.  First, “there is direct evidence 
supporting the agency interpretation that military expectations of punishment were 
high.”
  
He then turns his attention to the questions of why the military subordinated themselves 
to civilian leadership and to what result? 
228
                                                 
224 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., pp. 172-74. 
  In the 1960s, senior military leaders would have had clear memories of General 
Douglas MacArthur’s insubordination to President Truman and subsequent removal from 
command in Korea.  This memory was reinforced during a conversation between 
President Johnson and General Westmoreland in February 1966.  The President 
225 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 174. The conventional wisdom to which Feaver refers comes 
primarily from three U.S. Army officers who claim that senior military leaders were too compliant with 
strategies they knew were not succeeding and could not succeed—the latter being more important than the 
former:  Colonel Harry G. Summers, On War:  The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania:  Strategic Studies Institute, 1981); Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr. The 25-Year War:  
America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984); and 
(then Major but now Major General) H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty:  Lyndon Johnson, Robert 
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1997).  Feaver did not reference, but could have, one more military piece that follows suit:  
Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Wayne, New Jersey:  Avery Publishing Group 
Inc., 1985).  
226 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid.., p. 172 and 174. 
227 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 175. 
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reportedly told the General, “I have a lot riding on you…I hope you don’t pull a 
MacArthur on me.”229  Second, the Johnson administration manipulated the services.  
“Interservice rivalry and the preoccupation of senior military officers with advancing 
their own service interests gave civilian principals the opportunity to offer service ‘side 
payments’ in the form of an expansion in the size of the Marine Corps or control over 
particularly desirable billets that inflated the value of working.”230  Finally, civilian 
leaders used a form of subjective control and “promoted senior military officers who 
concurred with the civilian viewpoint, or at least did not disagree so strongly.”231
    The Vietnam War lasted over two decades—from the 1954 advisory effort to the final 
withdrawal in 1975.
 
232  The war resulted in 58,220 U.S. deaths,233 cost about $738 billion 
(in fiscal year 2011 dollars), and did not attain the stated U.S war aims.234  These results, 
however, do not matter with regard to analyzing the war from the principal-agent 
perspective.  “The goal civilians pursued, the substance of ‘working,’ was to preserve 
South Vietnam without conquering North Vietnam….This was quite clearly what civilian 
leaders wanted, and they refused to pay for anything more.  Such a goal was 
inappropriate and perhaps unachievable, given…strategic realities….But it was the policy 
the civilians asked for and, by and large, it was the policy the military delivered.  So far 
as civil-military relations go, civilians have a right to be wrong.  This time they were.”235
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230 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 175. 
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232 I used the dates in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, Marlyland:  The 
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The perspective in which Feaver is interested is this:  Vietnam was an example of a 
divergence of views between political and military leaders.  Intrusive monitoring, threats 
of punishment, and manipulation were required to ensure the military “worked” and did 
not “shirk.”  The Johnson administration used each of these mechanisms, and the military 
“worked” in the narrow, principal-agent sense of the word. 
    The Vietnam War, in Feaver’s mind, is an example of the principal-agent approach at 
work.  He presents the elements of the principal-agent framework; then uses Vietnam—
as well as the Cold War, Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo—to show how 
the framework applies in real cases.236
    The intent of Armed Servants is not, however, merely to analyze one aspect of the 
civil-military relationship, civil control over the military.  Rather, it is to present “agency 
theory as a worthy alternative to the reigning institutional paradigm of civil-military 
relations, Huntington’s model of civilian control.”
  Each case is evaluated by one criterion:  did the 
military “work” or “shirk.”  That is, whether political leaders retained power and control 
over the military.  Feaver’s fundamental issue is to establish how principals act in order 
to secure compliance with their agents. 
237
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  Toward this intent, Feaver 
demonstrates that Huntington’s model which predicted the military would work only 
under nonintrusive civilian monitoring is inaccurate.  Feaver uses Cold War and post-
Cold War cases to show that the military generally worked—in the narrow definition of 
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“work”—even when the military disagreed with civilian decisions and even under 
intrusive civilian monitoring.238
    Power, control, obedience, and compliance in light of a “right to be wrong”—the core 
of the principal-agent framework and the subtext for all civil-military policy discourse—
are necessary parts of the relationship between senior political leaders and their military 
subordinates.  A variety of monitoring regimes, some intrusive and others not, are also 
necessary—as they are in every bureaucracy.  In the sense of understanding how the civil 
and military bureaucracies interact and how principals get agents to comply with their 
directives, Feaver’s approach in Armed Servants is helpful.    
 
    If agency theory is to replace the reigning model, however, it will have to explain more 
than it does now.  Ensuring compliance, while important, is but a small component of the 
civil-military relationship necessary to wage war.  For example, by themselves, power, 
control, obedience, and intrusive monitoring inhibit, rather than encourage, the very 
dialogue that even Feaver recognizes is necessary to wage war successfully.239  The 
relationship between the senior civilian and military leaders who wage war is more 
complicated than the principal-agent formulation:  members of the military (agents) 
promise to risk their lives and civilian leaders (principals) promise to answer to the 
electorate for the consequences of any policy decisions.240
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  These promises do not suffice 
with respect to war-waging responsibilities.   Both senior political and military leaders 
have responsibility for the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers that are used in war and 
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for the lives of the innocent that are inherently as risk in war.  Further, both share the 
responsibility as architects of strategy and policy and as those who execute their 
bureaucracies and adapt to war as it unfolds.  The relevant difference is that senior 
political leaders have final decision authority whereas senior military leaders do not.   
    Feaver ends Armed Servants by saying “let civilian voters punish civilian leaders for 
wrong decisions.  Let the military advise against foolish adventures, even advising 
strenuously when circumstances demand.  But let the military execute those orders 
faithfully.  The republic would be better served even by foolish working than by 
enlightened shirking.”241
    Gideon Rose, in How Wars End, makes a similar observation concerning the civil-
military interactions during the Iraq war:  “[Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld felt 
contempt…for the [defense] department’s conventional wisdom, and calmly set about 
bending the military to his will.  His first order of business was to eliminate the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff as an independent source of authority.  Then he stocked the hierarchy with 
officers who would follow his lead.  And finally he took personal charge of the war 
planning process, demanding endless drafts and relentlessly pushing [General Tommy] 
Franks to deliver something that conformed to his [Rumsfeld’s] specifications….So most 
officers simply shelved whatever disapproval they may have felt and gave their boss what 
  In this conclusion, Feaver is correct, but the republic would be 
best served by the kind of balance Huntington attempts to achieve in his “objective 
control model,” a balance which results in senior political leaders making war-waging 
decision that are likely to lead to success.   Compliance to orders is simply not enough; 
the substance of orders is also important.  Justice in war demands more than compliance. 
                                                 
241 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 302. 
101 
 
he wanted.242  Secretary Rumsfeld demonstrated power, established control, and received 
compliance but as Thomas White, the civilian Secretary of the Army during this period 
put it: ‘If you grind away at the military guys long enough, they will final say, ‘Screw it, 
I’ll do the best I can with what I have.’”243  Jeffrey Record corroborates Gideon Rose’s 
appraisal in Dark Victory:  America’s Second War Against Iraq by saying, “[Secretary] 
Rumsfeld…believed the Clinton administration had given the professional military too 
much latitude…and he was determined to reassert the authority of the Secretary of 
Defense…. ‘I want to reinstate civilian control of the military!,’ he roared during a 
meeting shortly after taking office.”244
    Rose’s and Record’s description of the civil-military relationship and the decisions and 
actions that emerged from it accords with the principal-agent framework.  The military 
“worked” because it did what the civilian leadership wanted, how they wanted it done, 
but the Iraq war lasted longer and resulted in more death, innocent and soldier, than it 
needed to in part because of this kind of relationship.  In the end, the cost of the Iraq War 
was over 5000 U.S. killed; tens of thousands of U.S. wounded; even more Iraqi 
casualties—military, police, and civilian; and an estimated of $1 trillion to the United 
States.  A civil-military relationship based upon power and control, one that seeks 
compliance over outcome, is simply not one that will generate effective war-waging 
decisions and actions. 
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    Feaver admits that he “has paid relatively less attention…to how civilian control [as he 
posits it] might affect the ability of the military to carry out its functional role to defend 
and advance the national interest.”245
    The Vietnam War and the Iraq War cases show that it’s no more possible to understand 
war-waging responsibilities using power, control, obedience to a right to be wrong, and 
intrusive monitoring to achieve compliance without reference to outcomes than it is to 
understand a professional sport using the internal dynamics of a sports team and the 
team’s relationship to management without reference to scoring.  Agency theory cannot 
be a “worthy alternative” to Huntington until it includes an analysis of the functional 
imperative. 
  But that’s just the point. 
    Civilian control of the military remained intact throughout the Vietnam War, but the 
functional imperative—effectiveness—suffered and tens of thousands of lives were used 
for no worthy purpose.  Of course, winning the war but losing civil control would be a 
worse outcome.  Huntington’s central idea concerning the two imperatives, however, was 
not to take an either/or approach; rather, it was to get the balance right:  have a military 
instrument capable of successfully protecting the nation while remaining subordinate to 
civil authority.  The principal-agent framework, at least as far as it goes in Armed 
Servants, emphasizes the social imperative over the functional and in doing so 
diminishes, even masks, a significant portion of the war-waging responsibilities of senior 
political and military leaders.  If in some future study Feaver takes up an analysis of the 
effect of agency theory on the functional imperative, he will have to explain not only how 
civilian control affects the military’s responsibilities for tactical, war-fighting functions 
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but also how it affects the strategic, war-waging functions that senior political and 
military leaders share. 
 
Implications for jus in bello war-waging responsibilities. 
    Perhaps one day Feaver or others will take up the task of completing an analysis of the 
principal-agent framework to determine its effect on the functional imperative.  In the 
meantime, the question relative to just war theory is whether, or to what extent, the 
framework presented in Armed Servants can illuminate understanding senior political and 
military leaders’ jus in bello war-waging responsibilities.  This question is a legitimate 
one even if Feaver himself does not ask it.   
    The principal-agent framework is helpful to understanding war-waging responsibilities 
in several ways.  First, the principal-agent framework addresses the second war-waging 
responsibility by explaining at least part of what is required to translate decisions 
concerning war aims, strategies, and policies into action.  Monitoring regimes—intrusive, 
non-intrusive, or some combinations of both—agency theory points out, are necessary to 
make sure execution stays aligned with decisions.  Such monitoring will be necessary 
both for military and non-military bureaucracies because war aims cannot be achieved 
through military means alone.   
    Secondly, the principal-agent framework corroborates the necessity of robust civil-
military dialogue as the means to identify war aims, strategies, and policies—even as the 
framework’s own structure, as will be seen below, inhibits the very dialogue it finds 
necessary.   
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    Finally, the framework identifies the necessity of civil primacy.  While seeking to 
provide a descriptive account of how the relationship between senior political and 
military leaders actually does work, Armed Servant’s goes on to say that democracy is 
“better served even by foolish working than by enlightened shirking.”246
    To account for civilian final decision authority and ultimate control as an aspect of the 
tension inherent in waging war, the tri-partite tension as presented in Chapter 2 must be 
adjusted.  The first two elements can stand as stated:  first, set war aims and make 
strategy and policy decisions that increase the probability of being right, or at least less 
wrong than those one is fighting; second, translate those decisions into action to achieve 
war aims at the least cost, in lives and resources, and least risk to one’s political 
community then adapt decisions and actions as the war unfolds.  The third, however, 
must be changed to read:  do all of the foregoing while observing the war convention; 
maintaining legitimacy, public support of the war effort; and maintaining proper 
subordination of the military to civilian leadership. 
 Such a 
statement is unfounded, for descriptive accounts alone cannot provide the basis for 
normative claims.   Democracies require that elected leaders, as opposed to military 
officers, have final decision authority and retain ultimate control of the military.  The tri-
partite tension in the war-waging dimension of jus in bello, therefore, should be amended 
to so state.   
   These three contributions to understanding the war-waging responsibilities of senior 
political and military leaders, however, are accompanied by four areas that prevent the 
principal-agent theory from providing an adequate foundation for jus in bello’s war-
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waging responsibilities.  First, the internal dynamics set in motion by power, control, 
obedience to a “right to be wrong,” and intrusive monitoring can obstruct the very 
dialogue necessary to wage war.  Second, compliance monitoring inhibits adapting initial 
decisions to the changing realities inherent in war.  Third, because the economic-based 
principal-agent framework leaves out other aspects of the relationship between citizens-
who-become-soldiers and their government, soldiers’ lives are treated as if they had less 
value than they actually have.  Finally, the civilian “right to be wrong” is too absolutely 
stated to be a useful guide in the conduct of war.  Each of these shortcomings will be 
taking up in turn. 
   First, the internal dynamics set in motion by power, control, obedience to a “right to be 
wrong,” and intrusive monitoring can obstruct the very dialogue necessary to wage war.  
The kind of dialogue necessary to properly execute war-waging responsibilities, one that 
both Armed Servants and Soldiers and Civilians describe as necessary, is unlikely to 
emerge from people in a work relationship based upon solely, or even primarily, upon 
power and control and where “work” is defined as doing what the civilian leadership 
wants done, how it wants it done.   
    Every work relationship has an economic dimension to it, and every work relationship 
has power and control dimensions.  But over-emphasizing power, control, and 
economics, and overly narrowing the definition of “work” can distort one’s 
understanding of a proper work relationship.  Such over-emphasis as the primary basis 
for their relationship with employees and subordinate leaders is more likely to establish a 
toxic work environment than one in which employees feel free to voice their opinions and 
contribute to success of the enterprise.    
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     President Johnson, known for his ability to establish power and control over those 
with whom he interacted, certainly did so with his military advisors.   For example, in 
early November 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested a meeting with the President to 
discuss how the war was being fought.  This was, in the words of one attendee, “to be the 
meeting to determine whether the U.S. military would continue its seemingly 
directionless Vietnam buildup to fight a protracted ground war or take bold measures 
designed to bring the war to an early, favorable conclusion.”247  The President “did not 
offer his guests a seat” and after “only a few minutes…attacked them in the most vile and 
despicable terms, cursing them personally, ridiculing their advice, using the crudest and 
filthiest language.”248  The result, not just of this single incident but of an environment 
set by the President and his Secretary of Defense in which control was paramount, was 
not an open dialogue which produced strategies and policies with a reasonable probability 
of success.  Rather, it was one that “did not permit a candid assessment of the situation or 
evaluation of possible American actions designed to influence it,” and one that created a 
relationship in which “the president remained ignorant of the Chief’s opinions, and the 
Chiefs remained ill-informed of the direction in which the administration’s Vietnam 
policy was headed.”249
    Secretary Rumsfeld’s desire to assert civilian control and the authority of the office of 
the Secretary of Defense over the Joint Chiefs and Services had similar results.  “Long 
before Operation Iraqi Freedom, even before 9/11,” writes defense analyst Jeffery 
Record, “civil-military tensions inside the Pentagon were running higher than perhaps at 
  It was a classic toxic environment. 
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any time since the reign of Robert McNamara [President Johnson’s Secretary of Defense 
during the Vietnam war], who, like Rumsfeld, was an abrasive, assertive, exceptionally 
self-confident man who was not afraid to impose his views on the professional 
military.”250  Even President Bush, acknowledging Secretary Rumsfeld’s strengths, 
admitted that “at times, Don [Rumsfeld] frustrated me with his abruptness toward 
military leaders and members of my staff.”251  The emphasis on establishing the power of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and control over the military resulted in a “Broken 
Dialogue,” according to Matthew Moten.252  The broken dialogue ultimately affected 
planning for the Iraq war.  “Rumsfeld’s insistence on controlling every detail exacerbated 
their [the Joint Chiefs] concerns.”253  In the end, Moten concludes, Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
action undermined the credibility of senior military officers and created a management 
style and an environment that cast subordinates as adversaries.254
    Moten then contrasts Secretary Rumsfeld’s approach with his replacement, Robert 
Gates, who “gained a reputation for honest consultation and listening to military leaders.  
He has not always accepted their advice, but he has not denigrated it either publicly or 
privately.  Ironically, he proved far more willing to discipline his subordinates than 
Rumsfeld, firing a service secretary, relieving general officers, and accepting the 
retirement of combatant commanders, but that has done nothing to diminish his good 
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reputation with the uniformed military, who respect leaders who maintain clear and 
consistent standards.”255
    Power and control are absolutely a necessary element in the relationship between 
senior political and military leaders who wage war.  When this power and control is 
asserted too quickly in a dialogue, is overused, or becomes the primary basis for the civil-
military relationship, however, the result is counter-productive to war-waging 
responsibilities.  Feaver’s focus on power and control is understandable given his aim of 
understanding how principals control their agents.  Power, control, and the narrow 
definition of “work” alone, however, alone provide an insufficient foundation for a 
productive dialogue necessary for senior political and military leaders to exercise their 
war-waging responsibilities.   
 
    Second, compliance monitoring inhibits adapting initial decisions to the changing 
realities inherent in war.  Compliance monitoring makes sure that the agent does what the 
principals wants done in the way the principal wants it done.  Such monitoring is 
absolutely necessary when running any larger corporate endeavor.  Compliance 
monitoring is also necessary in waging war.  Senior political and military leaders both 
use compliance regimes in executing their war-waging responsibilities, but waging war 
also requires other forms of monitoring methodologies. 
    Compliance regimes are a natural fit within a principal-agent framework where “work” 
is defined as agents doing what principals want done how they want it done.  They are 
also a natural fit for some aspects of waging war.  In those areas where standards are 
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fixed—for example, in determining the level of fiscal, personnel, contracting, and 
materiel accountability, or in monitoring logistical delivery times—compliance regimes 
are the perfect tool to use.  These kinds of regimes do not question the standards; they 
only concern compliance with the standards.  Strategies and policies, however, are not 
areas where standards are fixed.   
      Strategies and policies are relative to the war aims.  If strategies and policies are not 
helping to achieve war aims, the question is not just whether military and non-military 
departments are complying with them.  Rather the strategies and policies themselves need 
to be questioned.  They are also relative to the enemy.  If strategies and policies are 
having no effect or an insufficient effect on the enemy, continued compliance with them 
is rarely the proper action to take.  Rather, the proper action is to question the strategies 
and policies themselves.  Last, strategies and policies are relative to one’s own capacities.  
A strategy or policy may be conceptually perfect, just what is needed to subdue the 
enemy and achieve war aims—in theory.  Simultaneously, these theoretically perfect 
strategies and policies may be impossible to execute because one’s military forces or 
non-military departments are incapable of actually doing what is called for by the 
strategy or policy.   These cases require either change to military or non-military capacity 
or modification to strategies and policies so that they can actually be executed.  Simply 
put, senior political and military leaders waging war need more than compliance 
monitoring regimes.   
    Chapter 5 will take this topic up more completely.  At this point, suffice to say that the 
principal-agent framework’s use of compliance regimes is understandable given its 
definition of “work.”  Alone, however, compliance regimes are insufficient to execute 
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war waging responsibilities, for they offer little room in which to evaluate the substance 
of the strategies or policies that are being complied with or to determine whether the 
strategies or policies are the “right” ones. 
    Third, because the economic-based principal-agent framework leaves out other aspects 
of the relationship between citizens-who-become-soldiers and their government, soldiers’ 
lives are treated as if they had less value than they actually have. In its most stark form, 
an employer’s “job” in the principal-agent framework is to direct, monitor, and punish.  
This approach is understandable given the framework’s focus on explaining how, in the 
face of the two problems described below, principals get their agents to do what they 
want done, how they want it done. The direct-monitor-punish approach, however, is not 
the only aspect of the relationship that exists between senior political and military 
leaders.  
    The first problem is the adverse selection problem, “that the employer cannot know for 
certain about the true preferences and capabilities of the applicant.”256  The second is the 
moral hazard problem which derives from the fact that the “employer (principal) wants to 
hire a diligent worker (agent), and once hired, would like to be certain that the employee 
is doing what he is supposed to be doing (working) and not doing something else 
(shirking).  The employee…would like to be hired and so has an incentive to appear more 
diligent during the interview than he really is….Once hired…the employee has an 
incentive to do as little work as he can get away with all the while sending information 
back to the employer that suggests he is performing at an acceptable level.”257
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principal-agent framework, these two problems play out throughout the civil-military 
context.258  On one hand, these two problems innocently describe some of the behaviors 
inherent in any work force.  On the other hand, Feaver introduces an analogy—that the 
civilians within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service secretariats are to 
the military as police patrol officers are to a community—that is not so innocent.  
Civilian-principal employ “police patrols,” according to Armed Servant’s, as a form of 
intrusive monitoring that are “designed to turn up evidence of agent wrongdoing.”259
    In any work environment, a percentage of employees engage in wrongdoing.  Such 
knowledge requires employers to have proper policies accompanied by adequate 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
  In 
one sense, Feaver is merely identifying a best management practice:  put in place audit 
mechanisms to ensure systems and processes are running as intended and to deter 
employees who might be tempted to subvert the system or process or to use it to their 
advantage.  But police look for criminals and prevent crime, and in this sense, the term 
Feaver uses suggests something more than deleterious than routine management.  
260
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  Common best business practices, however, 
show that if an employer wants to create a positive work environment and, thereby, 
increase the probability of success in the enterprise of the business, that employer does 
not base his or her employer-employee relationship on the minority of employees who 
are involved in wrongdoing.  If all Feaver meant by the analogy was that employers must 
be on the lookout for wrongdoing as they monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
organizational systems, his observations would be benign.  His claim is stronger.  He 
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says, “In the civil-military context, an important indicator of police patrol monitoring is 
the size of the civilian secretariat of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service 
secretariats.  These are extension of the executive branch principals, the patrol 
officers….large numbers of civilian officials are evidence of a police patrol monitoring 
mechanism.”  Here, he clearly equates the size and purpose of the defense department’s 
staff with “police patrols…[that are] designed to turn up evidence of agent wrongdoing.” 
261
    The senior political and military leaders responsible for waging war require an 
approach more in line with common best business practices.  These senior leaders need 
Inspectors General, internal and external auditing organizations, and other ombudsman 
like agencies to help them run the large organizations for which they are responsible.  
Each helps ensure that the systems of a leader’s organization are running properly.  Each 
helps ensure that subordinates have avenues to voice concern outside the regular chain of 
command.  Further, one of the important roles of the inspector general is the protection of 
civilian and uniformed employees, making sure they are treated well and provided the 
care and support that law and regulation mandate.  There are separate criminal 
investigation agencies that attend to illegal behavior when such behaviors arise.  By 
narrowing the analysis aperture to power, control, the narrow definition of “work,” and 
the direct-monitor-punish model, the principal-agent framework misses important 
dimensions of the phenomena it intends to explain.  
  The staff has many more purposes than that. 
    Citizens-who-become-soldiers are the people whose lives senior political and military 
leaders will use in war. Direct, monitor, and punish may be part of a leader-employer’s 
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responsibility, but these three factors cannot suffice.  Respect for those whose lives will 
be used in war demands more.  Citizens-who-become soldiers remain human beings, and 
the value of their lives must be respected.  The tactical aspects of this respect are 
demonstrated, in part, through a military chain of command providing the soldier with 
what he or she needs in terms of training, equipment, supplies, life support, leadership, 
and just treatment.  Further, respect for the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers is the 
reason why Walzer introduces the requirement to balance due care to non-combatants 
with the due risk that can be expected of soldiers.   
    This respect for the value of soldiers’ lives is also manifested through the decisions and 
actions taken by the senior civilian and military leaders who are responsible for waging 
war.  First, if all senior leaders do is direct, monitor, and punish—rather than interact 
with their subordinates as human beings, seeking their input, eliciting their opinions, and 
explaining orders or directives—those leaders are disrespecting subordinates at an 
individual level.  Disrespect can take on a second dimension, however.  If, in treating 
subordinates merely as items to be ordered, monitored, and punished if they don’t do 
what they were told as they were told to do it, senior leaders develop an attitude toward 
subordinates that fails to take their lives into consideration in ways a valuable human life 
deserves.  The potential for an organizational or systematic disrespect, therefore, 
emerges.  Ultimately, the result may be foolish policies, overly dangerous strategies, or 
poorly conceived campaigns where citizens-who-become soldiers are killed or injured 
needlessly. 
    The senior civilian and military leaders who are responsible for waging war have more 
than direct, monitor and punish responsibilities.  They have responsibilities that derive 
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from respecting the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers.  The first of these is, or 
course, not to force citizens to fight in illegal or unjust wars—a jus ad bellum 
responsibility.  Walzer makes this point and declares it a responsibility of political 
leaders.262  Walzer also describes a second responsibility to prevent even just wars from 
turning into crusades—a jus in bello responsibility to stop the fighting once a just war has 
attained its aims, or its aims are within political reach.263
    A small group of civilian and military leaders discussed the war’s end with President 
George H. W. Bush.  Colin Powell, then the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
wrote that as he sensed the end of the Gulf War was near, he called General Norman 
Schwarzkopf [then the Commander of U.S. Central Command responsible for military 
operations during the war] to get his sense of the situation.  One advisor said that the 
United States does not want to be seen fighting beyond “the rational calculation;” 
similarly, another commented that America did not want to be seen as “killing for the 
sake of killing.”  When the President spoke to the nation, he said, “Kuwait is liberated.  
Iraq’s army is defeated.  Our military objectives are met….I am pleased to announce that 
at midnight tonight [February 28, 1991], eastern standard time….all U.S. and coalition 
forces will suspend offensive combat operations.”
  Walzer is not exactly clear as to 
whose responsibility this is, but this responsibility is descriptive of the civil-military 
decision that ended the 1990 Gulf War.   
264
                                                 
262 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., pp. 21-32 and 287-296. 
   President Bush held the 
263 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars,ibid., p.110. 
264 Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York:  Random House Large Print, 1995), pp. 790-797.  See 
also George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed:  The Collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square, and The Gulf War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), pp. 
480-492; Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War:  The Inside Story of the 
Conflict in the Gulf (New York:  Little, Brown and Company, 1995), pp. 400-403; Lawrence Freedman and 
115 
 
responsibility for making the final decision, but a wider set of civilian and military 
leaders shared the responsibility to ensure the President’s decision was a good one.  What 
both the President and his advisors had in mind was doing all they can to use the lives of 
soldiers justly and wisely and to avoid unnecessary risk to the innocent.   
    The third responsibility is to treat citizens-who-become-soldiers with the dignity and 
respect—individually and organizationally—that they deserve as human beings.  
American citizens-who-become-soldiers do have their individual right to life changed or 
infringed or abridged vis-à-vis the enemy, but not vis-à-vis their own government.  At the 
higher level, senior civil and military leaders have responsibilities to their citizens-who-
become-soldiers.  They should not knowingly use the lives of citizens-now-soldiers 
foolishly or in stupid ways.  Senior political and military leaders may make mistakes and 
err in their judgments and directives.  They cannot, however, do so knowingly or 
callously.  “The institution of rights against a government,” Dworkin points out, “is not a 
gift of God, or an ancient ritual, or a national sport.  It is a complex and troublesome 
practice that makes the Government’s job of securing the general benefit more difficult 
and more expensive.”265
    Citizens-who-become soldiers certainly learn quickly that military life involves its 
share of foolishness and stupidity.  They also learn that their lives could well be put at 
risk as a result of some foolish, stupid, or dumb order.  But unless such orders are the 
exception, not the rule, military discipline will break down—and very quickly.  At the 
tactical level, discipline is maintained, contrary to conventional wisdom, because the 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991:  Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, 
New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 403-404. 
265 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 
1978), p. 198. 
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“rule” is that orders are reasonable given the circumstances, likely to contribute to 
mission success, and likely to contribute to self preservation.  Within tactical units, 
soldiers often argue among themselves and with their leaders—sergeants and officers—as 
to what’s “smart” in a particular case.  Soldiers in well-led, disciplined units expect to be 
heard and listened to; they expect reasoned leadership and orders, not foolish, stupid, or 
dumb orders handed out by an authoritarian whose only rationale is “to demonstrate that 
I’m in charge” and who treats them as objects, not persons.  These are among the ways 
that a soldier rights are respected at the tactical level.  Soldiers also expect that the 
various echelons in their chain of command—all the way up to the senior political and 
military leaders who identify war aims, strategies, and policies—see to it that they are 
respected in these ways.  By becoming a soldier, a citizen’s life can be used.  It should 
not, however, be wasted, treated callously, or used in vain—whether by leaders at the 
tactical or strategic level. 
    Again, a direct, monitor, and punish approach is understandable within a principal-
agent framework with a focus on explaining how principals get their agents to do what 
they want done, how they want it done.  Alone, however, such an approach cannot 
provide an adequate foundation for the war-waging responsibilities of senior political and 
military leaders.   The citizens-who-are-now-soldiers, those whose lives are literally on 
the line, deserve better and justice in war demands better. 
    Finally, the civilian “right to be wrong” is too absolutely stated to be a useful guide in 




    Because the principal-agent framework is designed only to explain one aspect of the 
relationship between senior political and military leaders—how the senior political leader 
principals get their military subordinate agents to do what they want done how they want 
it done—the framework has only to assert the existence of the “right to be wrong.”  But 
just as soldiers remain moral agents in combat, senior military leaders remain moral 
agents in the war-waging “boardroom.”  Simple obedience is not the standard for soldiers 
and their leaders on the battlefield, and it cannot be the standard for senior military 
leaders in the “boardroom.”  Justice in the conduct of war, therefore, requires an 
understanding of the right to be wrong
  In such a claim, he is correct in this sense:  Civilian leaders in a 
democracy are responsible for making the final decisions concerning the war-waging 
responsibilities associated with war aims, strategies, and policies.  Senior military leaders 
are, and must be, subordinate to this final decision authority.  The democracy requires 
such, even when senior military leaders believe that war aims, strategies, and policies are 
“not the best” from their perspective.   
267 and of what is involved in civilians “claiming 
the right to be wrong”268
    In Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, 
Feaver reports that “emerging norms within the [American] officer corps promise more 
friction in civil-military relationships.”
 deeper than “civilians have it and the military does not.” 
269
                                                 
266 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, op.cit., p. 65. 
  According to the surveys, the friction comes 
from a growing number of mid level officers who show “some reluctance to accept one 
of the basic assumptions: that civilian leaders have a right to be wrong….military officers 
267 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., pp. 6, 171, and 177. 
268 Peter D. Feaver,  Armed Servant, ibid., p. 8. 
269 Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, editors, Soldiers and Civilians, op.cit., p. 464. 
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now believe that it is their role to insist rather than merely advise or advocate in private, 
on key decisions, particularly those involving the use of force.”270  These beliefs, Feaver 
and Kohn claim, identify a new civil-military norm in which mid-grade officers imply 
that “while their leaders should not be openly insubordinate, they may, indeed sometimes 
should, resist civilian direction or even resign in protest of civilian policies.” 271  Such a 
norm, Feaver and Kohn conclude, has “already caused real friction…and could lead to 
real trouble.”272
    The normative implication is clear: best not to deviate from the principal-agent “right 
to be wrong” norm because such deviation may place the social imperative at risk.  A 
different conclusion might also be drawn, however.  The views expressed by the mid-
level officers may not challenge the principle of civilian control.  Rather the mid-level 
officers are expressing concern over the duties of their military seniors during the civil-
military dialogue necessary to exercise, responsibly, their shared war-waging duties.  
Further, they point to an important moral question:  is there a limit to the obedience 
senior military officers owe their political masters?  This question strikes at the heart of 
the basic assumption of the principal-agent framework. 
   
    The “right” in “right to be wrong” cannot be a universal right, a right that any civilian, 
on any topic, and under any conditions can claim against any member of the military.  
Rather the “right to be wrong” is a limited to some civilians, on some topics, and at some 
times. This limited set of people can claim the “right to be wrong” against some members 
of the military.  That is, senior military leaders ought to obey the final decisions of those 
                                                 
270 Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, editors, Soldiers and Civilians, ibid., pp. 464-65. 
271 Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, editors, Soldiers and Civilians, ibid., p. 468. 
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senior political leaders who have the authority to declare war (or direct other uses of 
military forces) and employ military forces in it, even in situations where military leaders 
disagree with the decisions. 
     Clarity in identifying who can claim this right is not a trivial matter.  The President 
and the Secretary of Defense, for example, can use Constitutional and legal grounds to 
claim this right.  The Constitution identifies the President as the Commander-in-Chief.273    
The Secretary of Defense can also claim the “right to be wrong.”  By statute, the 
Secretary of Defense has the authority, direction, and control over the Department of 
Defense; is the principal assistant to the President in all matters related to the department; 
and is in the chain of command, thus exercises command and control over all U.S. 
military forces for both operational and administrative purposes.274  Conceivably, the 
principals of the U.S. National Security Council, when speaking on behalf of the 
President may be legitimate claimants to this right.275
    The validity of subordinates and staff of principals making a claim to the “right to be 
wrong” would be situational.  On one hand, some principals communicate through their 
  With respect to the executive 
branch, however, beyond this small circle, claiming to have the “right to be wrong” 
becomes problematic.   
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subordinates and staff as a matter of efficiency.  On the other hand, staffs, and sometimes 
even senior deputies, are notorious for saying that they speak for a principal in cases 
where they do not.  Similarly, there are situations where one might question whether even 
a Vice President can speak for the President and, therefore, claim the right to be wrong.  
Vice Presidents Truman and Johnson, for example, relative to Presidents Roosevelt and 
Kennedy were in different positions than was Vice President Cheney relative to President 
Bush.  A common behavior in large bureaucracies like those of the U.S. federal 
government is for staff or deputies to wield power as if they had it.  Such behavior is a 
bureaucratic means to extend one’s influence and power, but it is not a legitimate claim to 
the “right to be wrong.”   
    The legislative branch may also have Constitutional grounds to claim this right,”276
                                                 
276 Article I, Section 8, U.S. Constitution.  Jethro K. Lieberman, The Enduring Constitution, op.cit., pp. 
452-53. 
 but 
this claim differs from that in the executive branch.  No single member of Congress—
unless events trigger the statutory presidential succession—would be able to claim the 
right because none has the authority to issue orders.   Congress as a body, however, has 
authorities related to raising and funding military forces and operations as well as 
declaring war and authorizing the use of military forces.  These authorities are extensive, 
important, and related to the war-waging responsibilities of identifying war aims, 
strategies, policies, and military campaigns.  In 1975, for example, Congress did not 
authorize the funding necessary to execute President Nixon’s strategy in Vietnam.  Thus, 
American military support was not employed to assist the South Vietnamese in resisting 
North Vietnam’s 1975 final military offensive.  This Congressional action could be 
understood as a Legislative Branch’s claim to the “right to be wrong.”   
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    Feaver provides no detailed discussion about who may claim the right to be wrong, 
saying merely “civilians have a right to be wrong.” The reality is that this right can be 
claimed only by a small subset of civilian political leaders in identifiable executive 
branch positions and by the legislature acting as a body.  For practical reasons, this is an 
important circle to draw; no civilian outside this circle as a proper claim to the “right to 
be wrong.” Clarifying the scope of who can legitimately claim the “right to be wrong,” 
suggests that this right is better understood as a positional duty similar to Walzer’s 
account of the responsibilities of officers, that is, duties and obligations which apply 
“only to those who have consented, promised, or come to occupy a relevant role.”277
    Similarly, Feaver says nothing about when the “right to be wrong” can be responsibly 
used.   Certainly an authorized senior civilian leader can use the right after extensive 
consideration of the facts of a situation, the alternative courses of action and their 
potential costs, risks, and consequences.  Even if, in the end, the senior political leader or 
set of leaders who make a final decision are mistaken or in error, the right can be said to 
have been used responsibly.  Anyone can be wrong.  No one is infallible.  Even the most 
earnest decision maker and the most proficient bureaucracies err.   This case is an 
example of responsibly claiming the “right to be wrong,” and is, therefore, 
uncontroversial.  It would be similarly uncontroversial to have heated debate prior to 
making a decision that is ultimately proven to be mistaken.  Such debate, however 
heated, is expected as part of the well developed decision making process.  
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    There are controversial cases, however.  What if a senior civilian leader or set of 
leaders claim the right relative to a decision that the battlefield has already been proven to 
be mistaken and wasteful of the lives?  Cases like this, where the decision in questions is 
known—or reasonably can be known—in advance, to be foolish, stupid, dumb, and 
wasteful are different from mistakes of an earnest decision maker.  There could be even 
more controversial senses than repetitive foolishness, stupidity, and wastefulness.  For 
example, what if the final decision was to promulgate a policy that limited distribution of 
bullets to three per soldier per day as a means to reduce the cost of the war and limit 
civilian casualties, even during active and heavy combat?  Certainly, the right could be 
claimed in either of these cases, but such a claim would be controversial since it would 
not be claimed responsibly.   
    Clearly every senior leader, civilian and military, involved in the discussions of 
decisions concerning known foolishness, extreme stupidity, or avoidable waste would 
argue strenuously against such a decisions.  Further, no actual leader would likely ever 
direct anything like known stupidity, extreme foolishness, or avoidable wastefulness.  
What makes cases like these important, however, is that they illustrate limits to when the 
“right to be wrong” can be reasonably claimed.  They illustrate that the “right to be 
wrong” is a strong right in way Dworkin uses it in Taking Rights Seriously.  “In most 
cases,” Dworkin says, “we say that someone has a ‘right’ to do something, we imply that 
it would be wrong to interfere with his doing it, or at least that some special grounds are 
need for justifying any interference.”278
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  It would be wrong for military or civilian leaders 
to interfere with the responsible exercise of “the right to be wrong” as explained in the 
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uncontroversial cases.   But are there special grounds in the controversial cases of 
justified interference with a civilian leader’s “right to be wrong” as Armed Servant’s 
principal-agent framework understands that right? 
    Military leaders, as well as subordinate civilian leaders, must work to attain war aims, 
and execute strategies and policies that emanate from proper authorities, even if those 
leaders disagree with either the decision making process or the outcome.  A democracy 
must insist upon this.   Disagreement voiced prior to a decision being made does not 
constitute interference.  Military leaders are not to execute illegal or immoral strategies or 
policies, ones requiring genocide, or torture, or indiscriminate killing of noncombatants, 
for example.  The extreme cases of known, repetitive, or extreme foolishness or stupidity 
and avoidable waste, however, suggest that some decisions may cross a line separating 
honest mistakes in matters of prudence, on one hand, and immoral directives and 
decisions because they reflect recognized or sustained foolishness and prolonged 
stupidity, on the other.   
    War-waging decisions inherently involve using lives.  Respect for the value of those 
lives, whether of the innocent or of citizens-who-become-soldiers, places a responsibility 
on those making such decisions.  The responsibility is to make the best decisions possible 
given the known and knowable facts, the realities of a particular situation, and the 
competing perspectives that must be considered.  This responsibility is a positional 
responsibility attendant upon those who can legitimately claim “the right to be wrong.”  
Waging war is also about recovering from honest mistakes as quickly as reasonably 
possible.  Citizens expect their senior political and military leaders to wage war as wisely 
and prudently as possible.  This expectation is founded upon a government’s 
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responsibility to respect and value the lives of its citizens-who-become-soldiers.  That 
this expectation that was not met during the Vietnam War was part of the outrage that 
followed the publication of the Pentagon Papers.279
    Interference is not understood as senior political or military leaders trying to prevent 
making a foolish decision relative to war aims, strategies, or policies.  It would not be 
interference, for example, to convince a final decision authority that a previous decision 
which had been executed was proven to be ineffective or that the three bullet policy is 
foolish in the extreme and would use lives irresponsibly.   
     
     Certainly decisions can be mistaken, facts can be misunderstood, alternatives and be 
wrongly analyzed, consequences unforeseen, and risks not fully understood.  Human 
beings and the organizations they create to assist in making decisions can always be 
mistaken.  An enemy’s plans are not usually known, and even when they are, plans are 
not always followed.  Battle creates unforeseen opportunities and vulnerabilities for both 
sides.  Friction and uncertainty reign supreme in war.  So mistakes are common, even 
mistakes with tragic human consequences.  These realities are the reasons for robust 
debates that precede initial war-waging decisions and equally robust arguments about 
subsequent war-waging adaptations. 
     Either because of chance or unforeseen enemy action, tragic consequences may occur 
even if one used the best decision-making processes and executed the most thoughtful 
strategies and policies in the best ways.  Neither senior political nor military leaders can 
be absolutely sure of the efficacy of their own judgments, either at the start of a war or 
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during it.  Both understand that they could be wrong.  These leaders actually need each 
other, therefore, to argue and debate fully so as to prevent foolish, stupid, dumb, or 
wasteful decisions from being made.  Further, American society expects such interaction 
between their senior political and military leaders; they expect extensive dialogue and 
argument to precede consequential decisions that affect the use of the lives of their sons 
and daughters, husbands and wives, mothers or fathers, or brothers and sisters.  The 
absence of a robust dialogue is what should be upsetting, as Gideon Rose observed about 
the 2003 Iraq invasion:  “A dysfunctional national security decision making process 
allowed the operation to proceed without serious questioning of heroically optimistic 
assumptions or proper contingency planning.”280
    Contributing to debate, even heated ones that extend over months, is part of the war-
waging responsibility of those senior leaders, political and military, who participate in the 
decision-making dialogue.   En route to a final decision, both civilian and military leaders 
have a duty to provide their best advice, to make their best case, to challenge assumptions 
and predictions, and to present evidence and counterevidence as the debate ebbs and 
flows.  The same duty applies to adapting, modifying, or reversing decisions made and 
executed because of the ever-changing realities of war.  Responsible claims to the “right 
to be wrong” require debate and argument prior to decisions, and this seems to be what 
the mid level officers in the Feaver and Kohn surveys may be suggesting.  They expect 
their seniors, the military leaders who participate in strategy and policy discussion, to 
argue forcefully so as not to get into a position where disobedience or interference 
becomes the only option.  Moreover, they expect their seniors to represent them and their 
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soldiers—the ones who have to execute on the battlefield—and argue forcefully and 
completely before foolish, stupid, or potentially wasteful orders, directives, strategies, 
policies, or military operations are set in motion.  If this is what the mid-level officer 
meant by “insist” or “resist”, then all this is normal; none of it constitutes interference 
with the “right to be wrong.”   
    Rather, interference with the “right to be wrong” is understood as senior political or 
military leaders interfering with the execution of final decisions—after they have been 
made. One form of interference in this sense is akin to saying, “No; I (or we) will not do 
that.”  A second form of interference involves duplicitous behavior, saying one will 
comply but either subverting the decision or doing what one wants whether it conforms to 
the decision or not.   
    The second from of interference is impermissible.  Whether the duplicitous behavior 
involves leaks that limit or close down on going debates thus foreclosing a decision 
before it even gets proper consideration, or “slow rolling” execution so that the decision 
made does not get a fair evaluation, or issuing directives to one’s organization that are 
contrary to the decision made—all are disingenuous and disloyal at best.  Some, 
depending upon the situation and consequences involved, may qualify for moral blame.  
    Two conditions are necessary before the first form of interference could be justified.  
First, the decision in question must be immoral not merely imprudent or disagreeable.  
Second, the interference must not challenge the ultimate principle of civilian control over 
the military.  Certainly cases like this would be rare, for fulfilling both conditions would 
be difficult.  It is not impossible to envision, however, a senior military leader who, after 
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participating fully in a robust debate and doing all he or she could to prevent a particular 
decision from being made, concludes that he or she cannot in good conscience obey the 
resultant order.  That leader could resign quietly without “going public,” for a public act 
could challenge—or be perceived to challenge—civil control.  It is also not impossible to 
envision a senior civilian leader resigning under the same circumstances, and being a 
civilian, his or her resignation would not challenge civil control. 
    Resignation of a senior official, even if not public, would interfere with the execution 
of a decision at the very minimum because of the temporary pause before execution that 
would likely result.  No administration would move forward on a substantive war-waging 
decision if a Secretary of Defense or State, or a National Security Advisor, or four-star 
general or an Ambassador serving in a war zone would resign over a moral issue he or 
she had with that decision—even if the resignation was quietly done.  Rather, an 
administration would be more likely to delay the decision or its execution until it was 
satisfied that, when the resignation and its reasons became known, the administration’s 
decision would stand public scrutiny.  Such a delay qualifies as the first form of 
interference, interference after a decision was made.  Further, even the potential 
resignation of a senior officer would have a significant and positive effect on the 
responsible use of the “right to be wrong.”  Allowing for justified interference when both 
the immoral and non-threatening to civilian control conditions are met would have the 
practical effect of decreasing early or unreasonable exercise of the right.  Justified 
interference, even if rarely used, would demonstrate that reasonable use of the right is as 
important as the right itself.       Meeting both conditions would be difficult, but the 
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difficulty does not affect the importance of acknowledging possibility of justified 
interference.   
    The situation resulting from Secretary McNamara’s testimony in August of 1967 
shows how difficult it is to meet both conditions. In this testimony, McNamara claimed 
that America was winning the war in Vietnam.  The Joint Chiefs were stunned according 
to Mark Perry’s book Four Stars.281  Perry explains that “McNamara’s testimony broke 
the unofficial contract between civilian leaders and military officer that, by necessity, 
exists in every democratic society:  members of the military pledge they will obey 
civilian authorities without questions, in return, civilian leaders pledge that those orders 
will not lead to the useless sacrifice of military life.”282  The Chiefs knew that it was 
impossible to win with the current U.S. strategy and policies and that there was no plan 
for winning the war.  The Chiefs believed, writes Perry, “that to continue the war under 
current conditions would be immoral; it would lead to a useless sacrifice.”283  The 
Chairman said to the Service Chiefs that “he believed they should resign en masse during 
a press conference to be held the next morning.”284  Ultimately, although convinced of 
the righteousness of their conclusion, the Chiefs did not resign en masse for they believed 
doing so would be mutiny.285
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  In effect, they knew they met the first condition but could 
not figure out how to meet the second.  They also knew that they had no alternative to 
offer upon which they could all agree.  Some form of justified interference appears to be 
necessary in order to preserve the moral agency of senior officials, military or civilian, 
282 Mark Perry, Four Stars, ibid., p. 162-163. 
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and to recognize that reasonable use of the right is as important as the right itself —even 
if the form of interference is as stringent and unlikely as described above. 
    Feaver and Kohn seem to realize that reasonable use of the “right to be wrong” is 
important when they say, “At the highest levels, civilians have to exercise their 
responsibility, appoint strong military leaders, listen to them, query them closely, 
advocate national defense policies, and nurture the effectiveness of U.S. military 
institutions.  Military leaders must reciprocate with candid advice and loyal 
subordination.”286
    In sum, the principal-agent framework cannot provide an adequate foundation for the 
war-waging dimension of jus in bello.  The principal-agent framework’s emphasis on 
power, control, the narrow definition of “work,” and a direct-monitor-punish regime—to 
the exclusion of other important dimensions to the civilian/principal/employer-to-
military/agent/employee relationship—sets the conditions for obstruction to the kind of 
  Here Feaver and Kohn seem to recognize that the “right to be wrong” 
must be understood and practiced somewhat differently than Armed Servants suggests.  
They seem to be acknowledging that responsible use of the “right to be wrong” requires 
some form of mutuality between senior political and military leaders.  These leaders have 
correlative duties:  military leader pledge loyal subordination and civilian leaders 
exercise their responsibility wisely.  This formulation is akin to Perry’s unofficial 
contract and lies at the heart of the view that responsible use of the “right to be wrong” is 
as important as the right itself.   Regardless, the foregoing discussion shows that the 
simple principal-agent formulation that civilians have a right to be wrong, by itself, is not 
a sufficient foundation for jus in bello war-waging responsibilities. 
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respectful dialogue necessary to wage war.  Compliance monitoring alone, while 
necessary, is insufficient.  Using the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers places 
obligations on both tactical and strategic leaders that are not based solely on the 
economic-based principal-agent framework.  Simply asserting the civilian “right to be 
wrong,” without adequate discussion of the scope of applicability or conditions under 
which this right is responsibly used, is an inadequate guide in the conduct of war.  These 
four shortcomings do not act as a criticism of the principal-agent framework, for it never 
set out to provide the kind of framework jus in bello’s war-waging dimension needs.  
These four shortcomings do identify, however, elements that must be accounted for in 
whatever foundation for the war-waging dimension of jus in bello is finally adduced. 
 
Conclusions: The Principal-Agent framework, not enough. 
    Neither the stark line that Walzer drew between political leaders who are responsible 
for war itself and the military leaders who are responsible for the conduct of war, nor the 
sharp subordination of military agent-employees to their civilian principal-employers 
adequately describes how war is actually conducted at the higher levels.  Walzer’s 
account is inadequate because it leaves out all together a discussion of senior political and 
military leader responsibilities in the conduct of war—that is, their war-waging 
responsibilities.  The principal-agent framework acknowledges senior political and 
military leader responsibilities and recognizes the conduct of war’s war-waging 
dimension, but this account is a narrowly focused framework that explains only how 
civilian principals get their military agents to do what they want, how they want it done.  
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The working relationship between civilian/principal/employer and 
military/agent/employee does have economic and compliance components, but it also 
involves much more.  An over-focus on one narrow aspect of the relationship can obscure 
the other elements involved and lead to misunderstanding the totality of what waging war 
is all about.  In sum, the principal-agent framework is helpful, but its utility is limited as a 
foundation for war-waging responsibilities.   
   Understanding senior political and military leader moral responsibilities in the conduct 
of war, their war-waging responsibilities, will require looking elsewhere.  The next 
chapter investigates Eliot Cohen and his theory of the “unequal dialogue” from Supreme 
Command:  Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime.287
  
  “Working,” as will 
become clear, has a much more robust meaning for Cohen than it does for Feaver, and 
Cohen’s relationship between senior civilian and military leaders is much richer than the 
principal/employer-agent/employee relationship Feaver uses.  Cohen’s account will 
provide a richer understanding of the moral issues of jus in bello issues associated with 
waging war at the highest levels, and therefore, become a necessary part of understanding 
the war-waging dimension of jus in bello.  His account, however, will not be sufficient. 
                                                 




Argument, Debate, and Dialogue 
 
 
    This chapter uses Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and 
Leadership in Wartime to continue the search for a way to fill the gap in Walzer’s 
account of jus in bello.  The chapter summarizes then analyzes Cohen’s position, a 
position that acknowledges the influence of the “normal theory” of civil-military 
relations—the theory that derives from Huntington’s Soldier and the State, that is 
employed in Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, and that Feaver’s Armed Servants uses as its 
starting point—but rejects it because it frees political leaders of all real responsibility for 
the gravest decisions in war, and it does not conform to the reality of waging war.288
    The analysis of Cohen’s “unequal dialogue” will find that it is consistent with Walzer’s 
rights-based theory; provides an adequate account of how senior leaders set and achieve 
war aims by making strategy, policy, and military campaign decisions that increase the 
probability of being right, or at least less wrong than those one is fighting; and insists 
upon observing the war convention and maintaining civil control of the military.  In the 
end, Cohen’s approach will have advanced the understanding of the tri-partite tension 
inherent in waging war and of the associated senior political and military leader 
responsibilities.   Thus, Cohen’s approach is a significant improvement over the 
  
Cohen’s framework involves the idea of an “unequal dialogue” as an alternative to the 
“normal theory.”   
                                                 
288 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, ibid., pp. 5 and 13 
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principal-agent framework and provides much of what is necessary to fill the identified 
gap in Walzer’s account of jus in bello.  The account in Supreme Command, however, 
will be found incomplete for three reasons.  First, his description of the “unequal 
dialogue” does not capture the full extent of the set of on-going dialogues that must be 
conducted to wage war.  Second, his discussion is incomplete in its treatment of the 
conditions necessary for the dialogue he describes to work.  Last, he does not discuss 
how decisions that result from the dialogue get translated into action—an important war-
waging responsibility. 
  
Cohen’s unequal dialogue. 
    Early in Supreme Command, Cohen explains that the very nature of war—an act of 
policy, a political instrument, the use of violence and force for political purposes—
demands a collaborative, political-military effort.289
                                                 
289 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, ibid., p. 10; Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Peret, 
editors and translators, On War, op.cit., pp. 75, 80-81, 86-87, 606, and 608.  
  For political and military leaders at 
the highest levels, there can be no neat bifurcation of duties as the “normal theory” 
suggests.  In waging war, senior civilian and military leaders face, together, exceptional 
difficulties.  The first difficulty concerns the stakes at risk.  There are personal stakes, for 
example the political life and legacy of a President and the professional reputation of 
senior generals, which affect the relationship among leaders as well as the policy 
decisions that flow from that relationship.  As important as these stakes may be, however, 
Cohen is clear that they are secondary.  The ultimate stakes are these:  the life of the 
political community, the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers, the lives of the innocent, 
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and the destruction associated with every war.  Second, there are difficulties resulting 
from the “unique and extreme” differences between the personalities, backgrounds, and 
experiences of political and military leaders.  Third, the issues of waging war are far 
more complex than those faced in peacetime.290  This complexity demands a 
collaborative, political-military effort, one that often will result in “furious” arguments 
and will be uneasy, even conflict-ridden.  Political leaders who merely dictate military 
actions, Cohen shows, almost always end in folly.291
    Cohen is identifying the war-waging responsibilities that are as much a part of 
conducting a war as are war-fighting responsibilities.  Further, he is clear that these are 
co-responsibilities of senior political and military leaders—responsibilities tied to the 
nature of war and the stakes involved in war—even as he asserts, unequivocally, that the 
final decision authority rests with civil leaders.  
   
    Political leaders, Cohen explains, should make no apologies for putting military 
leaders under pressure, even severe pressure through repetitive interrogations, probings, 
and questionings.  Similarly, military leaders should make no apologies for putting 
political leaders under pressure through repetitive discussion of plausibility, limits of 
force, likely consequences, and inherent risks.  In waging war, aims, strategies, policies, 
and campaign plans are inexorably linked to execution.  A blunt give-and-take between 
political and military leaders, Cohen maintains, highlights this linkage, for a proper 
dialogue ensures that the aims, strategies, policies, and campaigns decided upon can 
actually be carried out.  Cohen believes that the give-and-take dialogue conducted by 
                                                 
290 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, ibid., p.2. 
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senior political and military leaders occurs at the start of a war, sometimes even before a 
war starts, and continues throughout.  The dialogue ensures that aims, strategies, policies, 
and military operations adapt as war conditions ebb and flow.  This kind of tense 
dialogue, Cohen demonstrates, is necessary—not to assert domination or to clarify who is 
in control—but to arrive at the right outcome:  identify the course of action most likely to 
succeed amid conditions of ambiguity and conflicting options.292
    Cohen uses four historical examples—the American Civil War, World Wars I and II, 
and the War for Israeli Independence—to show that the best assurance against using lives 
wastefully, putting one’s political community at risk, or against any of the other risks 
inherent in the conduct of war, are streams of decisions amid opposing advice and sharp 
disagreements that emerge in long, sustained, interlocked arguments.  Political and 
military leaders improve the war-waging decisions they must make through incessant, 
close, difficult questioning of positions, assumptions, and suggested courses of action.
  In sum, therefore, 
Cohen’s discussion directly addresses the first senior political and military leader war-
waging responsibility—to identify war aims, strategies, and policies with the highest 
probability of success—and part of the second—to adapt initial decisions to the changing 
realities of war as they unfold.   
293
    This kind of dialogue is, according to Cohen, a “dark form of wisdom” necessary in 
war, for neither political nor military leaders can claim that they are most likely right 
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when it comes to the complexity of waging war.294
    Clausewitz addresses the complexity and difficulty of war-waging decision in On War.  
There, he defines the “essence of genius” as referring to “a very highly developed mental 
aptitude for a particular occupation.”
  The truth is that everyone, senior 
political and military or leader alike, is more or less wrong, or can be.   
295  The harmonious combination of characteristics 
that Clausewitz describes in his chapter “On Military Genius,” however, seems more 
appropriate to an ideal or theoretical construct than any real person.296  Hence, Cohen 
calls his penultimate chapter, “Leadership Without Genius,”297
    In Supreme Command, Cohen describes a process, the “unequal dialogue,” that 
demands more of the senior political and military leaders who wage war than direct, 
monitor, and punish. The outcome of the unequal dialogue, while insisting upon a 
political leader’s final decision authority, is aimed at achieving prudence in waging war, 
even if achieving a prudential outcome requires moral courage of the senior political and 
military participants.  Cohen’s approach requires senior political and military leaders to 
 that is, the leadership that 
recognizes that those responsible for waging war cannot count on a genius being 
available at exactly the right time and place.  Cohen goes on to argue that the reality is 
that good war-waging decisions are most likely to emerge from a set of political and 
military leaders bluntly and continuously arguing with one another in an attempt to 
identify strategy, policy, and organizational solutions to the complex and dynamic 
problems they face.   In the principal-agent framework, obedience is what matters most 
not the content of orders and directives; in Cohen’s account, content matters significantly. 
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argue strenuously until they can find an alternative to something as morally repugnant as 
sending citizens-who-become-soldiers to a war that the leaders know cannot be won in 
the way it is being waged—as they did in Vietnam for years.  He is not advocating what 
Feaver calls shirking—not executing a final decision, or executing as a “slow roll.”  
Rather, the “complicated and tense” unequal dialogue demands that senior political and 
military leaders hold each other accountable for outcomes, for the decisions and actions 
that they take together affect the life of the political community and the lives of the 
citizens-who-become-soldiers as well as the lives of the innocent—lives they use and put 
at risk in war.  The kind of dialogue Cohen envisions is an “uneasy, even conflictual 
collaborative relationship in which the civilian usually (at least in democracies) has the 
upper hand.”298
    Cohen realizes that the war-waging solutions that that senior political and military 
leaders seek are not “best” by any absolute standard; rather, the ultimate standard is only 
that they work, that they are better than those of the enemy, and that they achieve the 
declared war aims.
 
299  Political leaders make mistakes, adhere to false strategies, promote 
misguided policies, misjudge opponents, indulge incompetents, ignore realities, and can 
be unlucky.  This is why senior military leaders cannot simply salute and obey, and why 
political leaders must tolerate troublesome and sometimes uncomfortable 
disagreement.300
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  Military leaders can also make mistakes, hold to foolish strategies and 
outmoded concepts, promote ill-conceived operations, under estimate enemy strengths 
and intentions, over estimate their own capabilities, and can be unlucky.  This is why 
299 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, ibid., p. 174. 
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senior political leaders cannot just hand off execution to their military subordinates, and 
why they must drive senior military leaders to near distraction with sometimes 
embarrassingly probing questions. Cohen’s unequal dialogue is not easy, for either 
political or military leaders, but he is very clear:  such dialogue is necessary. 
    In a democracy, Cohen reminds us, the political leaders must have the final authority to 
decide on matters of strategy, policy, campaigns, and sometimes even tactics.301
    Cohen does not use the term “right to be wrong,” however.  He insists upon civilian 
leaders retaining the final decision authority and upon military leaders subordinating 
themselves to this authority.  So on the surface, it might appear that his “final decision 
authority” and “the right to be wrong” are the same, but Cohen seems to be suggesting an 
important subtlety.  That is, because of what is at stake in war—the lives of citizens-who-
become-soldiers, the lives of the innocent, and, potentially, the life of the political 
community—those with final decision authority as well as those who are part of the 
dialogue leading up to decisions have an obligation to be as “right as possible” before a 
decision is made, or said another way, before invoking the “right to be wrong.”  Here 
Cohen is talking about the correlative duties between senior political and military leaders 
  All four 
case studies in Supreme Command demonstrate adherence to this principle, even after 
intense debate.  Those with final decision authority, however, require that the route taken 
to a final decision be a rough one, lined with egos bruised by long, hard arguments.  The 
political community that political leaders represent and that commissions military 
officers, as well as the lives of the citizens-who-become-soldiers and the lives of the 
innocent, are owed no less.   
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with respect to achieving the best possible final decision.  The subtle difference in 
Cohen’s dialogue ensures that political leaders neither cut the dialogue short because it is 
uncomfortable, nor do they cut it short because the dialogue is not headed in the direction 
they want.  The subtle difference also helps ensure that military leaders do not cut the 
dialogue short by subordinating themselves to political leaders too early because their 
perspectives are creating tension or the questioning they receive is too intense. 
    At some point Cohen acknowledges that the dialogue has to end, decisions have to be 
made, and directions given.  At that point Cohen’s senior political leader has the authority 
to say, “Thanks.  I understand all of the arguments, potential consequences, and potential 
risks.  I know that not all of you agree, but here’s what I’ve decided and what I want all 
of you to do.”  Here the dialogue ends; subordination and execution begin.  Cohen would 
not want to shut down the dialogue before that point, however. Doing so would be wrong, 
especially if it was shut down merely to quiet opposing views, whether military or 
civilian.  When lives are at stake, Cohen understands that shutting down opposing views 
is more than simply rude behavior.  In casting the dialogue as he does, Cohen does not 
deny the power inherent in a senior political leader’s final decision authority.  Rather, he 
is emphasizing the obligation that such a leader has to those whose lives he will use when 
invoking that power.  His emphasis suggests that having final decision authority and 
exercising that authority responsibly are equally important. 
    The dialogue Cohen describes is unequal because political leaders have positional and 
legal authority over military leaders.  Cohen finds no need to talk about a “right to be 
wrong” because of the civilian leader’s unambiguous legal authority.  This unequal 
aspect of the dialogue ensures both civil primacy and military subordination.  In other 
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ways, however, because of the subtlety Cohen introduces, the dialogue is between 
relative equals.  For example, both senior political and military leaders are functionally 
equal.  Both senior civil and military leaders have vital knowledge, experience, and 
perspective necessary to construct the best possible strategies, policies, and military 
operations.  One set of leaders cannot succeed without the other.  Both are necessary, and 
in this sense, equal.  Both senior political and military leaders are also morally equal, for 
both have responsibilities for the political community’s defense, for the lives of the 
citizens-who-become soldiers as well as for the lives of the innocent.   
    The kind of the kind of dialogue Cohen envisions requires a relationship between 
political and military leaders that is not merely an economic relationship between 
employers and employees where the employer can impose his power and exploit the 
employee by claiming a “right to be wrong.”  It is a relationship based upon more than 
instrumental and economic values, power, control, and compliance. In order to work as 
Cohen describes, the dialogue requires that a degree of respect and trust exist among 
those in the dialogue and an equal amount of respect for the lives, individual and 
communal, that will be inevitably used and put at risk in execution.    
    Reflecting this respect, the purpose of Cohen’s dialogue is to arrive at a set of 
decisions that have the greatest probability of protecting the life of the political 
community and using well the lives of citizens-who-become soldiers—not merely to 
establish who is dominant over whom.  The unequal dialogue Cohen describes serves the 
purposes of protecting a political community, producing prudent action to achieve that 
purpose, protecting the lives of the innocent, and respecting the lives of the citizens-who-
become-soldiers by using them well.  This set of purposes represents values of major 
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significance; it demands, therefore, that the senior political and military leaders 
responsible for war-waging decisions conduct their business in ways corresponding to 
these purposes.302
    Cohen’s approach, like the principal-agent approach, insists upon the final decision 
authority resting with senior political leaders.  Each of the cases that Supreme Command 
reviews demonstrates the subordination of military leaders to their political masters.  
Unlike the principal-agent approach, however, Cohen’s approach understands “working” 
in a much broader sense than did the principal-agent framework.  That is, “working” 
entails producing decisions about war aims, strategies, policies, and military campaigns 
that have a reasonable probability of success.  Content and outcome matters for Cohen in 
ways it does not in the principal-agent framework. 
   
    The difference between the two approaches is reflected in how each looks at the 
Vietnam War.  In Cohen’s account both political and military leaders failed in Vietnam.  
“After the initial decisions to enter the war, the American civilian leadership held back 
from the kinds of bruising discussions with their military advisers,” he writes.303  “During 
the period of escalation,” Supreme Command continues, “…there was no comprehensive 
politico-military assessment of American strategy.”  In Deriliction of Duty, Major 
General H.R. McMaster agrees with Cohen’s assessment as he describes Vietnam in 1965 
as a “war without direction.”304 The result:  American soldiers, airmen, sailors, and 
marines went to war in Vietnam without strategy or direction.305
                                                 
302 Jean Hampton, Daniel Farnham, editor, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons:  Contractarianism in Moral and 
Political Thought (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 11, 20, and 25. 
  General Harold K. 
303 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, op.cit., p. 180. 
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Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff at the time, corroborates McMaster’s and Cohen’s 
positions.  In March of 1965, and from then on, General Johnson, “openly wondered 
whether the American military even belonged in Indochina, a view that was exacerbated 
by [General William] Westmoreland’s request for troops.”306
    Through numerous visits to Vietnam, assessments done within the office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the CIA, and the White House as well as reports done by senior 
military leaders,
 
307 “McNamara certainly, and [President] Johnson possibly, knew that 
the war was not going well from the beginning—as early as 1966.  Yet their scrutiny of 
operations in Vietnam focused chiefly on the level of effort being made, not on its 
fundamental direction.”308  The problem did not lie with the strength of will of the 
President or the Secretary of Defense or the dominance both exerted over the Joint 
Chiefs; nor did it lie with their desire for details about the war.  Rather, the problem lay 
with their inability to understand “what force could achieve” in Vietnam and what it took 
to run a war, and their inability to conduct an adequate dialogue with their military 
leaders.309
   No adequate dialogue like that which Cohen holds is necessary could occur when 
President Johnson “especially distrusted his military advisors,…sought to keep the Chiefs 
from opposing his Vietnam policy,…concealed the finality of his decisions 
on…policy,…[and] remained ignorant of the Chief’s opinions.”
   
310
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  Or when Secretary of 
Defense McNamara continually attempted to sever all communications between the 
307 General Harold K. Johnson made alone made ten trips according this his biography:  Lewis Sorely, 
Honorable Warrior, op.cit., p. 152.  
308 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, op.cit., p. 182. 
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Chiefs and the president, and Ambassador Taylor circumvented the Joint Chiefs.311  
Finally, no adequate dialogue could occur when the President’s disdain for his senior 
military leaders and their advice was evident.  Nor could it occur given the President’s 
desire to be left alone because he had “bigger things to do right here at home.”312
    Neither did the senior military leaders.  “In August 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
served more as technicians for planning in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,” 
according to McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty, “than as strategic thinkers and advisers in 
their own right.”
  Given 
the preoccupation with body count, lack of understanding of the war, the President’s 
intermittent interest in it, the dysfunctional civil-military relationship, and the equally 
dysfunctional dialogue that derived from that relationship, it is not surprising that the 
Vietnam War ended in failure.  Although they remained in control of their military 
subordinates, senior political leaders did not execute their fundamental war-waging 
responsibilities. 
313  Mark Perry’s Four Stars says, “on the eve of America’s most 
important military challenge since World War II [Vietnam], the nation’s highest-ranking 
officers represented the most diverse and divided group of policy-makers” in the history 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.314  He then goes on to describe how the U.S. service chiefs 
themselves had conflicting understandings of the war and what it took to win—from 
graduated reprisals to punish North Vietnam, to massive bombing, to concerted air and 
ground operations “somewhere short of war.”315
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McMasters points out, “that undercut their influence most.”316
    In the end President Johnson chose a middle course suggested by McGeorge Bundy 
which one historian described as “going to war—kinda.”
  Even if the civil-military 
dynamics would have been more supportive, no adequate dialogue could occur when the 
Chiefs fought among themselves, unable to construct even a military way forward upon 
which they could agree. 
317  “Beginning in mid-1966” 
General Creighton Abrams, Westmoreland’s deputy, began to question his boss’s big 
unit, conventional strategy.318  In 1967, all the military chiefs agreed that it was too late 
to withdraw and that what the United States was doing would not achieve success, but 
they could not agree on a strategy or on a way to present their views to the 
administration.319  In 1968, Clark Clifford replaced Robert MacNamara as the Secretary 
of Defense.  Clifford recalls a conversation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which the 
Chiefs said they did not know how long it would take to succeed in Vietnam, or how 
many more troops may be needed.  Further, they offered no alternative other than to 
continue “attrition that would wear out the Communists,” even though they had no idea 
when that point might be reached.320
        In Armed Servants, Feaver claims that the civil-military relationship during the 
Vietnam War worked [in the principal-agent narrow sense] because in the final analysis, 
the military obeyed even the orders they believed were dumb.
   
321
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is only military compliance, even in the face of moral repugnance.  Justice in war 
demands more.  War always involves using lives.  Using those lives, however, in ways 
that increase the probability they will be wasted is morally abhorrent, and those 
responsible for the strategies and policies leading to such waste are morally blameworthy.     
    During the Vietnam War, a war in which the kind of dialogue that Cohen describes 
was virtually non-existent, neither senior political nor military leaders exercised their 
war-waging responsibilities well.  “Let’s be clear about it,” wrote General Bruce Palmer, 
Jr. in 1984 (as a general officer, Palmer was a Field Force Commander in Vietnam, a 
deputy to General Westmoreland, and the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff), “the Unites States 
failed to achieve its objectives in Vietnam.”  Palmer then lists the price for the years of 
ambiguous aims, poor strategy, and ineffective policy that resulted from an inadequate 
dialogue between senior political and military leaders:  over 58,000 American lives, even 
more Vietnamese lives—combatant and noncombatant, destruction in North and South 
Vietnam, many billions of dollars, damage to U.S. self esteem and confidence, as well as 
damage to American prestige abroad.322
    Palmer uses “vain” in a different sense than did General McChrystal in the Iraqi desert.  
McChrystal was exhorting his soldiers to fight on, to accomplish the objectives they were 
assigned, and in so doing give meaning to their sacrifices.  McChrystal’s was a tactical 
perspective.  Palmer’s question is a strategic one, for the “it” in Palmer’s question refers 
to the war itself.  His is a strategic question that can be understood in at least two ways.  
  Palmer then poses a question:  “Was it all in 
vain?”   
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First, was waging the Vietnam war worth paying this price?  Said another way, were the 
benefits of the war proportional to the costs?  This version of the question concerns jus ad 
bellum.323
    This is also the question that haunted General Johnson, who in retirement, 
“remembered the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars to 
the President and tell him, ‘…you have required me to send men into battle with little 
hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced us in the military to violate almost 
every one of the principles of war in Vietnam.  Therefore, I resign and will hold a press 
conference after I walk out of your door.’ Then, added Johnson with a look of anguish, ‘I 
made the typical mistake of believing I could do more…if I stayed in than if I got out.  I 
am now going to my grave with that lapse of moral courage on my back.”
  The second way Palmer’s question may be understood, however, 
demonstrates that it is very much an issue of jus in bello.  In this version, the question is, 
“did the way political and military leaders waged the war waste the lives of citizens-who-
became-soldiers and put at risk the lives of the innocent unnecessarily?”  The second 
version of Palmer’s question is a matter of prudence in the waging of war. 
324
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Preventing, reversing, or sustaining imprudence. 
    Prudence has to do with exercising sound judgment, being able to assess the facts of a 
specific situation and pick out the best course of action to follow, given actual limitations 
and constraints.  A prudent choice avoids both the extreme of being brash, taking too 
much risk, and of being overly cautious, avoiding any risk.  Finally, prudence also 
includes action, execution, and implementation.325
    Some may find any application of prudence in war oxymoronic.  After all, on the 
battlefield, the imprudent, in some sense, is a daily routine.  In other senses, not so, for 
prudence in war includes considerations other than risk and danger.  War requires that 
soldiers be willing to risk their lives, but also that their commanders, and civilian leaders, 
not ask them to do so foolishly or pointlessly.  Soldiers expect that they may have to risk 
their life trying to take some important objective, rescue a fellow soldier, or protect an 
innocent non-combatant.  They do not expect to have their life “thrown away” or 
“wasted” in missions without much hope of achieving something that would give their 
sacrifices meaning. Unit Citations and individual medals are awarded for valor: doing 
what many would consider rash.  For example, the paratroopers who jumped behind 
enemy lines prior to D-Day, knowing that at best they would be surrounded as they 
fought to seize and retain objectives assigned to them, and the rangers who climbed the 
cliffs of Point de Hoc under withering fire on D-Day are still honored.  These actions 
seem imprudent from one perspective, but not from another.  The purposes involved gave 
  Properly understood, prudence lies at 
the very heart of jus in bello’s war-waging responsibilities.   
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these risks and sacrifices meaning.  The soldiers who took these risks and made these 
sacrifices knew they were involved in achieving a worthwhile end; their lives were used 
for a worthy purpose, not wasted, or used in vain as Palmer’s question suggests they were 
Vietnam. 
    Prudence has a place in war:  “prudent risks”—whether tactical or strategic—are 
acceptable, and leaders who can identify and take them are necessary to win wars.  
“Gambles” are not, for whether tactical or strategic, they represent excessive risk because 
they put individual lives and perhaps the life of the political community itself in 
unnecessary danger.  Any reader of Eisenhower’s Crusade in Europe is struck by the 
multiple, extended conversations and arguments among Eisenhower and his senior 
leaders focused on the risks inherent in the operations he commanded and the degree to 
which they might be mitigated.326
    Eisenhower’s account illustrates the fact that prudence is—or should be—an essential 
war-leader behavior.  One can see it most clearly by comparing commanders.  In the U.S. 
Civil War, General McClellan is often used as an example of an overly cautious leader, 
missing opportunities that the battlefield presented to him, while General Grant is more 
widely seen as an aggressive, risk-taking commander—although some say overly 
aggressive at times.  In World War II, British Field Marshal Mongtomery is usually 
judged to be more cautious (except perhaps in the Arnhem campaign), whereas General 
Patton is recognized as an aggressive risk taker—again sometimes overly so according to 
some.  In the Korean war, General MacArthur’s Inchon operation is usually understood 
   
                                                 




as an example of bold, but acceptable, risk; his drive to the Yalu River, on the other hand, 
many see as rash.   
    Senior political and military leaders seek, or ought to seek, prudence with respect to 
war aims, strategies, policies, and military campaigns.  They should seek to decide and 
act within the proper balance between the extremes of rashness and excessive caution.  
Identifying the “Aristotelian mean” depends upon the specifics, the facts, of each case.  
Sometimes the prudent action will lean more toward the rash; other times, more toward 
the cautious.  A prudent judgment, and the actions that flow from it, is more art than 
science.  Hence, a broad understanding of history, knowledge of the applicable principles, 
an analytic mind that can discern the relevant facts of a particular case, a synthetic mind 
that can see coherence amid the fog of ambiguity, the ability to listen to the experiences 
and judgments of others, and allow a decision to emerge from an extended discourse—all 
are essential war-leadership traits—whether military war leadership at the war-fighting 
level or senior political and military leadership at the war-waging level. 
    Waging war, Cohen correctly says, is too complex for any one person, or small set of 
people to understand.  There is no Clausewitzian genius. 327  To discover the prudent set 
of war aims, strategies, and policies necessary to wage war, therefore, senior political and 
military leaders need each other; they must collaborate.  Together, they must set war 
aims, identify strategies and policies, manage alliances and bureaucracies, decide upon 
the nature of acceptable risk, and shape operational choices—even where the final 
decision authority lies with the senior political leaders.328
                                                 
327 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, op.cit., pp. 100-112; Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, op.cit., pp. 173-
207. 
  Together, they must ensure 
328 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command, ibid., pp. 10 and 173-224.    
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that war aims and military, diplomatic, economic, and fiscal strategies and polices are 
aligned as best as possible.  Together they must constantly assess and reassess progress 
toward achieving strategic aims and changes to the multiple realities of war, then adapt 
their own aims, strategies, policies, and military operations, constantly rebalancing means 
and ends.  A dialogue like Cohen suggests has two basic aims:  avoid taking imprudent 
action—whether imprudent because it is overly cautious or overly rash, or if taken in 
error or proven to be imprudent as the war unfolds, and adapt quickly so that the 
imprudence is short-lived—all in order to achieve war aims at the least cost in lives, both 
of the innocent and of citizens-who-become-soldiers, and to minimize risk to the political 
community.   
    Finding the prudent course, avoiding the rash and the overly cautious, adjusting that 
course as a war unfolds, and maintaining sufficient unity in a nation’s commitment to 
success are hard enough even under ideal conditions.  In many cases, it is not the side 
who gets it right that wins a war, but the side that gets it least wrong, can adapt the 
fastest, and can sustain its will to win.  A continual, open, respectful, straight-forward, 
often brutally harsh, facts-of-the case-based discourse—as prudence demands and as 
Eisenhower’s book329
                                                 
329 For another useful look at collaboration and discourse, see Mark Perry’s, Partners In Command (New 
York, Penguin Press, 2007) where Perry explores the relationship and exchanges between George Marshall 
and Dwight Eisenhower. 
 and Cohen’s unequal dialogue describe—increases the probability 
of “getting it least wrong” and adapting as conditions change.  No doubt that bullying, 
belittling, backdooring, undermining, one-upsmanship, slow-rolling, power struggles, 
egos, turf battles, and other ever-present human and organizational dynamics—whether 
intentional or not, whether military or civilian—are all too common.  Equally without 
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doubt is that the more such dynamics dominate the dialogue among those senior political 
and military leaders responsible to wage war, the lower the likelihood of adopting a 
prudent course of action, the lower the likelihood of success, and correspondingly, the 
higher the probability of wasting resources and the lives citizens-who-become-soldiers as 
well as risking the lives of the innocent and the life of the political community.   
    As difficult as it may be, the responsibilities associated with waging war demand 
nothing short of the highest quality discourse among senior political and military leaders, 
even if the discourse is uncomfortably brutal at times.  The tri-partite tension inherent in 
waging war requires that senior political and military leaders constantly assess and 
reassess progress toward achieving strategic aims, changes in enemy activities, 
modifications required of friendly forces, then rebalance means and ends by adapting 
aims, strategies, policies, and military operations.  This is the requirement that Cohen’s 
unequal dialogue captures. 
    The war in Iraq under the Bush administration provides a good example of the role that 
dialogue plays in waging war and the effect that the quality of the dialogue has on a war.  
The senior political and military leaders who waged the Iraq war used two very different 
kinds of dialogues.  The first governed 2003-2006 period in Iraq; the second, 2007 and 
2008 period. The first dialogue was characterized by a mix of the principal-agent 
framework and “the normal theory.” At times, civilian leaders deferred execution to 
military leaders and at other times demanded compliance.  The first dialogue used an ad 
hoc approach of multiple conversations and manipulation. Often responsibilities were 
mixed and confused.  The second looked more like the unequal dialogue Cohen 
describes.  The difference between the results from the two kinds of dialogues is stark. 
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The story of two dialogues. 
    The first dialogue governed the planning for the invasion of Iraq and the waging of the 
war for the first several years, 2003-2006.  By the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
the Bush administration had been at war in Afghanistan for two years.  There were three 
early indicators that the 2003-2006 dialogue was broken.  The first surrounded General 
Eric Shinseki’s concerns about the invasion strategy—the flow of forces, supply lines, 
and the tenuous “northern approach” through Turkey—which he expressed to the 
President in a closed meeting on January 30, 2003.  Kore Schake, who attended this 
meeting with the President, said, “It’s the only time in my life where I felt like you could 
hear the hinge of history turn.  The President clearly didn’t know what to do.  So he 
thanked Shinseki and moved on.”330
    The second occurred in General Shinseki’s doubts about preparedness for what might 
follow regime change in Iraq, doubts he expressed in testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on February 25, 2003.  When pressed by Senator Carl Levin’s 
question about the potential size of force necessary to occupy Iraq after the Saddam 
regime was toppled, Shinseki replied, “Something on the order of several hundred 
thousand soldiers are probably…a figure that would be required.”
   
331  This assessment 
was counter to the Bush-Cheney team’s narrative, and it upset both Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz.332
                                                 
330 Peter Baker, Days of Fire:  Bush and Cheney in the White House, (New York:  Doubleday, 2013), 
Kindle locations 5089-5102. 
  In his own testimony before the 
House Budget Committee on February 27, 2003, Wolfowitz said that Shinseki’s estimate 
331 Peter Baker, Days of Fire, ibid., Kindle location 5203-5205;  Michael Gordon and General Bernard 
Trainor, Cobra II , op.cit., pp. 101-104. 
332 Peter Baker, Days of Fire, op.cit., Kindle location 5203-5232. 
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was “wildly off the mark.”333  Further, “neither Rumsfeld nor Wolfowitz ever asked 
Shinseki about his public estimate…so it was reasonable for the general to assume his 
views were not welcomed.”334
    The third indication happened during the initial invasion.  Army Lieutenant General 
Scott Wallace—the Commanding General of the army corps responsible, with a Marine 
Expeditionary Force, for the ground campaign that would topple Saddam Hussein’s 
regime—gave a joint interview to reporters of the Washington Post and New York Times.  
In the interview, Wallace said that the Iraqi irregular and paramilitary forces were “a bit 
different from” the enemy they had anticipated.  This remark, welcomed by some on the 
National Security Council who believed they were “not getting the straight story from 
Rumsfeld,” was interpreted by Secretary Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks (the 
Commander of Central Command and Wallace’s overall boss) as disloyalty, a repudiation 
of the strategy in Iraq, and a sign of Wallace’s own lack of aggressiveness.
  Shortly after General Shinseki’s response to Senator 
Levin’s question, the Defense Department started the discussion about Shinseki’s 
replacement.  The discussion of a replacement was public and earlier than normal—
another indication that “it was reasonable for the general to assume his views were not 
welcome.” 
335
                                                 
333 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco:  The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York:  the Penguin Press, 
2006), pp. 96-100; Peter Baker, Days of Fire, ibid., Kindle location 5205. 
  As one 
reporter put it, what Wallace had said “was dangerously off-message….Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was furious. Wallace was told to shut up around reporters. It 
was vintage Rumsfeld: after insisting on a very small invasion force, he refused to allow 
334 Peter Baker, Days of Fire, ibid., Kindle location 5219-5232. 
335 Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainer, Cobra II, op.cit., pp. 311-314. 
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his generals to admit their surprises and their constraints.”336
    From 2003 to 2006, even in the face of evidence that the overall strategy in Iraq—
progress toward a democracy to create security, transition responsibility to the Iraqis as 
quickly as possible, and withdraw—was failing, no serious adjustments to the approach 
were made.   
  The tenor of these three 
early indicators was clear: questions, doubts, and deviations are not welcome.  Comply.  
This would not be an unequal dialogue in Cohen’s sense, or any sense for that matter.   
    In 2003, violence was rising even as General Franks withdrew the three major 
headquarters that conducted the initial invasion to topple the Saddam regime and replaced 
it with one.337  The CIA briefed senior political leaders of a growing insurgency in 
November of 2003 and Bremer reported to Vice President Cheney that “we do not have a 
military strategy for victory,” yet the approach did not change.338
    Neither did the approach change in 2004.   In April of 2004 the U.S. Marines—at the 
direction of the White House and against military recommendations—initiated an intense 
battle in Fallujah against a determined enemy, only to have senior political leaders direct 
them to stop the battle mid-stream.
   
339
                                                 
336 James Kitfield, “My Iraq War,” in National Journal, March 21, 2013.  Available at: 
  (Later than year, U.S. forces went back to a bigger 
“hornet’s nest” in Fallujah.)   In November of 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage told the President that “We’re not winning in Iraq,” the President asked, “Are 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/my-iraq-war-20130321.  
337 Peter Baker, Days of Fire, op.cit., Kindle locations 5746, 5759, and 5772; Michael Gordon and General 
Bernard Trainer, Cobra II, op.cit., pp. 459, 487, and 493. 
338 Peter Baker, Days of Fire, ibid., Kindle locations 6057 and 6070. 
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we losing?” and Armitage replied, “Not yet.”340  The administration’s approach to Iraq 
did not change after Armitage’s report, nor did it change after the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz reported that, while the major violence in Iraq was in 4 of Iraq’s 
18 provinces, the other 14 were growing less stable, not more.  Rather than react to 
Wolfowitz’s report, “almost punctuating the lack of interest,” Bob Woodward observes in 
State of Denial, “[President] Bush reverted to the old talking points in a public question-
and-answer forum:  14 of the 18 provinces in Iraq appear to be relatively calm.”341  In 
December 2004, the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad, John Negroponte, sent a nine page 
memorandum to President Bush saying that a quick handover to Iraqis—a key component 
of the U.S. strategy in Iraq—was not possible and that efforts to rebuild Iraq were 
hampered by a resilient insurgency which was hardly defeated.342
    Another year, 2005, opened and closed without any significant adjustments to aims, 
strategies, or policies.  Early in 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice commissioned 
an assessment of Iraq.  The result was depressing.  It called Iraq a failed state with an 
active insurgency and a disaffected Sunni population.  The assessment concluded that the 
U.S. did not have a comprehensive, unified policy and that not enough attention was 
being paid to the political side of counterinsurgency.
  Political and military 
leaders were talking, but there was little dialogue and less change. 
343
                                                 
340 Peter Baker, Days of Fire, ibid., Kindle locations 7655, 7881, and 7971-7984. 
  About the same time, Colonel 
Derek Harvey presented an even starker assessment to the U.S. Defense Policy Board.  
The conclusions of this study rejected Secretary Rumsfeld’s position at the time that the 
341 Bob Woodward, State of Denial:  Bush at War Part III (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 368-
369. 
342 Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq 
from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, (New York:  Pantheon Books, 2012), pp. 130-132. 
343 Bob Woodward, State of Denial, op.cit., pp. 397-390. 
156 
 
U.S. faced only die-hard fanatics and dead-enders, not an organized insurgency.  Rather, 
Harvey described, in great detail, how the insurgency was well trained; well led; linked 
by family, tribal, and profession ties; and was exploiting the remnants of the collapsed 
Iraqi state.  Harvey briefed the staff and selected principals of the National Security 
Council, White House, and Joint Chief Staff.  His message was not well received, for his 
description ran counter not only to Rumsfeld’s personal belief but also to the more 
positive assessments being reported by the senior political and military leaders at the 
time.344  A senior Central Intelligence Agency analyst also produced an assessment that 
was skeptical of the claims of progress.  His analysis was that Iraq was slipping toward a 
civil war, elections would not produce security and stability by themselves, and Iran had 
already established intelligence and operational networks in Iraq.345  Regardless, in May 
of 2005, Vice President Dick Cheney said on CNN that he thought that Iraq was “in the 
last throes…of the insurgency.”  As Woodward put it, “it was a total denial of reality and 
of the trend.”346
     On June 28, 2005, the President reiterated his strategy in his speech on June 28, 2005 
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, “Our strategy can be summed up this way:  As the Iraqis 
stand up, we will stand down.”
   
347 Meanwhile Steven Hadley, the National Security 
Advisor did not believe “hand off to the Iraqis” was a strategy and hired Peter Feaver to 
write and staff a more comprehensive strategy.348
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  July 2005, Zalmay Khalilzad replaced 
John Negroponte as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.  Once there, he formed a Red Team to 
assess the current situation and approach.  This team concluded that the current approach 
345 Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, The End Game, ibid., pp.135-136. 
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was badly off course and had almost no prospect of success, that the timetable for 
handing power over to the Iraqis simply set them up for failure, and that the focus was 
too heavily weighted toward withdrawal rather than success.  The Red Team also 
reported that the insurgency was resilient and capable of regenerating itself and that the 
planned size of the Iraqi security forces would likely be too small.  Khalilzad showed his 
team’s assessment to both senior military and civilian leaders to no avail.349  Feaver 
ultimately produced a 35 page “Strategy for Victory” in September which President Bush 
approved, but nothing actually changed in Iraq.  By November of 2005, Representative 
Jack Murtha would claim that the approach to Iraq was “flawed policy wrapped in 
illusion,” but even this criticism from a long-time supporter of America’s military did not 
prompt fundamental change.350
    The opportunity to actually change approaches in Iraq in 2005 would pass.  The 
successful December 2005 election of a Prime Minister in Iraq was judged to be 
sufficient progress, confirming the original democracy/transition/withdrawal strategy.  
Simply put, Secretary Rumsfeld “wanted to do everything possible to tamp down the 
critics,” and General George Casey, the senior general in Iraq, remained convinced that 
the plan was on track and that hand over to Iraqi security forces followed by U.S. force 
reductions would be possible in 2006.
   
351
    In fact in early 2006, “Casey made the decision to off-ramp two brigades… in effect 
cutting the force by that amount.”
   
352
                                                 
349 Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, The End Game, op.cit., pp. 158-162. 
  This force reduction took place about the same time 
350 Bob Woodword, State of Denial, op.cit., pp. 423-424; Peter Baker, Days of Fire, op.cit.., Kindle 
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as the bombing of Samarra’s Al Askari Mosque on February 22, 2006—the attack that 
triggered massive sectarian violence in Iraq.  Although both military and political leaders 
believed that “the nature of the conflict had changed,” little changed as to the basic 
approach.353  Casey reports that they did explore various courses of action, but 
determined that the Al Askari attack did not trigger a civil war, the violence continued to 
be confined to only three provinces, so “we laid out specific objectives and tasks…much 
as we had in our earlier campaign plan.”354  Both military and civilian leaders at the time 
held to the original strategy: progressing along the milestones set for Iraq’s move toward 
democracy, handing over responsibility to the Iraqis, and withdrawing.355  By the end of 
2006, Casey had shifted his position to believe additional troops were required, but as he 
admitted, “I waited too long to make the decision to cancel the drawdown.”356
    The 2003-2006 dialogue between political and military leaders was not producing 
anything close to a prudent way to wage the Iraqi war.  Though this period was marked 
by multiple, intense discussions on Iraq, many visits, secure video conferences, meetings, 
briefings, and assessments, the war was not being waged well.  All of these discussions 
added up to a facsimile of the kind of dialogue Cohen recommends, but not the real thing.  
In retrospect, the facsimile had more in common with discussion around compliance with 
the plan rather than a dialogue around adapting the plan to unfolding realities.  Adapting 
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requires a real dialogue.  Compliance does not.  It needs only the people in charge 
demanding greater effort in doing what they want done, how they want it done. 
    Meanwhile, the soldiers and marines who carried the weight of fighting the war during 
this period did all they were asked to do, and sometimes much more.  From the principal-
agent perspective, waging the Iraq of 2003-2006 was an example of “working,” but the 
realities in Iraq were more violence, more instability, a larger insurgency, emboldened 
militias, growing involvement of foreign fighters, and strategic aims not being achieved.  
Senior political and military war-waging responsibilities n the 2003-2006 period—the 
setting of war aims; making strategy, policy, and campaign decisions that increase the 
probability of being right, or at least less wrong than those one is fighting; translating 
those decisions into action to achieve war aims at the least cost, in lives and resources, 
and least risk to one’s political community, and adapting to changing realities as they 
unfolded—left much to be desired. 
    In fact the 2003-2006 period emerges as an example more of sustained imprudence 
than of prudence and of a broken dialogue that was aimed more at compliance with the 
original strategy than adapting to the unfolding dynamics of war and ensuring the lives of 
the citizens-who-become-soldiers were being used well.  Further, as was the case in 
Vietnam, as casualties mounted and a successful outcome seemed less and less likely, 
American political support for the war eroded from 2003 to 2006. The legitimacy of the 
Iraq war was being eroded by the lack of progress and the appearance that the war was 
unwinnable.  By early 2007 there was open discussion in Congress and across America of 
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forcing a withdrawal from Iraq because many believed the war was a lost cause.357
     To deal with this reality, President Bush, Secretary Gates, and other senior political 
and military leaders employed a much different dialogue and approach to their war-
waging responsibilities.  Senator Levin put it clearly in his opening statement to Secretary 
Gates’ confirmation hearing on December 6, 2006 saying, “The situation in Iraq has been 
getting steadily worse, not better….we thoughtlessly disbanded the Iraqi army and 
disqualified tens of thousands of low-level Baath Party members from future government 
employment….we have failed…to secure the country and defeat the insurgency….we 
have failed to disarm the militias….we have failed to rebuild the economic infrastructure 
of the country.”
  This 
was the reality that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Rumsfeld’s replacement, faced.   
358  Senator Levin went on to say that the “Department of Defense’s 
effectiveness had been reduced by a civilian senior leadership that has ‘too often not 
welcomed differing views, whether from our uniformed military leaders, the intelligence 
community, the State Department, American allies, or members of Congress of both 
political parties.”359
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    A second, and markedly different, Iraq dialogue began in the early summer of 2006 
and came to maturity during Secretary Gates’ tenure.  Perhaps this new dialogue was 
triggered by the significant rise in sectarian violence following the Samarra mosque 
bombing; or from a memo to the White House from aides in Baghdad that said the 
strategy of political progress, transition to Iraqi control, and withdrawal was failing 
because the assumptions upon which this strategy rested were no longer valid; or from 
pressure growing in the American public and building in Congress.360  Perhaps it was a 
combination of these factors and others that were added to the President’s own torment 
after visiting casualties and meeting grieving military families, that led to the different 
approach.361  For it was in August of 2006 that the President, when meeting with relatives 
of slain soldiers, heard from one mother, “Don’t let my son have died in vain.”  And from 
another he heard, “He did his job.  Now you do yours.”  For the President, “withdrawing 
troops before Iraq was secure would be admitting their sons and daughters had indeed 
died in vain, and this was something he just could not let happen.”362
                                                 
360 Peter Baker, Days of Fire, op.cit.,Kindle locations 9517 and 9529. 
  Or perhaps it was a 
conjunction of reports and assessments in the last half of 2006, all of which described an 
increasingly violent Iraq, suggested that the original strategy and policies were failing, 
and predicted a dire result if a different approach was not taken.  By the late summer and 
early fall of 2006, the situation in Iraq was so bad no one could claim the strategy was 
working.  Identifying the exact cause of the change in the dialogue, or cause or the 
precise point in time when it changed is not important.  That a real dialogue did emerge is 
what is important. 
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    One of the major differences was the perspective of President Bush.  Initially, he 
mostly followed developments in Iraq, but delegated the conduct of the war to his 
subordinates.  His approach was to trust and delegate to his generals and civilian 
subordinates.  “You fight the war, and I’ll provide political cover” was the way President 
Bush described his approach.363  The President was to become a much more involved and 
assertive presence in the second dialogue. Another difference was an insistence on a 
ground-reality based discussion and an inclusion of more disparate views of the realities 
in Iraq.  Besides his own staff, secretaries, and military commanders, the President sought 
the perspectives of more junior members of his staff, academics, think tanks, a specially 
formed Iraq Study Group, and retired generals.  A third difference was the fact that all 
options were on the table.  This would be a well-focused, robust, often contentious, even 
brutal set of discussions that did not occur in the first non-dialogue governing the 2003-
2006 period.  Whereas the first sought to downplay differences, the second would not.364  
A fourth difference was a new Secretary of Defense who identified his “highest priority” 
as “turning the situation around in Iraq.”365
    This second dialogue focused on two opposing courses of action:  the status quo—i.e. 
make progress in Iraq’s move to democracy, transition to Iraqi control, and reduce forces 
in Iraq toward ultimate withdrawal—or a “surge,” an increase the size of U.S. forces and 
shift to a counterinsurgency strategy.  Most of the President’s military and civilian 
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advisors as well as the Iraqi Study Group recommended the status quo, but the President 
chose change.  This decision flowed from two important sources:  first, a very detailed 
understanding of the political and military situations in Iraq and within the United States; 
second from an extensive, extended, and often contentious and iterative set of discussions 
including the President, his principal national security advisors, active and retired senior 
military leaders, Congressional leaders, think tanks, and academics.  Besides the internal 
review ordered by the President, there were other, independent reviews by military 
headquarters, think tanks, and governmental departments.  All contributed, directly or 
indirectly, to the final recommendations made to the President.  The final decision was 
the President’s to make, but the route to that decision was a contentious and inclusive 
one.366
    In the end, President Bush changed not only the strategy but also his leadership team.  
In Iraq, General David Petraeus replaced General George Casey and Ambassador Ryan 
Crocker replaced Zalmay Khalilzad, Admiral William “Fox” Fallon replaced General 
John Abazaid at Central Command, and Robert Gates became the Secretary of Defense 
replacing Donald Rumsfeld.  The result of the second dialogue was twofold.  First, it 
produced unambiguous strategic, political-military unity of purpose:  clear strategic 
direction as well as new strategies, policies, and a new military campaign to achieve the 
aims the President set.  Second, it established a set of civil and military leaders who were 
expected to align policies and execute the new direction.  Over the next two years, 2007-
2008, execution of this new direction dramatically reduced the overall violence levels in 
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Iraq; saw the acceleration of Iraqi security force growth in size, capability, and 
confidence; permitted nescient Sunni reconciliation to spread and Shia militia influence 
to diminish; and created the opportunity for political solutions that were absent in 2005 
and 2006.  By mid 2008, U.S. force reductions began and a Status of Forces Agreement 
was being negotiated between the United States and Iraq.  In 2009 U.S. forces withdrew 
from Iraqi cities, which set the conditions for ultimate withdrawal of all American forces 
from Iraq.367
    Another contribution, at least as important, came from translating the war-waging 
decisions which emerged from the second dialogue into action, then adapting as events 
unfolded.  Supreme Command, unfortunately, says nothing about this execution 
dimension of senior political and military leader responsibility. 
  The second dialogue helped contribute to turning potential failure into 
potential success.   
 
Conclusions:  The unequal dialogue, necessary but insufficient. 
    Justice in the conduct of war, jus in bello, entails two sets of responsibilities.  The first 
are war-fighting responsibilities.  These are the moral responsibilities that soldiers and 
their leaders have in the midst of battle.  These responsibilities emanate from the tension 
between winning and fighting well and are adequately addressed in Walzer’s Just and 
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Unjust Wars and other of his writings.  The second set concerns war-waging 
responsibilities.  These are the moral responsibilities of senior political and military 
leaders to identify and execute proper war aims, strategies, policies, and military 
campaigns.  These responsibilities emanate from a tripartite tension and are linked to the 
rights of a political community and of its citizens, the same as those which Walzer uses 
as the basis of his just war theory. These war-waging responsibilities, as earlier chapters 
have shown, are absent from Walzer’s account of jus in bello.   
    The principal-agent framework of Armed Servants, an approach that describes the 
interaction of senior political and military leaders, was found inadequate as an 
explanation of war-waging responsibilities.  The framework was inadequate because it 
places too much emphasis on power, control, subordination, and compliance.  The 
framework also over-emphasized the economic, employer-to-employee aspect of the 
relationship between the senior political and military leaders who wage war.  While the 
framework does identify the need for military leaders to advise political leaders 
concerning decisions they are considering, even offering sharply and strongly delivered 
advice when necessary, the primary emphasis is on the political leader’s “right to be 
wrong” and on military compliance with what civilians want done and how they want it 
done.  The principal-agent framework places insufficient emphasis on the responsibility 
for outcomes:  to ensure that the political leader’s final decision is as right as possible.  
Further, insufficient emphasis was placed on the co-responsibility that senior political and 
military leaders share in both the decision making process and in execution.  To be fair, 
Peter Feaver never intended the framework to provide an explanation of the moral 
responsibilities of senior political and military leaders.  Rather, he wanted only to provide 
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an explanation of how civilian principals got their military agents to “work,” in the 
narrow definition of the term.   
    In the end, the principal-agent framework provided some useful perspectives, but 
Cohen’s unequal dialogue approach provided much more.  His discussion of the kind of 
“unequal” dialogue necessary to execute properly senior political and military leader war-
waging responsibility provided an understanding of political leader final decision 
authority that is more nuanced than simple asserting “the right to be wrong.”  While 
Cohen, at least for democracies, correctly insists upon final decision authority resting 
with political leaders, he is equally insistent upon a certain kind of dialogue whose 
purpose is to arrive at a set of outcomes—decisions that increases the chances that the 
right war aims, strategies, policies, and campaigns will be identified, decisions that have 
the greatest probability of protecting the life of the political community, using well the 
lives of citizens-who-become soldiers, without putting the innocent overly at risk—not 
merely to establish who is dominant over whom.   
    Cohen’s account demonstrates that justice in war demands more than balancing 
winning and fighting well—war-fighting responsibilities.  Waging war involves using 
and risking lives.  Justice in the conduct of war demands that war-waging decisions and 
actions that result in lives being used and risked in ways that increase the probability they 
will be wasted or risked unnecessarily be called what it is:  morally abhorrent behavior 
and those responsible, morally blameworthy.       
    As much progress as Cohen makes in understanding the war-waging dimension of jus 
in bello, it is not complete.  He says little about execution.  Dialogue—however good it is 
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and however likely it is to produce right decisions—must be followed by action.  
Decisions and plans have to be translated into coherent, military and non-military as well 
as domestic and diplomatic action.  Cohen’s account says little of this translation.  For 
Feaver, execution is a matter of monitoring regimes, specifically compliance monitoring: 
civilian monitoring to ensure what they want done, the way they want it done, get done.  
But, at least as presented in Armed Servants, the content of execution—decisions, orders, 
and directives—matters little, compliance matters more.   For Cohen, content is 
important, but a discussion of execution is mostly absent.  A full account of war-waging 
responsibilities must include both decision and execution.  
    With respect to the dialogue itself, both Feaver and Cohen correctly emphasize 
military subordination to civilian leaders.  Both also discuss how civilian and military 
leaders should also press each other on war aims, strategies, and policies.  What makes 
the dialogue work for Feaver is clear:  fear of “being caught” by intrusive monitoring 
mechanisms, then “being punished.”  Such an account is inadequate, for it exclude too 
much and in practice is unlikely to produce the kind of dialogue required.  Cohen 
includes discussion of the respect and candor between senior political and military 
leaders that is necessary to make the dialogue work but gives slight account of the 
important role senior political leaders play—since they are the senior members of the 
“unequal dialogue”—in setting the right climate for the kind of dialogue that is necessary.   
    The next chapter will suggest answers to the questions Cohen does not address:  what 
it takes to conduct a proper dialogue and what is needed to translate the decisions which 




The Dialogue-Execution Cycle 
 
 
    This chapter shows that waging war involves not an unequal dialogue, but a set of 
near-continuous dialogues which produce decisions that are executed by sets of 
bureaucracies.  These resultant decisions are then adapted as the realities of war 
determine which actions work, and which do not.  The chapter begins with a discussion 
of friction, that phenomenon in war that makes even the simplest action difficult.  Then 
the chapter provides a more complete description of the sets of dialogues necessary to 
wage war.  Finally, the chapter discusses execution, translating decisions into action.   
The chapter ends by adding dialogue to execution, presenting a performance-oriented, 
dialogue-and-execution regime as that which is necessary to improve the likelihood of a 
war being waged prudently and justice in war at the strategic level obtaining.  Such a 
regime is what is necessary to act justly at the strategic, war-waging level of war, 
consistent with what the lives of the innocent and the citizens-who-become-soldiers and 
life of the political community  are owed by those senior political and military leaders 
who are responsible for risking and using those lives.       
 
Friction in War. 
    Intellectually it’s not that hard:  conduct a proper dialogue among senior political and 
military leaders; identify war aims, strategies, campaigns, and policies that have good 
chance of success; translate those into action; and adapt as realities unfold.  Actually, it’s 
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very hard.  It takes a lot of leadership and management effort and plenty of focused 
attention.  Without such attention, the political and military bureaucracies will do what 
they always do—business as usual.  This is no surprise to anyone associated with 
bureaucracies.  They are designed to do the same thing repetitively, to maintain a routine, 
and to keep an organization moving on an even keel.  Business as usual is the business of 
a bureaucracy, and bureaucracies are absolutely necessary.  Large organizations—like the 
U.S. Departments of Defense and State, the Military Services, and geographic combatant 
commanders and their subordinate headquarters—could not operate without a 
bureaucracy.  When such organizations face something new, however—especially if it is 
also something that is rapidly and continually changing—bureaucracies don’t do so well.  
War is just such a phenomenon.  It is always new, always different, always atypical, and 
always changing rapidly.  War is, therefore, something that poses great difficulty to a 
bureaucracy.  To wage a war, senior political and military leaders must both use and 
break their bureaucracies, and therein lies the leadership and management challenge of 
execution.      
    “Everything in war is simple,” says Clausewitz, “but the simplest thing is difficult.”368  
He was talking primarily about war-fighting, the friction inherent in actions on the 
battlefield and in support of active campaigns.  His comments, however, apply equally to 
war-waging, actions required of senior political and military leaders and the friction that 
occurs at the strategic level.  “Friction,” he says, “is the force that makes the apparently 
easy so difficult.”369
                                                 
368 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, op.cit., p. 119. 
  Accordingly, Clausewitz explains that friction is one of the factors 
369 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ibid., p. 121. 
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that distinguishes “real war from war on paper.”370  He speaks of friction as physical, 
using a machine analogy:  the smooth running machine slowed down by the physical 
effects of weather, terrain, and military movements.  He also addresses ways in which 
psychological friction slows the military machine:  fear, stress, and tiredness.  The 
enemy, whose actions are deliberately taken to interfere with friendly operations, is 
another source of both physical and psychological friction.  These and “endless minor 
obstacles” great and small all combine, according to Clausewitz, to slow the military 
machine.371
    If he were writing today, he would have expanded his discussion of the sources of 
friction.   On War was written prior to the development of large staffs and huge 
bureaucracies created in the late 19th century and expanded further during the 20th century 
responding to the need to coordinate large armies executing execute widely dispersed 
campaigns.  Clausewitz also wrote prior to the advanced, integrative communications 
networks that currently proliferate from the individual soldier to senior political and 
military leaders.  Napoleonic campaigns—the grist of Clausewitz’s study—were certainly 
conducted by large forces and over expansive distances (for the time), but nothing 
compared to the global operations of a world war, or the simultaneous operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and against Al Qaeda and their affiliates.  Scale creates a friction all its 
own.  Friction is exactly why the apparently easy—conducting a proper dialogue among 
senior political and military leaders; identifying war aims, strategies, campaigns, and 
   
                                                 
370 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ibid. p. 119. 
371 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ibid. pp. 119-121.  Also considered sources of friction, but treated in 
different chapters in On War are danger, pages 113-114, physical effort, pages 115-116, and the friction 
inherent in just finding out what is going on in the battle area—intelligence in war, pages 117-118. 
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policies that have good chance of success; translating those into action; and adapting as 
realities unfold—is actually very hard. 
    Friction is rife amid war-waging activities, and it comes from multiple sources.  A 
modern day Clausewitz would write about organizational friction and bureaucratic 
friction.  These kinds of friction contribute to slowing the military machine and 
distinguish real war from war on paper just as much as the physical and psychological 
friction about which Clausewitz wrote.   Four sources of personal, organizational, and 
bureaucratic friction stand out:  experience and background differential between senior 
political and military leaders, the scale of complexity associated with waging war, 
bureaucratic inertia within and among the multiple bureaucracies now necessary to wage 
war, and the limits of human beings.  All four permeate nearly every aspect of war-
waging decisions and execution. 
    Simply put, senior political and military leaders have quite different developmental 
experiences and backgrounds.  The difference in perspectives is inherent in the two 
worlds, “given their different purposes, responsibilities, careers, and methods.”372
                                                 
372 Richard H. Kohn, “Building Trust:  Civil-Miliary Behaviors for Effective National Security,” in 
Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, editors, American Civil-Military Relations:  The Soldier and the 
State in a New Era (Baltimore, Maryland:  the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), p. 271. 
  
Flexibility and ambiguity—in both concept and execution—helps build political 
consensus and thus lays the foundation for political success. This is the art that political 
leaders learn as they develop.  The world in which military leaders develop their art is 
one in which exact and unambiguous orders, because of the nature of the battlefield, 
require flexibility in execution.  The complexity of waging war is akin to a multi-




high-stakes pressure, and continual change.  Senior political and military leaders must 
find solutions in the face of an enemy deliberately trying to “undo” whatever solutions 
those senior leaders emplace.  Moreover, strategy, policy, and campaign solutions must 
not only “fit” the enemy situation, they must also be acceptable domestically and 
internationally.   Last, these solutions must be executable by the set of national 
bureaucracies necessary to wage war. 
    Each bureaucracy—state, defense, and Congress, to name just a few—has its own 
culture and processes.  Making any one work is hard, for each has its own way.  Making 
them all work in sufficient concert is, well, harder still.  Waging war is, therefore, 
inherently complex and requires both political and military art.  The fact is, however, that 
the senior political and military leaders, whose responsibility it is to work with each other 
in this complex, Rubik’s cube, high-pressure environment, don’t often work together.   
    Moreover, the Rubik’s cube of war waged by a democracy involves the Legislative 
Branch of government, either through pre-decisional briefings and discussions, in 
testimony to special committees, or through individual or small group engagements of 
key Congressional leaders.373
                                                 
373 Robert M. Gates, Duty, op.cit., pp. 19-20, 24, 50, 60-1, 84-6, 440, and 575. 
  Waging war in a democracy also involves engaging with 
the media.  Forthright testimony to Congress, media engagements, and public speeches 
must contain accurate descriptions of successes and failures, progress and obstacles.  
These aspects the waging war in democracies adds to the friction of the already complex, 




    Finally, senior political and military leaders remain human beings.  As such they are 
limited in energy and capacity, and they are subject to foibles and folly just as is anyone 
else.  Some are people of strong intellect and character and others not; most somewhere 
in between.  Some senior political and military leaders have the courage and capacity to 
challenge peers and seniors in a dialogue over substantive issues and the strength to be so 
challenged; others avoid or shut down such discussions or use ad hominem attacks to 
establish dominance.  Some senior political and military leaders run large organizations 
well and provide excellent leadership in the bureaucracies for which they are responsible; 
others are virtually inept.  Some have the wisdom to understand the necessity for the kind 
of dialogue described in the previous chapter; others fear such a dialogue considering it a 
challenge to their position.      
    Put all this together and the degree of friction becomes self evident.  What is 
apparently easy, becomes difficult.  Personal, organizational and bureaucratic friction is 
real, and it affects both the war-waging dialogue and the translation of the results of that 
dialogue into coherent action.  
    Difficulty does not obviate necessity, however.  War is a continuous political-military 
activity that requires an equally continuous civil-military dialogue-execution regime, not 
a discrete dialogue in which military leaders provide episodic “advice” or “input,” then 
wait to be told what to do.  Nor is it a discrete action in which political leaders provide 






Sets of dialogues.  
    As well as Cohen captures a good bit of the difficulty and complexity of the dialogue 
between and among senior political and military leaders in Supreme Command, his 
description is of the tip of the proverbial iceberg.  In Duty, Secretary Gates says as much:  
“Political scientists, historians, and reporters are often completely unaware of events or 
experiences unseen by the public eye that influence important decisions….presidents and 
other senior officials listen to a wide array of voices other than those in official 
government channels.”374
    Gates writes of many private and small group discussions.  Some were conducted to 
ingest details and increase understanding; others to smoke out disagreements with 
conventional wisdom and discover alternative reasoning.  Some were face-to-face in the 
theaters of war or in the capitals of allies and coalition partners, others done on secure 
video conferences or on the telephone.  There were discussions with the President and 
Vice President, the National Security Advisor and the National Security Staff, Cabinet 
Secretaries and their deputies, Ambassadors, senior U.S. military officials—the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs and the Chiefs of the military services, U.S. field and geographic 
commanders, Members of Congress and their staff, senior officials within the Department 
of Defense, reporters from various media, think tank personnel, and academics.  There 
  In both the Bush and Obama administrations, Gates describes 
multiple types of dialogues, in multiple forums, and with a variety of leaders and 
thinkers—all feeding discussions among a smaller set of senior civilian and military 
leaders responsible for structuring options and recommendations for a Presidential 
decision.   
                                                 




were discussions with representative of similar sectors within other countries—allies, 
friends, and coalition partners.  He also describes multiple, often simultaneously 
conducted reviews that fed into the recommendations staffs made to more senior leaders.  
Some were done by the Departments of Defense and State, and some done by the 
National Security Staff.  Others were done by the Joint Staff as well as the staffs of field 
commanders or regional geographic commanders.  Still others were done by think tanks 
or by individual academics.375
    Cohen’s account of the unequal dialogue focuses primarily upon the small set of senior 
civilian and political leaders in discussion with the President.  He hints at the continuing 
nature of this dialogue when he discusses Churchill and Clemenceau.
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  As such, it is 
accurate as far as it goes.  Gates’s account, however, provides a look into the expansive 
nature of the dialogue—the discussions and arguments that precede the final “unequal 
dialogue” between senior political and military leaders leading to a decision.  These 
preceding discussions are an important part of the dialogue, for if they are well 
conducted, they can help ensure that the final dialogue is as factually based as possible, is 
informed by alternative analytic perspectives, considers a range of feasible alternative 
courses of actions, and reflects the risks and opportunities involved.  An unequal dialogue 
without these preceding discussions does a dis-service to the President because his 
decisions will have been made with inadequate information, analysis, options, and 
risk/opportunity assessments.   




    Together, Cohen’s and Gates’ accounts provide a clearer picture of what is involved 
constructing war aims, strategies, policies, and military operations that have a high 
probability of being “right,” or at least “less wrong than those of the enemy.”  Together, 
they also provide a clearer picture of what is necessary to conduct dialogues like these:  a 
proper leadership climate, protected space, time, leader/managerial focus, and attention to 
outcomes.   
    A proper, war-waging dialogue needs a sufficient leadership climate.  Cohen’s unequal 
dialogue calls for a collaborative, even if sometimes conflictual, relationship between 
senior political and military leaders, a relationship that takes for granted the fundamental 
subordination of soldiers to civil control.377  Gates provides more detail as to what such a 
dialogue needs:  senior civilian leaders to “set an atmosphere so people would be more 
inclined to speak up,” an “environment where all points of view can be expressed and 
have a robust debate.”378 This is an important point.  As the leaders with the dominant 
legal and constitutional position and with the responsibility for making final decisions, 
senior political leaders have the burden to set the right climate for dialogue.  In fact Gates 
believed that it was “a major task of the secretary of defense…to help manage [the 
relationship between military and civilian leaders] and ensure that the president listens to 
professional military advice that he may not want to hear, and that the senior officers 
offer their best and most candid advice and obey loyally, especially when they are 
overruled.”379
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    Even this expanded description, however, does not quite capture the totality.  Dialogue 
requires the participants to listen to each other with open minds.  Each must press the 
other and be willing to be pressed.   Military officers must “tell blunt truths” and have 
candor as a core value,380 but telling blunt truths to brick walls is useless and seen to be 
the futile activity it is.  Secretary Gates sums it up this way, “I will involve you.  I will 
listen to you.  I expect your candor…I want to know when you are in disagreement with 
each other or with me.  I want to know if you think I’m about to make a mistake—or 
have made one….I respect what each of you does and your expertise.  I will need your 
help….But, once decisions are made, we must speak with one voice.”381
    A broken dialogue looks like the one that governed the waging of the Vietnam War 
and the one that was in place during much of the time the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
were being waged.  In these cases, although the final civilian decision authority was 
never questioned, the nation was not well served, the lives of the citizens-who-became-
soldiers were not well used, the lives of the innocent were risked unnecessarily, and 
justice in the conduct of war did not obtain.   
  Here Secretary 
Gates recognizes the difference between having an opportunity to provide one’s advice 
and being heard.  General Shinseki, in the previous examples, was given the opportunity 
to provide his advice; he was hardly heard.  When participants, whether civilian or 
military, are dismissive of the perspectives of others, the dialogue breaks down and is 
quickly replaced with a facsimile, or worse—with no dialogue at all.   
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    War-waging dialogue requires protected space.  Transparency is important in 
democracies, but the arguments over what exactly is happening in the war, the discussion 
of alternatives, and the debate over the “best” course of action must take place 
“privately.”382
    There are times when public discussions are not only important but necessary, 
especially in a democracy.  Some of these discussions—whether with members of 
Congress, the media, or others—precede a final decision.  These must be done with 
integrity and candor, but also carefully so that they contribute to finding “answers” to war 
aims, strategies, and policies with the highest probability of success rather than unravel 
pending decisions.  The 2006-2008 public debate over what was the right policy in Iraq 
showed how difficult public discussion can be.  On one hand, parts of the public debate 
were necessary and contributory to better strategy and policy decisions.  On the other 
hand, parts were just public manipulation of facts that politicized the dialogue for 
personal reasons. 
  Premature public discussion—whether “leaked” or overtly provided, 
whether by military or civilians—sows distrust and suspicion among the participants of 
the dialogue, which make the dialogue harder than it already is.  Further, the “leak” is 
often a technique used to manipulate the outcome of a dialogue.  Such manipulation—
whether done by a senior political or military leader, or by their subordinates or staff—is 
actually the antithesis of dialogue, a way to pretend to participate in a legitimate dialogue 
when actually using position, power, and information to get a desired outcome that may 
not emerge from the dialogue otherwise.   
                                                 




    What these debates show is that a proper war-waging dialogue takes time.  Casting the 
dialogue in the singular, as an “unequal dialogue,” does not reflect the reality of waging 
war:  the dialogue actually consists of sets of repetitive, overlapping, and iterative 
dialogues from which practicable aims, strategies, policies, and military operations can 
emerge.  Continuing sets of repetitive, overlapping, and iterative dialogues—some 
private and some public—reflects Churchill’s belief that “the conduct of war emerged, 
not from any one ‘grand plan’ or strategy, but out of a series of conflicting and changing 
views, misunderstandings, personal interests and confusions.”383  It also matches 
Clemenceau’s use of “a stream of decisions, not an overall choice in favor of one or the 
other.”384
    War is dynamic, as is politics.  Analysis conducted and decisions made at the start of 
the war are neither static nor everlasting.  As hard as it is to conduct the initial sets of 
  Thus patience and persistence among senior political and military leaders 
becomes as necessary as pressing and listening to one another.  A singular dialogue 
neither matches the reality described by Churchill, Clemenceau, or Gates, nor does it 
corroborate the “provide me your advice as input to my decision” model of a civil-
military relationship or the “I know what I want done and how I want it done; you just do 
it” model.  These models are not satisfactory because they increase the probability that 
the political community will not be protected, the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers 
will not be used well, and the lives of the innocent risked unnecessarily.   Further, these 
kinds of pseudo-dialogues risk the legitimacy of the war.  Cutting the dialogue short, 
overly restricting the sets of dialogues that are necessary, or manipulating the dialogue—
all are perversions of senior political and military war-waging responsibilities. 
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dialogues and arrive at a satisfactory solution to war aims, strategies, policies, and at least 
the opening campaign, these initial decisions are only the beginning.  The same give and 
take must be sustained throughout the war.385
    War-waging dialogues also require leader and managerial focus.  One of the many 
example Secretary Gates records is a “five-hour meeting” in Afghanistan with Generals 
McChrystal (the overall commander in Afghanistan) and Petraeus (McChrystal’s U.S. 
boss as the commander of U.S. Central Command), Admirals Mullen (Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff) and Stavridis (McChrystal’s NATO boss as the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe), Michele Flournoy (Gates’ Undersecretary of Defense for Policy), 
Lieutenant General Rodriquez (deputy to McChrystal responsible for ground operations 
in Afghanistan), and a few members of staff.
  Change is the only constant in war; those 
responsible for waging war, therefore, must commit themselves to constant adaptation.  
Constant adaptation requires a set of constant reality-based dialogues, and time. 
386   This meeting was one of many leading 
to the assessment and recommendation that General McChrystal was tasked to make 
within the first 90 days of assuming command in Afghanistan.   Later, Gates recalls 
“nine, very long (two-to-three hour) meetings” just on General McChrystal’s 2009 
Afghanistan assessment and strategy recommendations.387
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  While this dialogue was being 
conducted, events continued to unfold in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as those 
associated with the wider war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates.  Nothing stood still as 
one decision was being made, not on the battlefield or in the capitals of the countries 
waging war.  The dynamism of war and politics demands equal dynamism in the decision 
386 Robert Gates, Duty, op.cit., p. 353. 




making processes associated with making war waging decisions.  Losing focus in this 
kind of dynamic environment is easy; the need for sustained, focused attention on the part 
of the senior political and military leaders responsible for waging war is apparent.   
    Busyness, however, tends to dissipate focus.  As important as were the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and against Al Qaeda, they were not the only security items that needed the 
attention of Defense Department and National Security Principals.  For example, at one 
point, the three wars that the U.S. was waging unfolded against a backdrop of the Iranian 
nuclear program, Somali pirates, North Korean nuclear tests, as well as a variety of 
developments in Russia, China, Israel, and Pakistan—to name a few.  Further, there were 
domestic issues, chief among them the American economic crisis and the many 
consequential decisions that had to be made as a result.  Further still, there were “routine 
issues” like Congressional testimony, management decisions associated with running the 
Department of Defense, budget submissions, decisions concerning major acquisitions, 
personnel assignments, and assorted official representational duties with visiting foreign 
defense officials.  Blandly, Secretary Gates sums it up this way, “In short, despite the 
tremendous power inherent in the job, the secretary of defense must deal with multiple 
competing interests both within and outside the Pentagon and work with many 
constituencies, without whose support he cannot be successful.”388
    All of this makes the right kind of continuing civil-military dialogue all the more 
necessary.  For without directed focus and attention of senior civil and military leaders 
not only would unity of effort start to unravel but also each bureaucracy for which these 
leaders are responsible would do what it does best—not change, “business as usual.”  The 
 
                                                 




result:  limited unity of effort and cohesiveness of action toward common war aims.  This 
is the nature of any complex activity conducted by multiple bureaucracies.  This is the 
nature of waging war. 
    Senior political and military leaders are pulled in so many directions that one of the 
ever-present temptations that face them is to short cut the process, falling back on one 
version or another of Huntington’s “objective control theory,” the “normal theory” of 
civil and military role differentiation: political leaders decide and direct; military leaders 
execute.  Another temptation comes from the principal-agent framework:  just do what I 
want done, the way I want it done.  Yielding to these temptations, political leaders might 
want to say, “just give me your best military advice so we can make a decision,” or 
military leaders might want to say, “just tell me what to do and let me do it.”  Such 
temptations must be resisted, “for a politician to dictate military action,” Cohen says at 
the outset of Supreme Command, “is almost always folly.”389  And for a military leader to 
sit back and allow strategy and policy to be formed in a vacuum is equal folly.  
Furthermore, in reality, there is no arbitrary line dividing civilian and military war-
waging responsibilities.  As has been evident throughout this study, with respect to 
waging war, there is no neat way of carving off distinct spheres of either pure political or 
pure military action—except that senior political leaders have the final decision 
authority.390
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  War simply requires the sustained, focused attention of the senior political 
and military leaders responsible to wage it. 




     Finally, a properly conducted dialogue focuses on output: “getting it right,” that is 
making decisions that increase the likelihood of attaining war aims and decrease the 
probability of putting the innocent and the political community at risk or using poorly the 
lives of citizens-who-become soldiers.  In war-waging dialogues, differences in opinion 
as to what is happening arise not only among the senior political and military leaders, but 
also among the wider sets of other groups—domestic and foreign, military and civilian—
who make up the network of agencies, organizations, and leaders associated with waging 
war.  Differences of understanding lead to different assessments, options, and 
recommended courses of action.  Sometimes these differences are profound, as Gates 
describes the differing position between Vice President Biden and other members of the 
national security team over the surge in Afghanistan.391
    Outcomes—likelihood of success and progress toward achieving that success—are the 
very purposes of the dialogue.  Further, outcomes determine legitimacy, at least in the 
eyes of the American citizens.  Legitimacy and public support for a war flow from a 
citizenry who believe the war is right and who believe that their nation, or political 
community, can win and are making progress toward winning.
  In these cases, focusing on 
outcomes is much more important than “winning” the debate or achieving “dominance” 
over those who oppose one’s view.   
392
                                                 
391 Robert Gates, Duty, op.cit., pp. 335-386. 
  Legitimacy and public 
support does not flow from than “winning” the debate or achieving “dominance” over 
392 Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler and Christopher Gelpi, “Success Matters:  Casualty Sensitivity and the War 
in Iraq,” ScholarWorks, Georgia State University, Winter 2006.  Available at: 
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=political_science_facpub.  This 
essay continues work done several years earlier on the same topic and published in Peter Feaver and 
Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles:  American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force 




those who oppose one’s view only to then execute decisions that reduce the likelihood of 
progress toward achieving common war aims. 
    A properly conducted set of dialogues, extended, inclusive, and iterative require an 
adequate leadership climate, protected space, time, leader and managerial focus, and an 
attention to outcomes.  Such a set of dialogues is only half of senior civil and military 
leaders’ war waging responsibilities.  The other half is translating the results of the 
dialogue into action then adapting as battlefield and political events unfold.  Secretary 
Gates recognized both sides of the job in saying that he “participated in the development 
of our strategies both within the Pentagon and in the White House, and then had primary 
responsibility for implementing them….”393
 
  The execution half of waging war involves 
using the civil and military bureaucracies to carry out a continuous cycle of activities:  
execute the strategy and policy decisions that emerge from their initial dialogue, monitor 
changes that occur in war—both on the battlefield and in the political communities, adapt 
initial strategy and policy decisions as the realities of war determine which work and 
which do not, execute these new decisions, and go through the cycle again.  In reality, 
therefore, the initial dialogue never stops, it just becomes part of the execution cycle—
hence, Churchill’s series of discussions and Clemenceau’s streams of decisions. 
Execution: making the bureaucracies work.  
     Secretary Gates would concur with Churchill and Clemenceau with respect to the on-
going iterative nature of both the decisions and actions necessary to wage war.  The 
                                                 




dialogue that Gates describes and that Cohen shows had been useful to those studied in 
Supreme Command is not a compliance oriented dialogue, as Armed Servants suggests.  
Rather, the dialogue is, or should be, performance oriented.  That is, a dialogue aimed at 
finding the gaps between actual reality as it is unfolding during a war—on the battlefield, 
amid the political community (or communities), and in the capital (or capitals)—and the 
desired reality—success at achieving war aims.  Once these gaps are found, senior 
political and military leaders then must adapt—understand, to the degree possible, what is 
actually happening; decide whether new developments required adjustments to aims, 
strategies, policies, or military campaigns, and if so, what those adjustments should be; 
then issue the requisite directives and execute—quickly because if one’s enemy executes 
better, they win.  Sometimes the adaptation involves changes to strategies and policies, 
even war aims themselves; other times, the adaptation involved changes in personnel, 
coalition partners, or resource levels.  Outcomes matter.  The function that senor political 
and military leaders perform in war is this:  conducting a war, in both its fighting and 
waging aspects, better than their opponents.   
    The extensive, inclusive, collaborative, contentious, and continuous sets of dialogues 
help maintain a focus on “exposing reality.”  The sets also help to identify the gap 
between that reality and desired outcomes.  Last, the sets help in adapting aims, 
strategies, policies, and campaigns accordingly.394
                                                 
394 The explicit link between the dialogue and execution is derived from: Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan, 
Execution:  The Discipline of Getting Things Done (New York:  Crown Business, 2002). 
  These war-waging responsibilities are 
as essential to the conduct of war as is fighting.  In businesses, the cost of chronic 
underperformance is money, market share, and perhaps the job and reputation of the chief 




become-soldiers—and, in some limited cases, the very existence of the political 
community.  When waging war, dialogue and execution matter. 
    Supreme Command leaves execution absent from its treatment of “soldiers, statesmen, 
and leadership in wartime.”395  Perhaps this omission is a matter of just not discussing the 
obvious.  In the case of war, however, the obvious cannot be assumed.  Properly 
conducting the sets of dialogues and arriving at initial war aims, strategies, policies, and 
military operations is but half the job.  The other half is executing and adapting, no easy 
tasks as Robert Komer demonstrates in Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, a study of U.S. 
bureaucracies during the Vietnam War, at least up to 1972 when RAND published his 
research.396
    “Why,” Komer asks in 1972 when the war was not yet over, “has a cumulative 
enormous U.S. contribution…had such limited impact for so long?  Why, almost 
regardless of the ultimate outcome, has U.S. intervention entailed such disproportionate 
costs and tragic side effects?....Why did we do so poorly for so long?”
   
397
                                                 
395 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, op.cit., from the subtitle. 
  Komer is 
asking questions about execution, about the gap between actual reality and desired 
reality.  The substance behind Komer’s questions reappears in the form of impressions 
Secretary Gates formed soon after he joined the Bush administration as the Secretary of 
Defense. “Even though the nation was waging two wars,” he observes, “neither of which 
we were winning, life at the Pentagon was largely business as usual when I arrived….It 
was clear why we had gotten into trouble in both Iraq and Afghanistan…when the 
396R. M. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing:  Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Perfomrance in 
Vietnam (Santa Monica, California:  RAND, 1972) 




situation began to deteriorate, the president, his senior civilian advisers, and the senior 
military leaders had not recognized that most of the assumptions that underpinned early 
military planning had proven wrong, and no necessary adjustments had been made.”398
    In both the Vietnam case and the pre-Gates Afghanistan and Iraq cases, the dialogue 
between senior political and military leaders was at best a pseudo-dialogue.  And the 
dialogue seemed insufficiently connected to execution and outcomes.  Such dialogues 
lower the probability of arriving at aims, strategies, and policies with reasonable 
likelihood of success.  Such dialogues also lower the probability of successful adaptation 
and execution. Such dialogues increase the likelihood of unnecessary risk to the innocent 
and to political communities and the likelihood of wasting the lives of citizens-who-
become-soldiers. 
 
That is, the system of performance-oriented dialogue with consequential adaptive 
decisions and actions, if it had been in place at all, had broken down. 
    How similar is Secretary Gates’ observation to some of the main conclusions in 
Komer’s study:  that a complete search of Vietnam War documents finds that a relatively 
sophisticated understanding of the culture and environment in which the war took place 
was present; that fairly detailed knowledge of the lack of progress and the reasons behind 
the lack of progress was widely known among senior political and military leaders; and 
that senior political and military leaders also realized by the mid-to-late 1960s that the 
war could not be won in the way it was being fought.399
                                                 
398 Robert M. Gates, Duty, op.cit., p. 115. 
 The senior political and military 
leaders simply could not translate what they knew into action.   




    They were unable make such a translation in part because of the dysfunctional civil-
military relationships among the principals and the bureaucracies they controlled.  
Moreover, what they knew about the war did not match the image of the war they had 
created.  The decisions they made were based more on their created un-reality than 
reality.  Further, they were unable to translate what they knew into action because of their 
basic inability to manage and adapt the organizations they led.  Others reached similar 
conclusions about Vietnam.400  In the end, Komer concludes, that our experience in 
Vietnam shows “how difficult it is to translate…lessons into…performance.  [Such 
translation requires] a consistent, deliberate effort to offset the inevitable tendency of 
bureaucracies to keep doing the familiar and to adapt only slowly and incrementally.”401
    Instead of waging and fighting a war in Vietnam that matched reality, the U.S. fought 
the war it knew how to fight.  In the process, 57,000 citizens-who-became-soldiers lost 
their lives.  Even more Vietnamese were killed.  And these tallies do not include the 
destruction of property and terrain, North and South.  Nor do these tallies include the 
decades of negative effects in America’s social and political fabric.  Komer’s study asked 
how such a moral travesty could occur.   
 
    In the end, he concludes that “whatever the wisdom of the…decisions to intervene in 
Vietnam, there is…much to be learned from the way we went about it….regardless of 
what policy called for, [U.S. governmental] institutions tended to play out their 
                                                 
400 See also, Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie:  John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York:  
Random House, 1988); Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore, Maryland:  The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Wayne, New Jersey:  Avery 
Publishing Group Inc., 1985); Lewis Sorely, Honorable Warrior, op.cit.; and H.R. McMasters, Dereliction 
of Duty,  op.cit.; and J. Powers, editor, The Pentagon Papers, Abridged addition for the Millennial 
Generation (Los Angeles, California:  PowerPlayz.com, 2012). 




existing…repertoires….And there was little top-level follow through or adequate 
management machinery to force them into different patterns of response.  Largely as a 
result, much of what we did turned out to be futile, wasted, and even irrelevant….We 
perceived the difficulties we confronted better than our responses would suggest.”402
    Here, Komer addresses the strategic dimension of the conduct of the war, specifically 
the war-waging decisions and actions taken by senior political and military leaders, not 
the tactical dimension of those who fought.  In one conversation with President Obama, 
Secretary Gates addresses these war-waging responsibilities by saying, “Mr. President, 
you and I—more than any other civilians—bear the burden of responsibility for our men 
and women at war….[in order for their sacrifices not] to be in vain….What we owe them 
is not only our support, but a clear strategy and achievable goals.”
   
403  Secretary Gates’ 
words to President Obama echo President Bush’s remarks when announcing the 2007 
surge in Iraq when he clearly referred to what the government owes the citizens-who-
become-soldiers so that their lives are used well: properly identified war aims, strategies, 
policies, and military campaigns as well as political and military bureaucracies that work 
to translate decisions and plans into actions. 404
    Coherent translation of decisions and plans into action was certainly not the case 
described by Dov Zakheim in A Vulcan’s Tale or in Ambassador Newmann’s The Other 
War concerning Afghanistan and summarized earlier in chapter 2. Rather both describe 
the inability to implement strategies and policies and a neglect of following decisions 
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404 George W. Bush, Decision Points, op.cit., p. 378. “The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American 
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with appropriately coordinated execution.  Neither did Zakheim and Newmann describe 
adaptive organizational structures and processes created specifically to deal with the 
dynamic challenges of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the kinds adaptive behavior 
exhibited by the senior political and military leaders in the face of the Civil War and 
described in chapter 2 or the kinds created during World War II and described in chapter 
1.  Given the many unique dimensions of both the Afghanistan and Iraq war, the fact that 
both were going on simultaneously, both included elements of irregular warfare, and both 
involved the complexity of coalitions, an emphasis on coordinated execution would seem 
to have been a natural point of emphasis. 
   The opposite was true, however. The difficulties in execution and adaptation that 
Komer describes are those that frustrated Gates who describes the Department of Defense 
as “structured to plan and prepare for a war but not to fight one.”405  Planning and 
preparing are steady-state activities conducted over time; change in this environment is 
slow and incremental.  These are important tasks and are the kind that bureaucracies do 
well; that’s why they are necessary.  Fighting a war, however, requires continual 
adaptation to a number of political and military rapidly changing situations.406
                                                 
405 Robert M. Gates, Duty, op.cit., pp. 116, 126-27, 133, and 147. 
  These 
kinds of task require either changes to the bureaucracy itself or extra-bureaucratic 
managerial action.  Mature extensive bureaucracies are very hard to change.  So to make 
the civil and military bureaucracies work in war usually entails new structures and 
processes specifically designed for performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution 
regime.  “Time and again, “ Secretary Gates laments, “I would have to tackle that 
damnable peacetime mind-set inside the Pentagon….the difference between getting a 




decision tomorrow versus next week or delivery of a piece of technology next week 
versus next month is huge.  [The Department of Defense] has been at war for over six 
years.  Yet we still use the processes that were barely adequate for peacetime operations 
and impose a heavy cost in wartime.”  The structures and processes necessary for a 
performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime may last only as long as the war, 
but ad hoc or not, they are a necessary element to wage war successfully.  
    A performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime is the kind of regime that 
President Lincoln and his civil and military subordinates created to wage the Civil War.  
It is also the kind of regime President Roosevelt and his team created to wage World War 
II.  It is the kind of regime that President Johnson and his civil and military leaders failed 
to create during the Vietnam War.  And it is the kind of regime that has been, at best, 
episodic in the wars following the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States.   
 
Dialogue, execution, and responsibility. 
    A performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime increases the probability of 
identifying the “right” set of initial set of war aims, strategies, policies, and military 
campaigns—one that have a higher probability of success.   This kind of regime also 
increases the probability of correctly adapting the initial set of decisions.  Using such a 
regime does not guarantee infallibility.  Rather, the guarantee is more limited; it is merely 
an increase in the probability of prudent action and of using well the lives of citizens-
who-become-soldiers, protecting the political community, and limiting risk to the 




legitimacy of a war.  Without such a regime, the probability increases that war aims, 
strategies, and policies may be conceptually correct or politically desirable, but un-
executable because they are disconnected from reality.  Simply put, senior political and 
military leaders need this kind of regime to fulfill their war-waging responsibilities.   
    A performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime needs a set of leaders who are 
committed to executing decisions that emerge from a proper set of dialogues, whether 
they agree completely with those decisions or not.  Such a regime also needs leaders who 
are committed to allocating enough time and attention to executing decisions long enough 
to see whether they are working.  Such a regime needs leaders who can evaluate the 
outcomes of execution honestly and objectively so that they can adapt—take the next set 
of decisions and actions.  Finally, such a regime needs civil and military leaders who can 
actually run the bureaucracies for which they are responsible.  In sum, the requirements 
necessary for execution are quite similar to those necessary for a properly run set of 
dialogues. 
    These requirements appeared not to be entirely present, according to Secretary Gates, 
during the 2009 decision to increase force levels and change strategies in Afghanistan.  
“In my entire career,” he writes, “I cannot think of any single issue or problem that 
absorbed so much of the president’s and the principal’s time and effort in such a 
compressed period.  There was no angle or substantive point that was not thoroughly 
examined.”407
                                                 
407 Robert Gates, Duty, ibid., p. 370. 
  In the end, the President decided on a “mission that the public and the 
politicians could easily understand:  Deny the Taliban momentum and control, facilitate 




Afghan security forces, transfer security responsibilities, and defeat Al Qaeda.” (italics in 
original)408  Following this decision, the debate concerned how to resource this strategy; 
several alternatives were discussed thoroughly.   Both the strategy and resource debate 
were hotly contended.409  “The aggressive, suspicious, and sometimes condescending and 
insulting questioning of our military leaders,” Gates writes, “made them overly 
defensive….A more collegial process, one that tried to identify points of agreement rather 
than sharpen differences, would have had a more harmonious conclusion and done less 
damage to the relationship between the military and the commander in chief.”410 The 
actual debate caused a significant rift between some senior political and military leaders.  
Those whose strategy and resource levels were not selected by the President began, in 
Secretary Gates’ words to “gather every negative bit of information about developments 
in Afghanistan and use them to try to convince the president that they had been right and 
the military wrong.  That began before the first surge soldier set foot in Afghanistan.”411
    Secretary Gates summed it up this way, “the president made a tough decision on the 
surge in Afghanistan in November 2009, and he had…made me, [Admiral Mike] Mullen, 
[General David] Petraeus, and [General Stan] McChrystal swear a blood oath that we 
would support his decision.  Unfortunately, [Vice President Joe] Biden and his staff, the 
White House staff, and the National Security Staff apparently had not taken the same 
oath of support.  From the moment the president left West Point [where he announced his 
strategy and resource decisions], they worked to show he had been wrong, that the 
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Pentagon was not following his direction, and that the war on the ground was going from 
bad to worse.”412
    Without leaders committed to executing decisions long enough to see whether they 
work, the likelihood of coherent action is minimal and the reality-based grist for the next 
set of decisions and adaptations that have to be made is distorted from the start.  A proper 
performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime, therefore, has little chance to exist 
let alone succeed.  If this kind of leadership behavior existed in a corporation, the bottom 
line would be affected; perhaps the corporation may go bankrupt.  In war, the cost is 
much higher.  Senior leaders behaving as Secretary Gates describes when the lives of 
citizens-who-are-now-soldiers and the innocent are at stake are not just poor leaders or 
managers, their behavior is morally reprehensible.  Any President’s decisions deserved a 
chance to work, and he is owed loyal support to make them work—by both his military 
and civilian subordinates.  If his decisions are proven incorrect or ineffective, then the 
dialogue should start again and adaptations made.   
 
    In addition to adequate leadership, a proper performance-oriented, dialogue-and-
execution regime also requires leaders to manage the work of their bureaucracy to 
produce what is needed to execute those decisions.  Since bureaucracies do not “do new 
or rapid change” well—the very realities of war—senior political and military leaders 
responsible to wage war must manage their organizations more carefully than what is 
required in “normal” times.  Often they must go beyond more careful management and 
create new management processes, forums, or organizations to accommodate the 
dynamism of war.   
                                                 




    Failure in execution reduces the probability of wartime success, for “no worthwhile 
strategy can be planned without taking into account the organization’s ability to execute 
it.”413  This is true for corporate leaders and it’s true for the senior political and military 
leaders who wage war.  The processes of identifying war aims, strategies, policies, and 
military operations then executing and adapting are “tightly linked to one another, not 
compartmentalized” between sets of leaders and their staffs.414
    The American strategist Bernard Brodie, in his book War and Politics, puts it this way, 
“unless [a war] is in pursuit of a reasonable political objective, any nation resorting to 
war is simply perpetuating wanton destruction of life and goods on a vast scale.”
  With respect to waging a 
war, if senior political and military leaders do not learn and adapt but continue to conduct 
a war using known inefficient and ineffective strategies and policies, or through known 
inefficient or ineffective organizations and management processes, those leaders should 
be morally blameworthy—even if not legally guilty—for the results of their actions just 
as soldiers and their leaders ignoring the war convention would be on the battlefield.  
415  
Wanton destruction and waste also result if the ends are reasonable, but the decisions 
concerning strategies, policies, resources, military operations, and the execution of these 
decisions do not contribute to attaining those reasonable ends.  Brodie concludes by 
paraphrasing an oft-used maxim, “war is not only too important to be left to the generals, 
but too important and far too complex to be handled adequately by any one 
profession.”416
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       A performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime increases the probability of 
identifying reasonable war aims was well as military and non-military strategies, policies, 
and campaigns.  Such a regime also increases the likelihood of properly adapting to the 
dynamic realities of war.   This kind of regime, therefore, improves the odds that the war 
will be waged prudently with progress made toward the reasonable aims decided upon.    
     A 2006 study, “Success Matters:  Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq,” analyzed 
public support for the Iraq war417  The study shows that the “body bag” count alone is an 
insufficient indicator of the legitimacy and public support for a war.418  The core 
conclusion of the authors is “that the U.S. public’s tolerance for the human costs of war is 
primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial attitudes:  beliefs about the rightness 
or wrongness of the war, and beliefs about a war’s likely success.”  While the two 
attitudes affect one another, the study demonstrated that “beliefs about the likelihood of 
success matter most in determining the public’s willingness to tolerate US. military 
deaths in combat.”419
    Cast in the quantitative language of political science, “Success Matters” ties war-
waging proficiency to legitimacy.  The beliefs of rightness of a war, whether a war is 
justified, is a consideration of jus ad bellum.  The probability of wartime success, 
however, is at the heart of the strategic dimension of jus in bello—prudence in waging 
war. The probability of success increases when a properly conduced performance-
  While public support for war and tolerance for casualties also vary 
in several other ways, in the end, the study showed that the most determinant factors 
came from a combination of right cause and probability of success.    
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oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime is used.  “Success Matters” demonstrates that 
the citizens of a country at war, and perhaps especially the citizens-who-become-soldiers 
and their families, will support a war that is progressing toward an ultimately successful 
outcome that matters. 420
    The tri-partite tension inherent in the war-waging dimension of jus in bello—set war 
aims and make strategy policy, and military campaign decisions that increase the 
probability of being right, or at least less wrong than those one is fighting; translate those 
decisions into action to achieve war aims at the least cost, in lives and resources, and least 
risk to one’s political community then adapt aims, strategies, and policies to the changing 
realities of war as they unfold; and do all of the foregoing while observing the war 
convention, sustaining the war’s legitimacy in the eyes of the political community, and 
maintaining proper subordination of the military to civilian leadership—is a dynamic 
relationship.  War’s essential uncertainty and constant change causes the dynamism 
inherent in the tri-partite tension, and a properly conduced a performance-oriented, 
  Purpose, progress, and ultimate success give meaning to the 
sacrifices inherent in war—thus giving legitimacy to the war.  Said another way, citizens 
consider illegitimate a war that appears to waste the lives of citizens-who-become 
soldiers by placing them in situations of significant risk, but for no worthy cause and with 
little chance of success.  Thus, “Success Matters” ties the legitimacy of a war to its 
probability of success, which in turn, is a function of the first two elements of the tri-
partite tension inherent in waging war: getting the aims, strategies, policies, and military 
campaigns “right enough,” or at least less wrong than those one is fighting, and then 
executing and adapting.  
                                                 





dialogue-and-execution regime helps keep the elements of this tension in sufficient 
balance.   
    A properly conducted performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime is far 
from the example of role differentiation that Walzer uses to separate political leaders who 
are responsible for the “war itself” and military leaders who are responsible for “the 
conduct of war.”  Actual war, waged by democracies at least, require that senior political 
leaders retain final decision responsibility.  En route to that final decision as well as in 
execution and adaptation, however, the responsibilities of senior political and military 
leaders are more integrated and shared than Walzer admits.   
    Clarifying and describing those responsibilities and including them where they belong, 
as part of jus in bello, is important because a just war theory that cannot account for this 
aspect of war is incomplete.  It is also important because unlike the four case studies used 
in Supreme Command, nations are not always fortunate to have wise senior political and 
military leaders.  In the analysis of the Vietnam War period, War and Politics reminds us 
that “a wiser President would have ignored [poor military] advice; more strategically 
minded generals would have given better advice.”421
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  A nation cannot, unfortunately, 
count on wise presidents and strategic minded generals both being present at the 
appropriate time.  Human failings, even stupidity at high places, and bumbling 
bureaucracies are at least as common as wisdom, genius and managerial excellence.  
Cohen, realizing this, thus named his penultimate chapter “Leadership Without Genius,” 
and commended the unequal dialogue as substitute for the absence of genius. Such a 




the absence of genius, that understand the low probability of wise presidents and strategic 
generals emerging at just the right time, and that recognize the existence of human and 
organizational failings require a properly conduced performance-oriented, dialogue-and-
execution regime that mitigates these realities, not just a singular unequal dialogue. 
 
Conclusions:  Looking for guiding principles. 
    In “Building Trust, “ Richard Kohn describes two war-time secretaries of defense 
whose behavior in office resulted in poorly decided war aims, strategies, policies, and 
military operations, and equally poor execution and adaptation.422  Secretaries McNamara 
and Rumsfeld, he says, were both people of “enormous drive, energy, and ambition:  
competitive…domineering, arrogant, dismissive, manipulative, hard-working, bullying, 
contemptuous, intimidating, ruthless, humiliating, and aggressive.”423  Both created 
dysfunctional relationships between the topmost civilians and the most senior military 
officers, relationships that resulted in the “lack of candor, consultation, coordination, and 
collaboration” which “can be disastrous for policy and decision making, in peacetime and 
in war.”424
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   Kohn goes on to state that such dysfunctional relationships are directly 
related to performance in war because they can cause “the United States to undertake 
unnecessary wars, prosecute them unwisely, and pile up hundreds or thousands of dead 
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and wounded Americans, not to speak of many times that number of enemies and 
innocent civilians.”425
    In peacetime, such leadership would be unfortunate; in wartime, it is morally 
reprehensible, for the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers and of the innocent are 
among the costs of executing the “disastrous policy” that emanates from dysfunctional 
relationships, dialogues, and execution.  Though senior political and military leaders act 
far from the battlefield, Kohn reminds us, the quality of their work selecting war aims, 
strategies, then identifying, executing, and adapting policies and military campaigns to 
achieve those aims—i.e. their war-waging responsibilities—are linked directly to justice 
in the conduct of war.   
   
    Accounting for jus in bello war-waging responsibilities and the principles that guide, 
or should guide, war-waging behavior, therefore, is fundamental to a complete just war 
theory.  Such an account will help address one of the important purposes of Walzer’s Just 
and Unjust Wars, to produce a book of “practical morality.”426  Just and Unjust Wars, 
among other things, intends to provide a structure—a language and a logic—that can be 
useful in understanding the moral dimension of war and in arguing about what is just and 
unjust in war.  Incorporating the war-waging dimension of jus in bello will also help with 
another of Walzer’s main purposes, providing “a comprehensive view of war as a human 
activity.”427  He intends Just and Unjust Wars to provide “help to men and women faced 
with hard choices,”428
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 where the “tensions are summed up in the dilemma of winning and 
426 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op.cit., p. xv. 
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fighting well…the military form of the means/ends problem, the central issue in political 
ethics.”429
    In leaving out jus in bello’s war-waging principles and responsibilities, however, 
Walzer leaves a gaping hole in what was to be a “comprehensive view of war as a human 
activity.”  The conduct of war, as this study shows, involves more than fighting.  
Conducting a war includes both war-fighting and war-waging activities.  The latter take 
place far from the battlefield, but are no less important or essentially connected to the 
conduct of a war.  Neither Walzer’s, Feaver’s, nor Cohen’s accounts have provided a 
fully satisfactory account of jus in bello’s war-waging dimension, but a properly run 
performance-oriented, decision-and-execution regime fills the gap in Walzer’s account. 
 
    Incorporating the war-waging dimension of jus in bello, to include the principles and 
theory of responsibility associated with it, provides a more complete framework useful in 
arguing about and explaining justified conduct in war.  Chapter 6 takes this final step.  
Drawing from the cases and discussion of the previous chapters, the next chapter suggests 
five principles—the principles of continuous dialogue, final decision authority, 
managerial competency, war legitimacy, and resignation—as those which should govern 
war-waging behavior.  Chapter 6 also discusses the sources and purposes of the principles 
it suggests. 
  
                                                 





The War-waging Principles of Jus in Bello  
 
 
    The final chapter completes the discussion of waging war, the strategic dimension of 
jus in bello that Walzer omits.  The chapter presents five principles—the principles of 
continuous dialogue, final decision authority, managerial competency, legitimacy, and 
resignation—as those that govern jus in bello’s war-waging activities.  The chapter also 
presents the sources and purposes of the five war-waging principles.  Finally, the chapter 
describes the war-waging responsibilities of senior political and military leaders jus in 
bello as positional responsibilities and identifies a rationale for the moral grounding of 
these responsibilities. 
   Ultimately, the five war-waging principles, like the jus in bello war-fighting principles 
of Walzer’s war convention, are designed to balance protection of individual and 
communal life with the legitimate conduct of war. At the tactical level, this balance 
occurs between winning and fighting well.  At the strategic level, the balance occurs amid 
the tri-partite tension inherent in the war-waging dimension of jus in bello:  (1) set war 
aims and make strategy, policy, and military campaign decisions that increase the 
probability of being right, or at least less wrong than those one is fighting; (2) translate 
those decisions into action to achieve war aims at the least cost, in lives and resources, 
and least risk to one’s political community then adapt aims, strategies, policies, and 
military operations to the changing realities of war as they unfold.  Finally, (3) do the 




eyes of one’s political community, and maintaining proper subordination of the military 
to civilian leadership.   
    The jus in bello’s war-waging principles also leave senior political and military leaders 
in a position akin to soldiers and military leaders on the battlefield:  “The cruelest 
decisions [are left] to be made by the men [and women] on the spot.”430
 
   The principles 
of jus in bello’s tactical dimension describe right conduct in the midst of battle; applying 
them correctly helps assure justice is done in fighting a war.  The principles of  jus in 
bello’s strategic dimension describe right conduct in the waging of war; applying them 
correctly helps assure justice is done in waging a war. 
War-waging principles.   
    The principles presented below emerge from the analysis and examples of the previous 
chapters.  Together, they form a framework that, if followed, increase the probability that 
war-waging decisions and actions will use the lives of citizens-who-become soldiers well 
and decrease the likelihood that the lives of the innocent and the life of the political 
community are risked unnecessarily.  The principles describe what senior political and 
military leaders owe the citizens-who-become-soldiers that they lead, the political 
community that they serve, and the innocent whose lives they risk.  Said another way, 
senior political and military leaders who follow the principles described below are acting 
justly with respect to jus in bello’s strategic, war-waging dimension, for the principles 
describe right conduct in the waging of war.   
                                                 




1. The Principle of Continuous Dialogue.  This principle recognizes the necessity for 
a robust civil-military dialogue prior to the initial decisions concerning war aims, 
strategies, policies, and military campaigns.  The principle also recognizes the 
need for continuing a dialogue throughout the conduct of war in order to adapt 
initial aims, strategies, policies, and campaigns to the dynamic nature of war.  
Because of the continuous nature of this dialogue, one that is linked to both 
making and executing war-waging decisions and actions, it must be approached as 
a decision-and-execution regime, not as a discrete event.  The President and 
Secretary of Defense are primarily responsible for setting the right conditions for 
this dialogue to take place, but the senior political and military leaders who 
participate in this regime are co-responsible for its conduct.   
    The jus ad bellum aspect of just war theory properly links war aims to the justification 
of the war itself.  For example, the aims of a war justified on grounds of self defense 
cannot go beyond defeat of the aggressor and reasonable punishment of the aggressor.  
The principles of jus ad bellum also limit war aims, strategies, policies, and military 
operations to the purposes of any specific war or intervention, thus preventing a war from 
turning into an expansive crusade.   There are jus in bello limits as well.  
    Neither war aims that cannot actually be achieved nor strategies, policies, and 
campaigns that cannot actually be executed—or do not actually contribute to achieving 
the aims—set can be “best.”  “Best” in some ideal sense doesn’t matter.  Best in the 
practical sense—using aims, strategies, policies, and military operations that have a 
reasonable probability of success relative to one’s enemies—does matter.   “Best” in this 




and campaigns decided without sufficient discussion about what actually is required to 
execute them and without a sufficient discussion about whether these requirements are 
available, affordable, and acceptable may commit a nation to the impossible, resulting in 
prolonged war, wasted lives and resources, and end in failure.  
    A robust, continuous dialogue, a decision-and-execution regime, is necessary not only 
before a war but also during it.  The reality is that war is so complex, unpredictable, and 
fast-changing—especially in an era of a 24/7 global media and social media—that 
decisions and actions have a limited “shelf life” of utility.  The first Gulf War of 1990 
provides a clear example of the requirement for robust, continuous dialogue before and 
during war. 
    Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.  Five days later, the first U.S. troops arrived in 
Saudi Arabia to defend it from the possibility of Iraqi attack.  On November 29, 1990, the 
United Nations issued a resolution setting a deadline for Iraq to withdraw its forces from 
Kuwait or face military action.  The U.S. Congress authorized force on January 12, 1991.  
The air campaign against Iraqi forces began on January 17th and the ground campaign on 
February 24, 1991.  The United Nations accepted the terms of a cease fire agreement on 
March 3rd, and the first U.S. troops began arriving home in March 17, 1991.431
    The U.S. civil-military dialogue began on August 1, 1990 when President George 
H.W. Bush was notified of Iraq’s pending invasion of Kuwait. War aims, strategies, 
policies, and military operations emerged iteratively from this dialogue even as the first 
American troops deployed to Saudi Arabia.  The discussions and debates among senior 
 
                                                 






political and military leaders, between the administration and Congress, with regional 
partners and allies, and in the press were fast and furious.  First to emerge was a set of 
principles used to guide final decisions as to war aims, strategies, policies, and military 
operations.432   That the U.S. would not let Iraq’s aggression stand was a relatively 
straightforward decision.  But what exactly to do, with whom, how, and when, were all 
matters of extensive and inclusive discussion—within the United States, with 
international organizations, and among allies and coalition partners.  From this dialogue 
came war aims—those acceptable not only to the U.S. but also the U.N., allies, and 
coalition partners.433  Several strategies emerged:  diplomatic, political, and military.  
Throughout, there was a constant set of conversations, briefs, debates, consultations, and 
“rolling” decisions.  The key U.S. participants included the President, the National 
Security Advisor, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the commander of U.S. Central 
Command.  Others were brought in as needed. 434  This dialogue continued right up to the 
final decision as to when and how to end the war.435  The war was short, but this was 
unexpected.  At the start, “the pundits were hard at work forecasting the darkest 
scenarios….citing numbers of 20,000 [casualties] or more…military estimates were 
below 2,000.”436
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    The civil-military dialogue associated with the 1990-91 Gulf War was not a discrete 
event.  It was continuous.  Nor was the dialogue characterized by senior military leaders 
episodically providing “military advice” as “input” to senior political leaders to use in 
separate discussions.  Rather, the dialogue is best understood as a regime, a structured set 
of dialogues over time in which senior military leaders—primarily the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs and the Commander of U.S. Central Command—were an essential part, not 
merely episodic attendees who provided “input.”  Once the war began, few major 
adjustments were needed because the war ended more quickly than anticipated, but the 
speed of the war did require adaptations—even in this short, seemingly straight-forward 
war differences of opinion arose.   
    One of the first concerned how long to wait before launching the air and ground 
offensive operations to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  Others concerned how long to 
allow sanctions to work, how long the coalition could hold together, how to assess 
potential risks and put in place mitigation measures, how to develop and sustain support 
in Congress and with the American people—all were argued by the senior political and 
military leaders.437  They also argued about the military strategy:  could air power alone 
attain the war aims, how should an air and ground campaign be structured, when should 
each start, what to do if Saddam began withdrawing his forces before the offensive 
operation began, and how to keep the war from spreading throughout the region.438
                                                 
437 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, ibid., pp. 353, 358, 390-91, 393, 397, 401, 
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  They 
also debated when and how to end the war—how much of the Iraqi Army should be 
438 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, ibid., pp. 328, 353, 380-81, 383, 395, 432, 




destroyed, and whether the offensive should transition to unseat Saddam.439
    Exercising war-waging responsibilities involves leaders who can adapt to the 
dynamism of war, and the longer the war lasts the more such leadership is required.  
Adaptive leadership differs from authority, and the difference matters.  Authority in a 
role—whether corporate CEO, military general, or Secretary of Defense—has a specific 
scope that defines the expectations of what those who granted the authority. 
  At times, 
senior political leaders challenged military perspectives; at other times, the tables turned.  
The point is that both sets of leaders were responsible for the quality and content of the 
dialogue.  Both were responsible to ensure the President’s decisions were best, “all things 
considered,” and both were responsible to ensure that the decisions made could actually 
be executed and had a reasonable chance to achieve the aims set. 
440
   Tactical, war-fighting, problems generally have solutions that can be implemented 
using current knowhow, and have persons in authority that can apply that knowhow.  If 
the lieutenant doesn’t know how to solve a problem, for example, one of his sergeants or 
his captain is likely to have faced a similar enough problem many times.  The lieutenant 
can count on that knowhow and authority.  If not, the lieutenant colonel or sergeant 
major, or other seniors in the organization in which the lieutenant serves, almost certainly 
will have an answer.  Generals and senior colonels who circulate the battlefield during 
combat often have discussions with subordinate leaders over a particular tactical problem 
with which his or her subordinate is having difficulty.  Such is the nature of tactical 
problems and battlefield leadership.   
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    In organizational theory parlance, these are called technical problems.441  Authority is 
important in solving technical problems.  Technical problems “may be very complex and 
critically important,…[but] they have known solutions that can be implemented by 
current know-how.  They can be resolved through the application of authoritative 
expertise and through the organization’s current structures, procedures, and ways of 
doing things.”442
    At the strategic, war-waging level, the problems are different, and authority plays a 
different role. War-waging problems are generally a mix of technical and adaptive 
problems.  Adaptive problems cannot be solved through technical means.  Adaptive 
problems commonly require that a team of experts come together to understand the 
problem at hand and help identify potential ways to deal with the problem.  Adaptive 
problems usually require that work is done outside the norm of the organization’s 
routine.
  Examples of the many kinds of technical problems that arise on the 
battlefield are conducting an attack or a defense, laying in an ambush, executing a 
security or reconnaissance plan, or executing a resupply or casualty recovery operation.  
Any one of these could be complex and important, but all can be resolved through 
existing capacities, and, appropriately, their solution can be directed by a person in 
authority. 
443  “Making progress requires going beyond any authoritative expertise…and 
generating new capacity [within the organization].”444
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  Many strategic level problems 
contain a significant adaptive element because the problem itself is not clear-cut, often so 
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complex no one person can understand it completely, and because both problem 
identification and the solution require learning-on-the-go.445
    Understanding an adaptive problem, or the adaptive component of a mixed problem, 
emerges from the context, so does implementing the “solution.”  Since the context of an 
adaptive problem is continually changing, the “solution” changes continually as well.  
Examples of mixed technical and adaptive wartime problems are these:  defeat the 
Confederate States in such a way so as to preserve the Union; conduct a global war 
against the Axis Powers and establish a more stable peace following their defeat; disrupt, 
dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and their affiliates.  Each of these problems has sub-
components which can be solved through existing organizations, processes, and 
structures.  Each, however, has significant elements for which no authoritative expertise 
exists and which cannot be fully understood, let alone solved, at the start.  Seeking 
technical solutions, using normal procedures and relying on authority are simply 
inappropriate when facing adaptive problems.  Understanding the problem requires 
“getting into it,” for the nature of the problem itself is dynamic, as is the solution. 
   
    In fact, at the strategic level, often there are no actual solutions.  Rather, there are 
resolutions that work for a time, but because strategic problems generally unfold and 
change over time, the resolution must be continually revisited.  As Ambassador Crocker 
once said about the problems that the senior leadership team faced in Baghdad in 2007-
2008, “all we can do is manage problems; we can’t solve them.”446
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  Such is the nature of 
strategic level problems.  Senior political and military leaders find themselves learning 




their way to understanding and resolving the problems they face; that’s why they need 
each other, and they need the continuous dialogue-and-execution regime. 
    Adaptive problems like those that senior political and military leaders face in waging 
war are problems where no one authority is capable of identifying a resolution let alone 
implementing it.  There is no “authoritative expertise.”  Leadership, in cases like these, 
shifts away from answer-giving authority, like that associated with technical problems.  
Rather, leaders facing adaptive problems must work to construct a relationship or sets of 
relationships; create forums in which to raise and process tough questions, hear divergent 
opinions; and argue about possible solutions.  Success in resolving adaptive problems 
involves implementing some possible solutions as if they were experiments, then learning 
from and adapting to what actually works.  In sum, leaders facing adaptive problems 
must use relationships and collaborative forums like that of a dialogue-and-execution 
regime as tools needed to understand a problem and work toward a solution, rather than 
finding someone in authority to direct an answer.447  “Dependency on authority 
appropriate to technical solutions,” Heifetz says in Leadership Without Easy Answers, 
“becomes inappropriate in adaptive ones.”448
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  This is why, when facing adaptive, war-
waging problems, senior political or military leaders who simply direct what they want 
done and how they want it done increase the probability of being wrong.  They are 
applying technical solutions to adaptive problems, applying an approach that may work at 
the tactical level but not at the strategic.  In fact, “the most common cause of failure in 




leadership is produced by treating adaptive problems as if they were technical 
problems.”449
    Adaptive leadership, the kind of leadership that waging war requires, therefore, is not 
about meeting or exceeding your authorizers’ expectations, which is what compliance 
regimes demand.  Rather, adaptive leadership is about challenging some of those 
expectations as the unexpected occurs.
 
450  By practicing adaptive leadership, those 
involved in the decision-and-action regime must tell each other what all need to hear 
regarding resolving the problems they face.451
   Unlike technical problems, there is no clear and time-proven framework or checklist 
that will result in a solution.  Those responsible for waging war need a plan, but they also 
need freedom to deviate from that plan as new events, situations, opportunities, and 
vulnerabilities arise.  Continual evaluation and deviation is the hallmark of adaptive 
problems; it is also the hallmark of a proper performance-oriented, decision-and-
execution regime. When conditions change, as they do constantly in war, senior political 
and military leaders are rarely able to control the outcome completely.  Rather, the reality 
of war is that several possible outcomes are equally likely.  Solutions to adaptive 
problems do not form a straight line.  As the authors of The Practice of Adaptive 
Leadership say, adaptive leadership “requires flexibility and openness even in defining 
  Only this kind of leadership can help 
senior political and military leaders make progress on the difficult war-waging issues 
they face together.   
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    The President and Secretary of Defense have the primary responsibility for setting the 
climate required for adaptive leadership and the dialogue-and-execution regime necessary 
to practice it.  This is the proper role of authority with respect to adaptive problems; 
authority convenes the experts and sets the climate necessary in which the dialogue-and-
execution regime takes place.  President Obama, acknowledging this responsibility at a 
particularly difficult and frustrating time in the dialogue over changing U.S. strategy in 
Afghanistan, said to Secretary Gates, “I’ve tried to set an environment where all points of 
view can be expressed and have a robust debate.  I’m prepared to devote any amount of 
time to it….What is wrong?”
   Waging war, one form of adaptive work to be sure, requires both senior 
political and military leaders to work together in a cooperative “leadership space,” which 
includes but is separate from each participant’s individual, role-defined scope of 
authority.   
453  Secretary Gates also recognized that it was his 
responsibility to “set an…atmosphere so people would be more inclined to speak up.”454
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Only the President and the Secretary of Defense have the authority necessary to convene 
the experts and establish the climate and the regime necessary for a war-waging dialogue.  
All have the responsibility to participate as adaptive leaders in the dialogue-and-
execution regime necessary to wage war.  Any one of the participants may take 
leadership roles at one time or another, but none other than the President and Secretary of 
Defense have the authority to convene, focus, and guide the set of leaders necessary to 
make war-waging decisions and take war-waging actions. 
453 Robert Gates, Duty, op.cit., p. 369. 




    No president wants to be wrong when it comes to committing the nation to war.  Too 
much is at stake.  Nor does a president want to be wrong when it comes to waging a war 
once committed.  Again, the stakes are too high.  In fact President George W. Bush said, 
“Sending Americans to war is the most profound decision a president can make.”455
   The other senior political and military leaders also have responsibilities in this process.  
They are co-responsible for the quality of the dialogue and the resultant initial decisions, 
just as they are for the on-going dialogue-and-execution regime needed during a war.  
Neither senior political nor military leaders have access to an “answer book.”  All are 
  In 
war, however, only the President and the Secretary of Defense have the positional 
authority to gather the necessary participants in a proper war-waging dialogue-and-
execution regime and to focus those participants on the adaptive problem they face 
together and the regime that keeps them from being “too wrong.”  The President and the 
Secretary of Defense have the responsibility, therefore, to ensure the set of senior 
political and military leaders focus on the right problems and make progress toward their 
resolution; have the information and analysis necessary when they need it; have the right 
forums and frequency to discuss, debate, and attain sufficient unity with respect to their 
decisions; execute those decision coherently; and adapt given what realities emerge.  
When this regime goes astray—as all such regimes inevitably will because of complexity, 
pressure, and personality—the President and Secretary of Defense have the responsibility 
to put things back on track, to refocus the discussion, or to manage the participants.  That 
is, they have the responsibility for the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the 
process, in addition to the outcomes of that process.    
                                                 




imperfect judges of which strategies and policies are likely to work.  Rare will be the case 
where either senior political or military officers would have “waged war before,” 
although some may have fought in wars.  All are imperfect predictors, therefore, of the 
consequences of decisions and action—at home, abroad, or on the battlefield.  None can 
foresee enemy reactions or decisions.  Whatever limited guarantee that may be found in 
waging war emerges from executing a proper dialogue-and-execution regime.  That is, 
the limited guarantee comes from a regime that attempts to maximize both the political 
and military expertise—both of which are necessary in waging war and neither of which 
are sufficient.  This is simply the nature of waging war. 
    Feaver correctly pointed out that if the senior civilian leader exercises his final 
decision authority wrongly, the “voters-as-principal is obliged to punish the politician-as-
agent by voting him or her out of office.”456
                                                 
456 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants, op.cit., p. 65. 
  The “vote-‘em-out” approach is one way to 
remove inept or ineffective leadership, but waiting until this point certainly seems to be 
an extreme that should be avoided in the first place.   A properly executed dialogue-and-
execution regime helps avoid this extreme.  Further, citizens expect senior political and 
military leaders to do what they can before the extreme obtains.  This is part of the 
responsibilities of their offices.  The final decision authorities are held responsible by the 
citizens as Feaver describes, but senior political and military leaders are also both 
responsible to the final decision authority and to the people as well.  Their responsibility 
demands that they do what they can to avoid the extreme of deciding wrongly, when such 
a decision can be avoided, and modify initial decisions quickly once they have been 




    A dialogue-and-execution regime that augmented each participant’s limited 
experiences and perspectives, one that strove to find “solutions” with the highest 
probability of success, and one that acknowledged subordination but also encouraged 
open participation, is the kind of regime that governed war-waging decisions made by 
President Roosevelt and his senior civilian and military leaders during World War II.  
The structure and style of this dialogue, as well as the participants in it, permitted just the 
kind of discussion and debates that are necessary to achieve the “limited guarantee.”  
This is exactly the opposite of the type of regime used by the Johnson administration 
during the Vietnam War—an example of an avoidable travesty in the exercise of war-
waging responsibilities.  Here the structure and style of the dialogue—if it can be called a 
dialogue at all—as well as the duplicitous behavior of at least some of the participants, 
resulted in using lives in a war that could not be won in the way it was being waged and 
putting the innocent at risk unnecessarily. 
    The issue concerning war-waging responsibilities is not whether President Johnson had 
the authority to make the decisions he made.  He did.  Rather, the issue is how he and his 
senior political and military leaders exercised adaptive leadership inherent in their war-
waging responsibility.  So the question becomes, which of the participants in this 
dialogue were morally blameless and which morally blameworthy?  Understanding the 
kind of dialogue-and-execution regime that is required to exercise war-waging 
responsibilities, provides a framework to help answer this question. 
    To get the rough, give and take argument over analysis, alternatives, risks, and 
consequences required by the dialogue-and-execution regime, much of it must be 




before foreclosure is necessary, harden positions too quickly, and add stress among 
participants in the dialogue-and-execution regime whose common leadership challenge is 
already stressful enough.  At best, leaks—even though they are the stuff of any capital 
city—detract from proper dialogue and execution.  At worst, they prevent it all together.  
Similar results occur when participants in the dialogue take the discussion to the public 
prematurely, before the group has time to complete their work.   
    One prime example where a combination of leaks and public discussion nearly derailed 
a proper dialogue and made execution more difficult occurred during the complex set of 
discussions on Afghanistan in 2009.457  The Washington Post article published an 
interview with General Petraeus in which he dismissed an option still being discussed 
among the principals.458  A couple of weeks later another Washington Post article was 
based upon a leaked copy of General McChrystal’s initial commander’s assessment of the 
situation in Afghanistan.459  The article ended by quoting the assessment:  “Failure to 
provide adequate resources…risks a larger conflict, greater casualties, higher overall 
costs, and…critical loss of political support.  Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to 
result in mission failure.”460
                                                 
457 Robert M. Gates, Duty, op.cit., pp. 366-385. 
  This article was followed by a TV interview (taped months 
before, but aired in sequence with the Post’s articles).   In the interview, GEN 
McChrystal discussed elements of his assessment and its conclusions.   McChrystal also 
gave a speech in London where, in the question and answer period, the general dismissed 
out of hand the option that the Vice President was supporting and that was still being 
458 Robert M. Gates, Duty, ibid., p. 367. 
459 Robert M. Gates, Duty, ibid., p. 368. 




debated.461  Secretary Gates was sure that none of this was an intentional attempt to derail 
the on-going discussion,462 but understood that the net result was not good.  “A wall was 
going up between the military and the White House,” according to Secretary Gates.  This 
kind of wall, at the very least, wasn’t helpful in making war-waging decisions, and was in 
Secretary Gates’ view, “bad for the country, even dangerous.”463
    Although Secretary Gates believed these interviews and speeches were not 
purposefully orchestrated to limit the options under consideration, he recognized his 
responsibility for the integrity and efficacy of the dialogue and admonished his military 
subordinates.  He reminded both generals about the necessity to provide their best 
analysis and judgment in the on-going dialogue and to provide it “candidly but privately.”  
Even as he did so, however, civilian members of the dialogue were, in Gates’ words, 
“spilling their guts regularly—and disparagingly—to reporters about senior military 
leaders…and the decision making process.”
   
464
                                                 
461 Robert M. Gates, Duty, ibid., p. 368. 
  Whether these senior political leaders 
were also admonished is unknown, but they should have been.  These and other instances 
created, at least for a time, a poisonous, suspicious, and sometimes condescending 
atmosphere that, again at the very least, is not conducive to making good war-waging 
decisions and is completely avoidable.  Simply put, those civilian or military subordinates 
who obstruct a high quality dialogue, who do not press for the best decision, who 
participate with less than full candor, or who execute half-heartedly or not at all are not 
doing their duty.   
462 Robert M. Gates, Duty, ibid., p. 369. 
463 Robert M. Gates, Duty, ibid., p. 369. 




    To work properly, the President and the Secretary of Defense are overall responsible 
for establishing the conditions for and the conduct of the dialogue, but both the civilian 
and military leaders who participate in this dialogue are co-responsible to maintaining the 
dialogue’s protected space and for the substantive quality of the dialogue itself.  
“Dysfunctional relationships,” Richard Kohn says, “between the topmost civilians and 
the most senior military officers—particularly lack of candor, consultation, coordination, 
and collaboration—can be disastrous for policy and decision making….Poor 
communications can cause the United States to undertake unnecessary wars, prosecute 
them unwisely, and pile up hundreds or thousands of dead and wounded Americans, not 
to speak of many times that number of enemies and innocent civilians.”465    Speaking of 
the 2009 dialogue on Afghanistan, Secretary Gates says simply, “On reflection, I believe 
all of us at the senior-most level did not serve the president well in this process.”466
2. The Principle of Final Decision Authority.  This principle recognizes the 
essentiality of civil control of the military in democracies.  At the same time, the 
principle recognizes that proper subordination and responsible exercise of final 
decision authority both require the specific kind of continuous civil-military 
dialogue-and-execution regime described in the first principle.   
  This 
reflection is a multi-faceted illustration.  In it, the President is seen as responsible for 
making the final decision.  The President is also seen as one who is served by a dialogue-
and-execution regime in which a set of senior political and military leaders are co-
responsible for its conduct and outcome.  
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    The final decision authority of the president and his senior civilian leaders extends not 
only to jus ad bellum matters—issues associate with the decision to go to war, but also to 
war-waging jus in bello matters.  War aims, strategies, and policies, as well as decisions 
about major operations and campaigns are not purely military matters; they are political-
military matters where the senior political leaders have final decision authority.  
Exercising this authority, however, is not arbitrary.  Like all political power in a 
democracy, the power to make final decisions is limited.  The U.S. Constitution limits 
this authority, legally and institutionally, by splitting war waging responsibility between 
the executive and legislative branches.  There are moral limits as well.   
    Exercising this war-waging final decision authority irresponsibly—in ways that lower 
the probability that decisions and actions will be effective; unnecessarily prolong a war, 
thereby wasting the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers and the resources of the 
political community; or increasing risk to the political community or the lives of the 
innocent—is morally blameworthy, even if not illegal.  These factors, therefore, help 
define “responsible use” of a political leader’s final decision authority.    
    Responsible exercise of final decision authority requires the kind of dialogue-and-
execution regime described in the previous principle and preceding chapters.  Such a 
regime increases the likelihood of identifying war aim, strategies, policies, and 
campaigns with the highest probability of success.  Such a regime also increases the 
likelihood of adapting correctly as a war unfolds.  Senior civil and military subordinates 
are properly subordinate when they ensure a high quality dialogue precedes the exercise 
of “final decision authority.”  Those who have the “final decision authority” must 




based as possible.  Disagreement in the war-waging dialogue is not a sign of disrespect or 
disloyalty. 
    Civilian control of the military is completely consistent with the often rough and 
tumble dialogue-and-execution regime that waging war requires.  Civilian control is also 
consistent with senior civil or military subordinates who, after a decision is made and 
executed, reengage in the dialogue if the results of that decision and action are found to 
be counter to what was intended.   Civil or military subordinates who obstruct the 
dialogue, however, or who do not participate in it fully, or do not carry out decisions 
completely and faithfully, are disloyal not only to the final decision authority but also to 
the political community, to the citizens-now-soldiers who end up executing the faulty 
decisions that emanate from an improperly conducted dialogue-and-execution regime, 
and to the innocent whose lives are put at risk unnecessarily. 
3. The Principle of Managerial Competency.  This principle recognizes the necessity 
to use, by-pass, or change if necessary, civil and military bureaucracies to ensure 
governmental structures and processes work to achieve war aims, to execute 
strategies and policies, and to support military operations.  The principle also 
recognizes that the senior political and military leaders’ are responsible for 
“managerial competency” within their scope of authority, and that executing this 
responsibility requires on-going, civil-military dialogue-and-execution regime. 
    Once a final decision is made, senior military and political leaders must make their 
respective bureaucracies work to support that decision.  Making a bureaucracy work, 




fast—is especially hard.  In war, however, this is exactly the task.  Senior political and 
military leaders are not only co-responsible for a proper dialogue, but they are co-
responsible for executing strategies, policies, and military operations.  In execution, 
senior leaders have limited options:  they execute using existing bureaucracies and their 
in-place processes, they put in place ad hoc organizations and processes designed to by-
pass exiting bureaucracies, or they create new organizations and systems needed to 
respond to previously unrecognized requirements.   
    A senior leader who cannot use his or her bureaucracy “well enough” is simply not 
living up to his or her war-waging responsibilities.  Senior political and military leaders 
who can hold soldiers and leaders in combat responsible for proper tactical execution 
under high-risk conditions, but do not hold themselves accountable to execute their war-
waging managerial responsibilities under much less risky conditions are at best 
duplicitous and at worse morally bankrupt. 
    Making a bureaucracy work requires focused leadership and management; anyone who 
has tried to run a large bureaucracy knows that it is not easy.  But neither is advancing in 
the face of enemy fire, or patrolling on roads where an enemy often employs Improvised 
Explosive Devices or other forms of surprise attacks.  Among the many leadership and 
managerial tasks necessary to make a bureaucracy work, attention to at least three —
compliance regimes, performance gap-and-adaptation regimes, and by-pass or change 
regimes—are among the more important when it comes to war-waging responsibilities.  
They rise in importance because each reflects the adaptive leadership that waging war 
requires of senior political and military leaders.  Each of the three managerial tasks listed 




Secretary Gates called “business as usual” and what Komer recognized as a 
bureaucracy’s “default position.” 
    Compliance regimes are those that involve setting and implementing monitoring 
mechanisms to enforce them.  Conversations relative to compliance regimes are about 
whether individual or organizational behaviors meet standards, and if they do not, what 
behavioral changes are necessary to meet standards.  There is no discussion about the 
standards themselves; they’re fixed.  The discussion is only about “performance to fixed 
standards.”  Such regimes are necessary, for example, to ensure contracting, acquisition, 
equipment accountability, or personnel actions are done according to law and regulation.  
Compliance regimes are examples of technical problems that waging war includes.  
Compliance regimes use authorities, known experts, who can provide solutions within a 
pre-existing framework. 
    Performance gap-and-adaptation regimes are not like that.  These regimes are required 
because war poses mostly adaptive, not technical, problems to the senior political and 
military leaders who wage it.  A performance gap-and-adaptation regime  involves setting 
aims, identifying the means—strategies, policies, leaders, and resources, for example—
necessary to attain those aims, then monitoring the gap between desired results and actual 
results, and adapting ends and means as necessary.  Monitoring is not necessary to gain 
compliance; rather, it is necessary to adapt. 
    Conversations relative to performance gap-and-adaptation regimes are designed to 
identify the gap between an organization’s ends (what it wants to achieve) and the reality 




identify how to adapt the ways and means being employed to achieve its ends to close the 
desire/reality gap.  They are also intended to stimulate a discussion about whether the 
ends are actually achievable.  In a performance-gap-and-adaptation conversation, the only 
fixed point is reality.  Adaptation—of ends, ways, means, or all three—is based upon the 
fixed point of reality.  Reality may require changing ends (war aims), ways (strategies, 
policies, or military campaigns and operations), or means (leaders, force size and 
composition, funding), or some combination thereof.  A performance gap-adaptation 
regime is necessary in the dynamic environment associated with any adaptive leadership 
challenge, like war, where initial assessments, decisions, and actions need constant 
reassessment and re-assessment.  Corporate executives need a performance gap-and-
adaptation regime,467 so do senior political and military leaders who wage war.468
    Using a compliance discussion where a performance gap-and-adaptation discussion is 
needed will inhibit an organization’s success.  For example, if war aims, strategies, or 
policies become “fixed standards” the resultant conversation will be compliance-oriented.  
The conversation will not include the viability of ends, ways, or means; it will only 
include a discussion of whether behaviors meet standards.  Over time, a compliance 
regime discussion can produce an “unreality.”  Perhaps this is what led President Bush to 
say, “For two and a half years, I had supported the strategy of withdrawing our forces as 
the Iraqis stepped forward.  But in the months after the [February, 2006] Samarra 
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bombing, I had started to question whether our approach matched the reality on the 
ground.”469
    Following his intuition, the President initiated a performance gap-and-adaptation 
discussion calling several outside the government experts to Camp David to a two-day, 
top-level review.  “Nobody within the administration was prepared to directly challenge 
Rumsfeld or Casey in front of the President”—a clear indication that no adaptive 
leadership was being exercised.
   
470  As the President began a new review, General Casey 
seemed to have no doubts.  “With [Prime Minister] Maliki and his cabinet in office and 
Zarqawi [leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq] out of the picture [because he was killed], the 
general was convinced that his strategy was on track—and that it was time to begin the 
withdrawal of the next few brigades of American troops.”471
    The third important leadership and managerial task necessary to make a bureaucracy 
work is a by-pass or change regime.  This kind of regime involves identifying parts of a 
bureaucracy that do not perform as necessary, then either creating a way to by-pass 
underperforming portion of the bureaucracy or changing the bureaucracy.  Conversations 
relative to by-pass or change regimes are about the difference between the speed at which 
  Whatever the reasons, 
whether conscious or not, the approach to monitoring the war in Iraq from 2004-2007 
resembled more a compliance regime than a performance gap-and-adaptation regime.  
That began to change with the President’s Camp David review, and completely changed 
by the time the President selected a new strategy, new leadership, and new resource 
policies in 2007. 
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bureaucracies normally work and the speed necessary to support dynamic war efforts.  
The former is generally too slow for the latter.  For example, the “routine” Pentagon 
process for buying new equipment is a multi-year, often decades-long process.  Because 
of the numbers of casualties caused by Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, soldiers 
needed better protection much faster than the routine procedure would allow.  Two by-
pass mechanisms were put in place, one by Secretary Rumsfeld and the other by 
Secretary Gates.  The first delivered better counter measures; the second delivered better 
vehicles.  Neither of these fast-delivered innovations would have been possible using 
routine systems. 
    General Marshall’s reorganization of the U.S. Army and its bureaucracies at the start 
of World War II is an example of a change regime.  Another is the reorganization that 
President Lincoln’s Secretary of War effected during the Civil War.  Many elements of 
these two changes continued after the war ended.  A third example involves creation of 
entirely new staff organizations and processes needed to coordinate decisions and actions 
of both the American and British defense and military organizations during World War 
II.  Only some of these changes continued after the war; others that were not longer 
useful or necessary, simply ended. 
    These three management processes, among others, are all necessary to wage war, but 
no one is sufficient.  They are required within civil and military bureaucracies as well as 
among them.  The point is that in addition to identifying adequate war aims, strategies, 
and policies, and in addition to directing that military campaigns or major operations take 
place, senior political and leaders must translate initial decisions into action, then adapt as 




to know when a compliance regime is applicable, when a performance gap-and-
adaptation regime is needed, and how to establish and run both.  They must have the 
capacity—usually developed from experience—to use, by-pass, or change the large 
organizations and bureaucracies for which they are responsible.  And they must figure out 
how to coordinate the set of organizations and bureaucracies necessary to wage war 
sufficiently enough to create a coherent effort toward achieve war aims.  Simply put, 
senior political leaders must be more than “politically reliable,” and senior military 
leaders must be more than “good warfighters.”  Both must be competent leaders and 
managers, individually and as a set.      
4. The Principle of War Legitimacy.  This principle recognizes that even justified 
wars can lose their legitimacy.  Legitimacy is a function of maintaining support of 
the population as one conducts a war which, in turn, is a function of righteousness 
of the war (a jus ad bellum concern) and progress toward probable success (a jus 
in bello concern).  In effect, these three elements tie legitimacy directly to the 
competency of senior political and military leaders in executing their war-waging 
responsibilities. 
    When a war is perceived as just, its aims seen as achievable, and progress is being 
made toward achieving those aims, the casualties resulting from the war are viewed as 
“worth the cost” and the war viewed as legitimate.  “The U.S. public makes reasoned and 
reasonable judgments about…fighting a war,” concludes one study. “Indeed,” the study 
continues, the public formed its attitudes regarding support for the war in Iraq “[by] 
weighing the costs and benefits.  U.S. casualties stand as a cost of war, but they are a cost 




and if it thinks the United States will prevail.”472
    Fighting a war poorly is one way to erode legitimacy; waging war poorly is another.  
In the Vietnam War, the American military was never defeated on the battlefield.  It 
fought well.  The way the U.S. waged the war, however—its war aims, its strategies, its 
policies, its campaigns and major operations—ultimately eroded American popular 
support.  The costs were seen by the American people as “not worth it.”  The war-waging 
activities of this period were more an example of sustained imprudence than proficiency, 
more like incompetent rather than expert leadership.   
  The “righteousness” of the decision to 
launch a war is tied to jus ad bellum; progress toward prevailing in a war is a matter of 
the conduct of the war, jus in bello, in both its war-fighting and war-waging dimensions.  
In sum, the result of senior political and military leaders who cannot execute their war-
waging responsibilities sufficiently well may be erosion of the very legitimacy of the war.  
    Over time incompetence or sustained imprudence tells the American people that the 
war is not being won and possibly cannot be won, so continuing the war is not “worth the 
cost” of lives or treasure.  Thus war-waging capacity and legitimacy are connected.  Such 
appears to be the case with respect to the war in Afghanistan.  In 2001, for example, only 
9% of polled Americans thought the war in Afghanistan was a mistake; in 2013that 
number is 44%.473  The “righteousness” of this war has not changed, but the way it has 
been waged has led 74% of Americans to conclude to either stick to the 2014 withdrawal 
date or accelerate withdrawal.474
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    Not all war-waging errors lead to defeat or loss of legitimacy.  World War II, for 
example, started off poorly.  A period of rapid and significant decline in American 
military capacity followed World War I.  “Victory in World War I had bred complacency 
and inhibited imaginative ideas and experiments in doctrine, organization, and materiel.  
A revulsion against war in general and disillusionment with World War I in particular, 
together with faith in the oceans as bulwarks of protection,…prompted retreat into 
national isolation….Because of the great…depression, congressional appropriations 
dwindled, manpower…declined, and…procurement languished.  Even after World War II 
began in Europe, the American public…remained lethargic toward military issues….for 
two decades after1920 the Army and National Guard together were quite incapable.”475  
Equally incapable were the war-waging systems necessary to raise, train, organize, equip, 
deploy, employ, and sustain a large military force fighting around the world.  In 
November of 1942, American troops were first introduced in the European Theater in 
North Africa.  The first main battle of that theater or war, the battle of Kasserine Pass, 
was a disaster.  By May of 1943, enemy resistance had ceased and the campaign for 
North Africa was over.  The American military forces had learned, and learned quickly, 
what succeeded on the battlefield.  They became a better war-fighting organization.  As 
one historian wrote, “No soldier in Africa had changed more—grown more—than 
[General Dwight] Eisenhower.”476
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    In a matter of months, a defeat in a battle was quickly turned into a successful 
campaign.  The defeat at Kasserine Pass did not result in questioning the legitimacy of 
the war.  Had defeat followed defeat, however, over time progress and perhaps even 
ultimate success in the war may have become an issue.  Senior political and military 
leader war-waging competency—the capacity to do what it takes to select achievable 
aims, identify strategies and policies to attain those aims, translate decisions into 
orchestrated military and non-military action, and adapt as a war unfolds—plays an 
important role in building, maintaining, or eroding legitimacy.  Senior leaders who fail to 
develop sufficient leadership and managerial abilities with respect to their war-waging 
responsibilities gamble with legitimacy.  The war’s legitimacy may survive, but such a 
gamble is not one that a senior wartime leaders should take. 
5. The Principle of Resignation.  This principle recognizes that senior political or 
military leader resignation is permissible under certain conditions.  Senior 
political and military leaders remain moral agents, not “mere instruments” of a 
government, but this principle is limited by the necessity to retain civil control of 
the military in a democracy.  
    The problem of resignation is twofold.  On one hand, resignation is necessary.  
Resignation acknowledges that everyone, including senior political and military leaders, 
remains a moral agent responsible for his or her conscience.  Resignation is also a useful 
recuperative mechanism that helps large organizations know when there are significant 
problems in what that organization is doing or how it is doing it.  Finally, resignation is 
useful in a performance-oriented, dialogue-and-execution regime, for it provides a way to 




resignation has a significant potential downside, especially applicable to the senior 
military leaders in a democracy:  it can be or be perceived as a direct challenge to civil 
authority, civil primacy, and civil control of the military.  The principle of resignation 
attempts to allow for the positive and necessary aspects of resignation while avoiding or 
mitigating resignation’s downside. 
     In the right circumstances, resignation often provides a healthy and necessary 
organizational recuperative mechanism, as Albert O. Hirschman argues in Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty:  Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.477  Hirschman 
describes “exit,” the option to leave, in three ways.  If there is a decline in price, 
availability, or quality of a product, consumers “exit” by going elsewhere to buy or 
invest.  If the decline is in management proficiency, a corporate executive may “exit” by 
leaving the firm.  And if the decline is in deteriorating governmental performance, then 
the “exit” is an official leaving his or her position.478  “Voice,” according to Hirschman, 
is the option for a consumer, executive, governmental official, or some form of 
“watchdog” organization to complain or attempt to improve by pointing out the decline 
and need for change.479
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  In many cases both options are available, even though one 
option or the other may be preferable in any given situation or organization.  “Exit” and 
“voice” are ways that can help firms, organizations, and governments (at least non 
totalitarian governments) know that what they are doing isn’t working and be prompted 
to do something about it.  
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   Hirschman recognizes, however, that “while feedback through exit or voice is in the 
long-run interest of organization managers, their short-run interest is to entrench 
themselves and to enhance their freedom to act as they wish, unmolested as far as 
possible by either desertions or complaints.”480
    Denial is a second common organizational response.  The customers, members, or 
leaders of an organization simply deny the report of decline.  This response is common 
for customers, members, or leaders who have invested a great deal and so has a 
considerable stake in the product, service, plan, or the organization in general.
  In other words, some managers and 
leaders don’t want feedback; they want silence and compliance with the plan—even in 
the face of evidence that what they are doing is not working.  These managers and 
organizations simply shut down both exit and voice to impose discipline.  Such is the 
case with autocratic managers where compliance and obedience are more important than 
success or progress and where threat of punishment replaces leadership; it is also the case 
in totalitarian governments where neither citizens nor leaders can leave or complain.   
481  In the 
case of senior leaders, this investment may have been a lifetime of service that included 
difficult sacrifices which, in turn, generated significant loyalty.  In fact, Hirschman points 
out, the more loyal a person is to an organization, the more he or she has invested in the 
organization or a specific product, service, or activity within the organization, the greater 
the ability to deny reports of decline.  The loyalist—especially one who has been a senior 
leader in the organization—has great difficulty coming to the belief that his or her 
organization could decline or deteriorate in the ways some are pointing out.482
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   Co-opting criticism, Hirschman demonstrates, is a third common organizational 
response to criticism.  In this case, the organization “domesticates the dissenters.”483  The 
doubter is kept on and given an explicit role as “devil’s advocate” or as a member of “the 
red team.”  In this way the dissenter’s conscience may be assuaged, but his or her 
effectiveness is reduced to a point where it is virtually discountable.  Co-opting forces the 
dissenter to give up, a priori, his or her strongest weapon:  the threat to resign under 
protest.484
    Whether managers and organizations choose to shut down, deny, or co-opt, the result is 
the same:  it denies the government—or other type of organization that might use them—
needed recuperative mechanisms.   When one or more of these approaches are employed, 
organizations are simply robbed of the ability to recognize and restore deteriorating 
quality in product or performance.
 
485
    General Harold K. Johnson, the Army’s Chief of Staff from 1964 to 1968 during the 
Vietnam War, considered “exit,” but rejected it.  Doing so, he may have robbed the 
United States in ways to which Hirshchman refers.  “When the President elected not to 
follow the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they had little choice but to go along or 
resign,” says the historian and biographer Lewis Sorley.
   
486  He quotes General Johnson 
who said, “We had made our recommendations….Our advice had been rejected and other 
courses of action were chosen, so we simply were good soldiers and did what we were 
told to do.”487
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that he had to resign.  He said, “I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval 
Office and give my four stars to the President and tell him, ‘You have refused to tell the 
country they cannot fight a war without mobilization; you have required me to send men 
into battle with little hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced the military to 
violate almost every one of the principles of war in Vietnam.  Therefore, I resign and will 
hold a press conference after I walk out of your door.”488
    Had General Johnson resigned because he could not reconcile the legal orders he was 
given with his understanding that the lives of soldiers were simply being wasted—
therefore, his legal orders were immoral, he would not have gone to his grave, in his 
words, “with that lapse of moral courage on my back.”
 
489
    When fighting, neither soldiers nor their military leaders are “mere instruments.”  
Rather, they remain moral agents.  The principles governing jus in bello’s tactical, war-
fighting dimension mandate that soldiers and their military leaders retain their moral 
agency. “Soldiers,” Walzer reminds all, “can never be transformed into mere instruments 
of war…Trained to obey ‘without hesitation,’ they remain nevertheless capable of 
hesitating…it is a mistake to treat soldiers [or their military leaders] as if they were 
automatons who make no judgments at all.”
  In holding a press conference, 
however, General Johnson would have changed an individual act of moral courage to a 
challenge to one of the bedrock principles of a democracy:  civilian control of the 
military.   
490
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  Senior military leaders, too, remain moral 
agents.  As such, they remain responsible for the decisions and actions they take.  The 
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“I’m only following orders” argument doesn’t hold much water for a soldier or a general, 
neither does the “they’ll only get somebody else” argument.   
     Leaving a position of significant responsibility is difficult.  Deception is very strong, 
as is co-opting.  Any “final policy decision,” Hirschman shows, “can always be made to 
look as some middle course between the two opposing points of view...hence [all] are 
made to feel that ‘if it had not been for me, an even more sinister decision would have 
been taken.’”491  The desire to remain close to power is also very strong.  Hirschchman 
suggests a variant to the famous dictum, “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.” His variant is this:  “Power corrupts; and even a little influence in a country 
with huge power corrupts hugely.”492
    Difficulty, however, does not set aside a senior leader’s responsibility to his or her 
conscience, or responsibility to the larger institution and the nation that those leaders 
serve.  Loyalty sometimes requires criticism; this is the premise of Hirschman’s 
argument.  To operate properly and especially in war, the nation to which a senior leader 
is loyal needs to know when its war aims, strategies, policies, and military operations are 
failing.  Without this feedback, whether expressed through voice, as should take priority 
  Finally, the organization itself may have formal or 
informal norms that treat either exit or voice as disloyalty, even treason or mutiny.  These 
kinds of norms are very powerful and pose significant difficulty to those considering 
resignation or major criticism.  Such difficulty is natural; concluding to resign should be 
hard.  
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in the case of senior military officers, or exit, the choice of last resort, the nation 
diminishes its chances of recuperating from deteriorated performance.     
    With respect to senior military leaders, however, resignation or criticism must be 
exercised in a way that does not challenge civil control of the military: “candidly and 
privately,” in the words of Secretary Gates—at least for senior military leaders.493
    Mass resignations of senior military officials like that considered by the Joint Chiefs 
during the Johnson Administration, or public resignations like General Johnson’s would 
have been, are problematic because of the threat to civilian control.  Public criticism of 
senior political leaders still in office, as Secretary Rumsfeld was subjected to by several 
retired general officers, is similarly problematic because this kind of criticism also 
challenges, directly or indirectly, civil control of the military.   Resignation simply 
because “advice is ignored” is also problematic, but for different reasons.  Here petulance 
seems more at play than morality or the desire to provide the nation an opportunity to 
recuperate from deteriorated performance.    
  Exit 
or voice options for senior civilian leaders are a bit different.  Because their resignation or 
dissent does not threatened civil control of the military, senior civilian dissent can be 
more public—the case of Senator Eugene McCarthy or the public Congressional leaders 
and presidential candidates who debated over Iraq and Afghanistan, are good examples. 
    General Maxwell Taylor provides an interesting example of public criticism of policy 
without challenge to civil control over the military.  After he retired as Chief of Staff of 
the U.S. Army in 1959, he wrote The Uncertain Trumpet.494
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policy of massive retaliation.  He called this policy “the Great Fallacy,” 495
    General Taylor’s book was a challenge to the logic of massive retaliation, whether 
such a policy made sense given the strategic realities of the early Cold War period.  It did 
not challenge the authority and responsibility of senor political leaders to make this kind 
of policy choice.  Nor did it challenge civilian control of the military.  Rather, it was the 
kind of “voice” Hirschman describes as a necessary recuperative mechanism.  General 
Taylor’s “voice” was a private matter while he was on active duty, expressed with candor 
but kept within the appropriate “protected space” necessary for a proper civil-military 
dialogue.  American civilian leaders ultimately adopted a more flexible response strategy, 
and General Taylor was recalled to active duty to become President Kennedy’s choice for 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962.  
 that is, the 
false belief that “the use or threatened use of atomic weapons of mass destruction would 
be sufficient to assure the security of the United States and its friends.”  He argued 
against basing U.S. national security on this fallacy and for a strategy of flexible response 
whereby the United States would be just as capable of deterring limited war as it would 
be for preventing World War III.    
    Voice seems to have a recognized place with respect to senior political and military 
leaders, but not exit.  Richard Kohn, for example, rejects resignation even if kept private.  
He writes, “Resignation—even the very hint of it, much less the threat or the act—is a 
direct assault on civilian authority.  Civilian officials rightly interpret it as such.  It 
inherently violates civilian control.”496
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immoral, are to be followed.  Kohn correctly points out that “even military officers at the 
very top of the chain of command…cannot know all of the larger national and 
international considerations involved, a calculation that belongs properly to the political 
leadership, elected and appointed.  Nor is there historical evidence that military judgment 
has been superior to that of the politicians.”497
        Those are not the grounds that General Johnson cites, however.  What distinguishes 
General Johnson’s frustration with military advice not being taken or the chiefs being cut 
out of many decisions—situations which did not prompt him to consider resignation—
from his moral anguish is this:  the strategies and policies in Vietnam had deteriorated to 
the point of wasting the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers in a war that could not 
have been won, at least not in the way it is being fought.  His was not a problem about 
not knowing “all of the larger national and international considerations,” as Kohn puts it.  
Rather, his was a problem about what he did know:  that the lives of citizens-who-
became-soldiers were being wasted.  His was a moral problem that involved recognizing 
first that the value of human life is such that, while under certain circumstances it can be 
used, it cannot be wasted, and secondly that he, his fellow Chiefs, the President, and other 
senior political leaders are co-responsible for the lives they use.  The issue was not 
whether he believed that he must obey distasteful, seemingly foolish, or sometime 
disastrous orders.  He knew that he must, after all he fought the futile defense of the 
  In this, Kohn is exactly right.  The scope 
of the president’s responsibility is larger than the scope of a general’s.  That’s why 
resignation over mere disagreement or the feelings of being ignored, disrespected, or 
treated badly is wrong.  A conclusion to resign cannot be taken this lightly.   
                                                 




Philippine Islands following the 1941 Japanese invasion, was captured, and survived the 
Bataan Death march, Japanese hell ships, and the neglect, brutality, illness, and starvation 
of extended captivity until September 1945.  General Johnson’s issue was one of moral 
agency.   
    Neither good order and discipline, nor civilian control of the military is at risk over the 
exercise of moral agency.  If soldiers and leaders are to remain moral agents on the 
battlefield, they must be moral agents in the boardroom as well.  Further, Hirschman 
might add, correct exercise of moral agency in some circumstance might result in a better 
organizational performance.    
    General Johnson has no responsibility for the consciences of others, but he does have 
responsibility for his own, to the citizens-who-become-soldiers that he leads, and to the 
nation he serves.  Absolute prohibition of resignation is unwarranted because it denies the 
individual moral agency and denies the institution an important recuperative mechanism. 
 
The sources and purposes of jus in bello’s war-fighting principles. 
    The source of Walzer’s war-fighting principles is clear:  usage.  They are revealed, 
Walzer claims, in the ways in which men and women—some who are citizens, some who 
are soldiers, others who leaders—argue about war.498 They are embedded in the 
explanations, justifications, and judgments ordinary people, as well as those responsible 
for the action in question, use.499
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justifications, and judgments, Walzer shows, they seek out coherence, lay bare the 
principles that the arguments, justifications, and judgments exemplify.500  Walzer is 
claiming that those who use the arguments, present the explanations or justifications, and 
make judgments are making statements as “to their own principles,” even though the 
principles may be worded and arranged more informally than they are when codified in 
just war theory.501
        War-fighting principles, part of what Walzer calls “the war convention,” are the 
principles that circumscribe what is morally permissible in combat.  The war convention 
is “the set of articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and 
philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgments of 
military conduct.”
  Walzer codifies the war-fighting principles from the analyses, 
arguments, justifications, and judgments contained in Just and Unjust Wars’ historical 
illustrations:  the principles of non-combatant immunity, double effect and double intent, 
proportionality, due care and due risk, and supreme emergency. 
502
                                                 
500 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. xv. 
  It is the case that the decisions are left to soldiers and their leaders 
who are on the spot, but one of the points of having principles is for them to be used in 
clarifying expectations and guiding those decisions—prior to combat in training and 
education, during combat in decision and execution, and after combat in judging what 
was done.  The principles are not in question, but their application in a specific case often 
is questioned.  Whether the principles were applied in a particular, oft-confused and 
stress-filled situation correctly is “the cruelest decision,” not whether the principles are 
valid guides in the exercise of a soldier’s or a leader’s moral responsibilities in combat. 
501 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, ibid., p. xv. 




    Walzer’s war-fighting principles serve multiple purposes.  More than guides for 
soldiers and their leaders in combat, they also act as a framework to explain and justify 
war-fighting decisions and actions.  They also provide the framework within which one 
can identify whether and under what conditions moral blame is warranted.  If asked, 
soldiers and leaders appeal to the war-fighting principles—even if unconsciously and 
indirectly—by saying the act in questions was “militarily necessary,” that they used “only 
the necessary force,” that they “tried to care for” the innocent, that they “never intended 
to harm noncombatants,” and that “the death of the innocent was unavoidable.”  An 
investigation, if one is conducted, may find that they were correct, or not, but the 
principles provide a way to judge moral blameworthiness after explanations and 
justifications are given, even if the act in question broke no law. 
    Rights, as chapter 1 explained, lay the foundation for the principles governing jus in 
bello; they also play an important role in understanding war-fighting responsibility in 
war.  “Individual rights (to life and liberty),” Walzer says, “underlie the most important 
judgments that we make about war,” even though taking another’s life in war is, under 
specific circumstances, justified. 503  Walzer’s understanding of the right to life is neither 
absolute, nor merely the result of arbitrary conventions or utility, for then justifying 
taking another’s life in war would be too easy.   So he calls these rights “something like 
absolute” and claims that civilian non-combatants retain their right to life; soldiers do 
not.504
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  “Simply by fighting,” Walzer claims and as was seen in chapter 1, “[soldiers] 
504 Elsewhere I have a more complete analysis of Walzer’s use of rights in his just war theory.  See:  James 




have lost their title to life and liberty….everyone else retains his rights.”505  The war 
convention rests on a certain view of noncombatants, which holds that they are men and 
women with rights and that they cannot be used for some military purpose, even if it is a 
legitimate purpose.”506  Walzer understands that war necessarily places civilians in 
danger; that is another aspect of its hellishness.  The principles of the War Convention 
restrict the hellishness of war by demanding that soldiers and their officers minimize the 
danger they impose on civilians; hence the principle of “due care and due risk.”507
    Jus in bello’s war-waging principles also arise from usage.  They have similar 
purposes, and they too are founded on a respect for the value of human life, individual 
and communal.  They are different, however in two respects.  First, jus in bello’s war 
waging principles apply to senior political and military leaders whose decisions and 
actions affect the conduct of war but who are far from the battlefield.  Second, jus in 
bello’s war-waging principles, with the exception of the principle of resignation, apply to 
processes not particular decisions and actions. This difference results from the nature of 
the war-waging problems that senior political and military leaders face, adaptive 
problems that cannot be understood, let alone solved, by a single authority.  Rather, the 
adaptive problems involved in waging war require a set of civilian and military leaders to 
create collaborative processes and forums in which the understanding and resolving of 
adaptive problems can emerge.  The adaptive problems involved in waging war also 
require that the set of leaders then use, adapt, or change their bureaucracies to execute 
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decisions.  Last, the adaptive problems in waging war require the set of leaders to adapt 
their understanding, decisions, and actions to the dynamics of war as they unfold. 
    Usage, actual war-waging discussions, is revealing.  Norms and principles are often 
not revealed in the acts themselves.  Rather, they are found in explanations and 
justifications adduced by those who acted; they are also embodied in the expectations that 
underlie questions concerning actions taken.  The discussion over what happened in the 
Abu Ghraib prison in 2003 and 2004 and why it happened, for example, concerned not 
only the individual acts of soldiers and leaders on the ground, but also war-waging policy 
issues over the adequacy of training and personnel selection as well as discussions about 
the effect of national policies on what took place in the prison.508
    The public discussion in late fall of 2006 over whether President Bush’s administration 
should “stay the course” in Iraq or take a new direction and the 2009 discussion 
surrounding President Obama’s decision three years later whether his administration 
  Important expectations 
and assumptions are embedded in the discussions surrounding Abu Ghraib and both 
presidential decisions.  The Abu Ghraib discussion assumed that the conduct of war 
involved more than war-fighting.  Those in the discussion assumed that the political and 
military leaders far from the battlefield had responsibilities that affected the conduct of 
the war.  The expectation was that senior leaders understand how their decisions will play 
out in practice and consider, therefore, the practical consequences of their decisions.   
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should change courses in Afghanistan both are examples of explanations and 
justifications providing a window into principles.509
    The public discussion surrounding both decisions often concerned the degree to which 
consultation and collaboration among senior political and military leaders had preceded 
the final decision—continuous dialogue. The discussions also concerned the realities in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the degree to which the Bush or Obama administrations’ 
strategies and policies should change because of the ways the wars had unfolded—
continuous dialogue and adaptation.  Next, throughout both discussions, regardless of the 
position taken on the pending decision, all assumed that the President had final decision 
authority. Further, all assumed that both senior political and military leaders shared the 
responsibility to help the President make the best decision and that the military and non-
military agencies and departments involved would be capable to execute whatever 
decision was made—final decision authority and managerial competence.  Finally, the 
discussions surrounding both decisions recognized, whether they believed the resultant 
decision to be reckless or responsible, that the lives of citizens-now-soldiers and the 
legitimacy of the war were at stake in the final decision,—war legitimacy.  In other 
words, the public discussion of these two important presidential decisions pointed to 
principles that guide, or should guide, those who have the final say in decisions, those 
who participate in the decision making process, and those who execute war-waging 
decisions.   
   
                                                 








   As was the case with Walzer’s war-fighting principles, usage—the actual discussions 
and arguments made over war-waging activities as well as the explanations and 
justifications used and the judgments pronounced reveal a moral depth beyond a 
discussion of a particular act, incident, or decision.   
    War-waging principles, like their war-fighting cousins, serve multiple purposes.  The 
five war-waging principles provide a framework that senior leaders can use to explain 
and justify their decisions and actions or for citizens or their representatives to question, 
judge, and when appropriate assign moral blame.  The principles also provide the 
framework for public discourse—whether in the media, during Congressional testimony, 
or some other public forum.  As the public discussion over President Bush’s 2006 
decision concerning Iraq and the 2009 discussion surrounding President Obama’s 
decision over Afghanistan showed, both those in the decision-making discourse or those 
commenting on it appealed to one or more of the war-waging principles by saying the 
decision or act in questions was the result of “extensive civil-military consultation,” that 
the “final decision was made by a proper authority,” that “we’re making progress,” “that 
as things change we’re changing with them,” and that “we’re doing everything possible 
in execution.”  In neither of these cases did a senior political leader say anything like, “I 
thought this up all by myself and ordered the military to do it, like it or not,” nor did a 
military leader say, “Yes, I was told to do that.  I don’t agree with it, so I’m not doing it.”  
The war-waging principles of jus in bello codifies practice, just as do jus in bello’s war-
fighting principles.    
    Finally, the set of war-waging principles is useful in the training, education, and 




responsibilities, and the tri-partite tension from which both are derived begin to describe 
the requirements for war-waging leadership.   
    The value of human life, of the innocent, of citizens-who-become-soldiers, and of the 
political community form the foundation war-waging principles, responsibilities, and the 
tri-partite tension inherent in waging war.  The senior political and military leaders who 
wage war, those whose responsibility it is to identify proper war aims, strategies, and 
policies, and to direct military campaigns and major operations, ultimately use or put at 
risk lives.  Respecting the individual lives that are entrusted to one’s care, takes on a 
greater importance when “care” is replaced by “use.”  Respecting the value of human life, 
even as it is used, demands of those responsible that the lives are used well, not wasted.  
Respecting the value of human life, even as it is put at risk, demands of those responsible 
that the risk is prudent.  Further, waging war risks the life of the political community, 
sometimes existentially.  Even if the risk is not existential, how a war is waged can, and 
often does, have a profound effect on the life of the political community.   
        War-waging responsibilities are positional responsibilities, responsibilities tied to 
some role or position, not “natural duties” which are moral requirements which apply 
more generally to all.510  Positional responsibilities, like those of senior political and 
military leaders who wage war, come to only those individuals filling the position to 
which the responsibility is tied.  That is, senior political and military leaders have “certain 
performances expected or required of [them] within the scheme in question.”511
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  Senior 
political and military leaders are in their positions voluntarily; they sought, or at least 




accepted, the positions they are in.  These senior leaders entered their positions with their 
eyes open, sufficiently informed as what duties and responsibilities the position involved; 
their promise to fulfill the responsibilities of their office obligated them.512
    Where Walzer uses his principles to describe “right conduct in the midst of battle”—
the tactical level of war’s conduct, the war-fighting principles describe “right conduct” at 
the strategic level of war’s conduct.  The principles of Walzer’s war convention apply to 
the battlefield; the war-waging principles apply in the boardroom.  The war-waging 
principles complete the description of justice in war.      
  When they 
fail to execute these responsibilities in waging war, they are not just politically liable 
putting their reelection at risk.  They are also morally liable because of the lives, 
individual and communal, that they use or put at risk.    
 
Conclusions:  Jus in bello, a complete account. 
    The war-waging principles described in this chapter expand the practical morality that 
Walzer intended to describe in Just and Unjust Wars, thus providing a more complete 
understanding of the moral dimension of war.  The combatant/noncombatant distinction; 
principles of proportionality, double effect, and double intent; as well as the principle of 
due care/due risk contain a suitable moral framework intended to guide moral action in 
combat and amid the tension of winning and fighting well.513
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  That is, soldiers and their 
leaders are to use them, apply them as they fight.  Application under the real conditions 
of war is always difficult.  “All we can require,” Walzer admits, “is serious efforts of 




specific sorts; we cannot require success, since the conditions of warfare are such that 
success isn’t always possible.”514
    Similarly, the war-waging principles provide the men and women who face the hard 
choices involved in waging war with a set of guides and way of explaining and justifying 
what they are doing or have done to those whose lives they use or put at risk.  They also 
provide a framework to explain what they are doing on behalf of the political community 
in whose name they act.  Both sets of principles, war-fighting and war-waging, provide 
the citizenry at large a way to judge what is done on their behalf, whether in combat or in 
capital cities.  Citizens, and their representatives, can use both sets of principles to 
understand and support a war or expose the hypocrisy or blameworthiness of those 
fighting or those waging war.  The principles exist, and their recognition matters.   
   
    Recognition of both war-fighting and war-waging principles matters first because they 
are the moral standard to which the United States holds its political and military leaders 
and its military forces.  At the war-fighting level, one need only recall the outrage over 
U.S. soldier behavior in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, or the My Lai massacre in 
Vietnam—to name two prominent examples.  At the war-waging level, one need only be 
reminded of the “disproportionate, powerful impact on American presidents, politics, and 
policy” that the Vietnam War has had.515
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  As Marvin and Deborah Kalb say in Haunting 
Legacy:  Vietnam and the American Presidency From Ford to Obama, “No president can 
any longer reach critical decisions about committing troops to battle…without weighing 
the consequences of the American defeat in Vietnam.  The war still casts an unforgiving 
515 Marvin and Deborah Kalb, Haunting Legacy:  Vietnam and the American Presidency From Ford to 




shadow over Oval Office deliberations.  Unwanted, uninvited, but inescapable, Vietnam 
refuses to be forgotten.”516
    Secondly, recognition matters because these principles are used to make both war-
fighting and war-waging judgments.  With respect to war-fighting, the judgments concern 
which acts committed in war are legitimate and which are not, which can be justified and 
which cannot.    With respect to waging war, the judgments concern whether the aims, 
strategies, policies, resources, and major operations have been made and executed well or 
not, whether—as President George W. Bush reports in Decision Points so often—the 
lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers are used well or wasted.   Both sets of principles 
allow argument about decisions and action taken in war, about justifying certain conduct 
and condemning other, and judging the soldiers and leaders, tactical and strategic, 
civilian or military, who were involved.
 
517
    Finally, recognition matters because war-fighting and war-waging principles can 
become part of the training, education, and development of soldiers and their military 
   Those doing the arguing, justifying, and 
judging are sometimes soldiers themselves.  Or those arguing may be senior civilian 
policy makers in Congress or the Executive Branch or senior military leaders, active and 
retired.  At other times, those doing the arguing, justifying, and judging may be the 
society at large, whether through the media or direct “communications” via protests or 
demonstrations.  In sum, both war-fighting and war-waging principles are part of the 
language and logic of war’s moral dimension—a language and logic as important as any 
other dimension of war. 
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leaders, tactical and strategic, and they can become part of the education of potential 
senior political leaders.  These principles require that soldiers be taught that they are 
never “mere instruments” or “killing machines,” but always remain moral agents—even 
in combat.  Leaders, officers and sergeants, set the behavior climate within their 
organizations.  Just as the climate a leader sets can result in high discipline or low, can 
produce a well trained organization or not, it can be a climate tolerant of moral abuse or 
one that prevents it.  Similarly, these principles require that senior political and military 
leaders are never “mere instruments,” but always are moral agents—even in the 
boardroom.  Senior political leaders set the climate for the war-waging decision and 
execution dialogue.  This climate can either increase or decrease the probability of 
making decisions and taking action that are “right or at least not too wrong.”  This 
climate also can increase or decrease the probability of adapting to the ever-changing 
realities of war, or being stuck to a cycle of sustained imprudence.  Thus, the climate 
senior political leaders set helps determine whether lives are used well or wasted, whether 
the innocent are place under necessary risk or unnecessary, and whether the life of the 
political community is put at risk or strengthened. 
    In some ways, neither the war-fighting nor the war-waging principles and the 
positional responsibilities that derive from them are new.  They are part of the historical 
record of every war.  War as a political act and the consequential essentiality of both the 
civil and military perspectives are long recognized in theories of war, within the military 
profession, within political science, and among national security theorists and 




have been sufficiently recognized by moral philosophers in just war theory.  This 
deficiency results from a fundamental misunderstanding of the conduct of war. 
     Conducting a war involves both fighting it and waging it.  Jus in bello, that area of just 
war theory that describes moral responsibility in the conduct of war, must therefore 
address both dimensions of war’s conduct.  This study attempted to fill the prevailing 
view’s gap in jus in bello by describing what acting justly in war means at the strategic, 
war-waging level.   The five war-waging principles—plus the tri-partite tension inherent 
in waging war—more completely circumscribe the moral dimensions of war’s conduct.  
Together with the traditionally recognized war-fighting principles and responsibilities, 
therefore, the war-waging principles and responsibilities of jus in bello contribute to 
describing justice in war.  Undeniably, the contents of this study will be found deficient.  
Equally undeniable, however, the content of this study advances the understanding of the 
moral dimension of war and may stimulate more discussion about an important 







    This study set out to identify and describe a yet unrecognized aspect of jus in bello, the 
portion of just war theory that deals with justice in the conduct of war.  The study found 
that Walzer, as the prime representative of the prevailing view of just war theory in the 
United States, restricts jus in bello to combat, war-fighting.  Then, using this restricted 
understanding of jus in bello, Walzer constructs a theory of responsibility and presents a 
set of principles that guide action for those responsible for fighting.  The study found 
further that Walzer’s restricted view is necessary but insufficient, for it omits an 
important dimension of the conduct of war:  the strategic, war-waging dimension.  
Simply put, the conduct of war involves both war-fighting and war-waging dimensions.  
For jus in bello to be complete, therefore, it must recognize the strategic dimension of 
war’s conduct, then expand to include an account of responsibility for waging war and a 
set of principles useful to guide decisions and actions within and to make judgments 
about this dimension of war’s conduct. 
    The war-waging dimension of war’s conduct involves setting war aims, identifying 
strategies and policies as well as allocating resources and conducting campaigns and 
major operations necessary to achieve those aims.  It also involves adapting initial 
decisions as to aims, strategies, policies, resources, and campaigns to the ever-changing 
realities that unfold during a war.  In addition, it involves making the machinery of 
government and military bureaucracies work in execution of the identified strategies 
policies, in making available the identified resources, and in supporting the directed 




    This strategic, war-waging dimension also determines how a war is fought and gives 
purpose to the fighting and meaning to the sacrifices and risks inherent in all wars.  
Expansive war aims, sometimes necessary, will require a larger war, or a longer one, or 
perhaps a more virulent war.  Using the wrong strategy given the circumstances and the 
enemy, and not recognizing the error, may lengthen a war unnecessarily or result in 
losing it all together.  Limiting resources, although sometimes necessary, may also have 
the effect of lengthening a war.  Policies relative to the enemy may also have 
consequential effects on actions taken on the battlefield.  Government and military 
bureaucracies that cannot be brought into line to execute what is expected of them, as 
well as decision making processes that cannot yield timely and practical results or adapt 
sufficiently to war’s dynamism, also affect how war is fought.   
    The strategic, war-waging dimension of war’s conduct, in the end, is about using and 
risking lives.  For nations waging war, those lives are of the citizens-who-become-
soldiers.518
    On one hand, the strategic, war-waging dimension is far from new.  Sun Tzu wrote on 
the strategic dimension of war around the fourth century B.C., and his work was first 
brought to the attention of the Western world by a Jesuit missionary to Peking whose 
 Waging war is also about risking the lives of the innocent and risking the life 
of the political community.  Even if a political community’s life is not risked in the 
existential sense, poor war-waging performance can put it at risk in other important ways.  
For example, trust between the government and its citizens can erode, as could fiscal 
solvency.    
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interpretation was published in France in 1772.519
    Huntington’s bargain worked its way into the prevailing view of just war theory.  It is 
at play, consciously or unconsciously, in the line that Walzer draws between the war 
itself, for which political leaders have responsibility, and the conduct of war, for which 
soldiers and military leaders have responsibility.  It is at play, therefore, when Walzer 
follows the logic inherent in drawing the line restricting jus in bello primarily to soldiers 
and their leaders who do the fighting.  This study has shown, however, that such strong 
  The study of waging war has been a 
matter of the science and art of war ever since.  On the other hand, this dimension of war 
has been mostly omitted from just war theory.  This omission, as this study shows, is at 
least partially based upon the mistaken view that the role and responsibility of senior 
political leaders are strongly differentiated from those of senior military leaders.  The 
former have jus ad bellum responsibility; the latter, jus in bello.  Perhaps such a role 
differentiation was not present when Sun Tzu wrote, or when Clausewitz wrote some 
2,000 years later, for the sovereign and the general were often the same person.  At least 
in present day democracies, however, the sovereign and the general are not the same.  In 
fact, this study uses Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State to show how strongly 
role differentiation is established in American civil-military thinking.  Huntington’s 
theory involves a kind of a bargain:  political leaders allow a degree of autonomy to 
military leaders in the conduct of war in exchange for an apolitical military.  Such a 
bargain, Huntington suggests, best serves a democracy because it balances the need for 
having a competent military instrument with the requirement that the instrument remains 
under the control of civil leaders. 
                                                 





role differentiation does not exist with respect to the realities of war’s conduct at the 
strategic, war-waging level. 
    This study has shown that political leaders are the final decision authority with respect 
to the major elements of war-waging responsibilities—war aims, strategies, policies, and 
major campaigns.  Both senior political and military leaders, however, share 
responsibility for conducting the complex and extensive dialogue-and-execution regime 
necessary to ensure decisions and actions, initial and subsequent, are as prudent as 
possible.  Even as senior political leaders are primarily responsible for setting the climate 
and conditions for a proper war-waging dialogue, all participants, civilian and military, 
share responsibility for the quality of the dialogue-and-execution regime and its resultant 
decisions, initial and subsequent.  Finally, both sets of senior leaders are responsible to 
make their respective bureaucracies work sufficiently well—individually and as a set—to 
attain the aims set, execute the decided upon strategies and policies, make available the 
resources necessary, and support the directed campaigns and military operations. 
    These responsibilities derive from the fact that senior political and military leaders, in 
addition to their responsibility to the innocent and to their political community, are 
responsible for using the lives of citizens-who-become-soldiers well.  Even in war, 
governments retain their responsibility for their citizens.  This responsibility is exercised 
through the military chain of command and captured well in the prevailing view’s jus in 
bello’s tactical, war-fighting dimension.  This responsibility is also exercised through a 
nation’s decision making processes as well as its execution machinery, the bureaucracies 




    The responsibility for war’s conduct lies far beyond the battlefield and the tactical 
dimension of jus in bello.  This responsibility is captured by the tri-partite tension of jus 
in bello’s strategic, war-waging dimension:  (a) set war aims and make strategy, policy, 
and campaign decisions that increase the probability of being right, or at least less wrong 
than those one is fighting; then, (b) translate those decisions into action to achieve war 
aims at the least cost, in lives and resources, and least risk to one’s political community 
and adapt aims, strategies, policies, and campaigns to the changing realities of war as 
they unfold; and (c)  do all of the foregoing while observing the war convention, 
sustaining the war’s legitimacy in the eyes of the political community, and  maintaining 
proper subordination of the military to civilian leadership. 
    This study suggests five principles as those that can help guide senior political and 
military leaders in the execution of their war-waging responsibilities.  They are the 
principles of continuous dialogue, final decision authority, managerial competency, war 
legitimacy, and resignation.  These principles do not provide senior political and military 
leaders “answers” to the war-waging problems that they face.  Nor can they act as “moral 
litmus paper” to identify which decision or action is just.  As is the case with jus in 
bello’s tactical, war-fighting principles, these strategic, war-waging principles merely 
describe the framework within which those responsible must decide and act and the 
framework which judgments and assignment of moral blame or praise can be made.  
Identifying these principles and the associated set of responsibilities is a significant 
addition to just war theory. 
    Thus this study adds to the understanding of war’s moral dimension.  Walzer set out, in 




responsible can explain and justify what they do on behalf of all of us, and a way the rest 
of us can analyze and judge what those responsible have done.520
    The work is not done, however.  Clarifying who is responsible for what as well as what 
responsibilities are shared, and how, together, those responsibilities should be executed is 
a start point, not an end point.  At least in the United States, many senior political and 
military leaders—and their staffs and subordinates—come to their positions mal-
developed and ill-educated with respect to war-waging responsibilities.  Both sets of 
leaders, in general, arrive at their war-waging positions believing, falsely, in one version 
or the other of Huntington’s role differentiated model or Walzer’s “line” between the war 
itself and its conduct.  Such false beliefs make waging war even harder than it already is.  
Assuming an important war-waging position of responsibility with the wrong intellectual 
framework guarantees more difficulty than is necessary.  It is as if one expects to do well 
playing soccer by outfitting oneself with hockey skates, stick, helmet, and pads.  Some 
new forms of preparation, development, and education are required to un-learn what 
current conventional wisdom has taught about war’s conduct at the strategic, war-waging 
level. 
 This study continues 
that work. 
    The need for a different approach to the preparation, development, and education 
emerges from a second source.  Happily, war is an episodic event.  The requirement to 
wage war is understood as a possibility by those who become senior political leaders.   
Unless a senior political leader comes to his or her position during a war, however, few if 
any who seek or are sought out to fill positions with war-waging responsibility see war as 
                                                 




a likelihood.  Even those political leaders who assume their responsibilities in a war will 
rarely have “done it before.”  More to the point, few senior military leaders have waged 
war either.  Senior military leaders certainly do view waging war as what they must be 
prepared to do, but a close look at the ways these leaders develop in their career reveals 
that they are very well prepared to fight a war but not as completely prepared to wage 
one. 
    Among political leaders, the result is deference.  Like Presidents Lincoln and Bush, a 
common and understandable reaction to war is to make some high level decisions but to 
“let the professional handle execution.”  That is, follow what Cohen called “the normal 
theory,” and defer to military leadership.  Perhaps this kind of approach might work with 
a quick war like the first Gulf War or the Panama operations to remove Noriega, but even 
in these kinds of cases, this study has shown more co-responsibility than deference in 
both the lead up to decisions as well as in execution.  On the military side, the result is 
treating war as merely an aggregate of tactics.  That is, treating waging war as a technical 
problem that changes in degree—fighting on a larger scale and wider scope—rather than 
a problem that changes in kind—the problem of waging war as an adaptive problem that 
is related to, but different from, fighting.  Senior political leaders can’t just defer, and 
senior military leaders can’t just aggregate.  Each set of leaders needs the skills and 
perspectives of the other; the political and military skills necessary to wage war are 
different from peacetime governing and from war-fighting.  Again, some new forms of 
preparation, development, and education are required to un-learn was conventional 




    Justice in the conduct of war finds morally blameworthy those soldiers and leaders 
who fail in executing their tactical, war-fighting responsibilities.  Certainly, such blame is 
carefully assigned, for all acknowledge the difficulty and complexity of making decisions 
and taking action in the actual conditions of combat—danger, fear, duress, and 
ambiguity.  Moral blame remains necessary, however, if soldiers and leaders who fight 
are to remain moral agents and if their actions are to be distinguishable from mere 
butchery.  Similarly, justice in the conduct of war must find morally blameworthy those 
senior political and military leaders who fail in executing their strategic, war-waging 
responsibilities.  Again, such blame must be carefully assigned.  Waging war is perhaps 
the most complex of human activities.  War is waged with incomplete information, under 
pressure, and amid competing priorities.  Furthermore, mistaken judgments are common 
in war, at the tactical and strategic levels. Yet, moral blame is necessary if lives are 
wasted or used unnecessarily, or if the innocent or political community are placed at 
unreasonable risk.  
    This study was written as the United States has withdrawn from a war in Iraq but is 
contemplating limited reengagement, completed an intervention in Libya, and is 
preparing to withdraw from a war in Afghanistan.  War is far from over.  The war against 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates continues as does an on-going argument over whether the U.S. 
and allies should intervene in Syria.  This study was written also during a crisis 
concerning Russia’s intervention into and annexation of Crimea as well as at least 
perceived threats to Eastern Ukraine and the Baltic countries.  Further, it was written as 
North Korea continued its bellicose attitude threatening new forms of nuclear testing; 




Middle East, and Central Asia; and the concept of “cyber war” is being discussed.  No 
one knows how any of these developments will unfold, nor can anyone anticipate other 
areas in which war’s head may emerge.  America may be tired of war, but war does not 
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